US Army War College

USAWC Press
Monographs
8-1-1997

Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat
William W. Mendel COL (RET)
Murl D. Munger COL (RET)

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs

Recommended Citation
Mendel, William W. COL (RET) and Munger, Murl D. COL (RET), "Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat"
(1997). Monographs. 181.
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/181

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Monographs by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

DEDICATION
This book is dedicated to those brave and devoted law enforcement offi cers who daily put their lives on the line to combat the drug menace.

STRATEGIC PLANNING
AND THE DRUG THREAT
William W. Mendel
and
Murl D. Munger

A Joint Study Initiative by
The National Interagency Counterdrug Institute
The Strategic Studies Institute
U.S. Army War College
and
The Foreign Military Studies Office
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

August 1997

*******
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect
the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or
the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimit ed.

*******
Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director,
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 170135244. Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications and Production Office by
calling commercial (717) 245-4133, DSN 242-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at
rummelr@carlisle-emh2.army.mil

*******
All 1994 and later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the Stra tegic Studies Institute Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI’s Homepage address is:
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/

ii

PREFACE
The primary purpose of this publication is to show how the principles and techniques of
strategic and operational planning can be applied to the supply reduction side of our national
effort to curb the trafficking of illicit drugs. An earlier version was published in 1991 which
introduced campaign planning methodology as a means to help bridge the gap existing
between the policy and strategy documents of higher echelons and the tactical plans
developed at the field level. These campaign planning principles, formats, and examples of
operational level techniques have been retained and updated for use as models for current
interagency actions. This expanded edition provides a more detailed overview of the drug
problem in the opening chapter and adds a new chapter devoted to strategy–what are the key
ingredients and how is an effective strategy formulated?
The content, which supports the goals set forth in the National Drug Control Strategy, is
intended to provoke thought within the interagency arena regarding better ways to
synchronize and sustain cooperative multiagency assaults on drug trafficking networks.
Never before has this been more important. The United States is at a critical juncture in its
campaign to eliminate the rampant drug problem. Past gains are in danger of being lost.
Recent trends suggest a resurgence in illicit drug use and that younger and younger
Americans are falling prey to the drug pusher.
There is no single issue now more damaging to our social institutions. (See Figure 1.) It
brings violence to our streets, robs our economy, threatens our criminal justice system, and
imperils the youth of America. Although victory * may be years away and our resolve tested,
we must continue to attack the drug abuse problem and the crime and human misery it
creates. While recognizing that eliminating the demand for drugs is the best and perhaps only
lasting solution to the larger problem, we also recognize that such can never be achieved
without complementary supply reduction actions that curtail the international drug
producers, the traffickers and the local pusher from selling their seductive wares.
When facing an enemy that is capable of outspending us several times over in the tactical
arena, the planning and programming procedures we employ are vital to success. The
efficient use of available assets is paramount. A timely and coherent strategy is required. Yet
even the most brilliant strategies falter when those involved in planning do not
translate strategy into a coordinated sequence of properly supported tactical
actions. This is true for military campaigns and the same is likely true for law enforcement
efforts when attempted on a grand scale. The drug war battlefield is international as well as
domestic, and border defense is a major component of the battle plan. Such a widely spread
arena requires integrated planning and programming efforts at the strategic, operational
and tactical levels if we are to maximize the return on our expenditures and substantially
reduce the flow of illicit drugs into the United States.

*

Victory is defined as “Reducing the level of drug abuse, drug crime, and drug related
violence to a level tolerable to U.S. society.”
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Figure 1. Ways Americans are Affected by Drug Abuse.
To further the effectiveness of counterdrug actions, we suggest that strategic planning
and campaign planning techniques can be useful means to establish unity of effort among
drug law enforcement agencies (DLEAs) at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of
activity. Campaign planning methodology is especially important when resources are limited
and must be applied in a sequential manner in order to achieve strategic objectives. The
campaign planning approach, therefore, affords a framework that would encourage drug law
enforcement agencies to program and budget resources for operations several years ahead.
Such campaign planning techniques can also help the Department of Defense (DOD) provide
more extensive and timely support to the DLEAs. This is because the military can
synchronize its training and budget programs with the planned actions of civilian law
enforcement authority.
It would be naive to believe that integrated interagency planning and programming for
counterdrug activities will be easily accomplished. Waging coalition warfare or conducting
combined operations is never easy. Real obstacles exist, both within the system and at the
human level. But it was allied efforts that won World War II and the Persian Gulf War
(DESERT STORM). Perhaps operational planning techniques can be of benefit only within
individual agencies. Nevertheless, combating international drug trafficking on the current
scale is a complex endeavor and the stakes are high enough to make us give interagency
operations a determined try.
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The national leadership has set forth a National Counterdrug Strategy which provides
guidance for both supply reduction and demand reduction activities. A variety of offices,
committees, and working groups have been established within the bureaucracy to
disseminate policy guidance to subordinate organizations. Congress has supported the
national strategy with appropriate legislation and has formed oversight committees to assist
in implementation. Supplemental strategic guidance has been issued by the Departments of
State, Justice, Treasury, Transportation and Defense for prosecuting such efforts as the
International Heroin Strategy and the International Cocaine Strategy. Subordinate federal
organizations and headquarters such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Customs Service (USCS), the U.S. Southern
Command, the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs) and others are developing
their own strategies and operational plans in support of the national strategy. Meanwhile, at
the tactical level, thousands of field operatives work diligently in dangerous conditions to
stem the drug flow. To assist in this effort, material in the following chapters will cover the
fundamentals of strategy formulation and operational planning with the intent of identifying
techniques that can be used by strategists and planners at all levels.
A secondary objective of this publication is to acquaint the reader with the fundamental
concerns resulting from the U.S. drug problem and with the organizational structure of the
two major U.S. counterdrug systems involved in supply reduction. Chapter 1 provides basic
information necessary to understand the magnitude of the problem and what is at stake in
the War on Drugs. In Chapters 2 and 3, the reader learns the complexities of the domestic and
international systems. While the system which controls counterdrug activities within the
continental United States (CONUS) differs substantially from that outside the continental
limits (OCONUS), they are closely interrelated. Likewise the several organizations within
each system must work closely together. Without this knowledge of the “cast of characters”
and the roles they play, planning at the operational level for tactical actions and military
support cannot be effectively accomplished.
Chapters 1, 2, and 3 are therefore intended for the reader who seeks an understanding of
the drug problem and the U.S. counternarcotics infrastructure that has evolved to combat the
supply of illicit drugs. Readers who already understand both the problem and U.S.
counternarcotics organizations, but are interested in strategic and operational planning
techniques and how they can be applied in the drug war, can move directly to Chapters 4
through 8. Chapter 4 concerns the principles of strategy formulation and how they can be
applied for multiagency efforts. It includes a sample HIDTA strategy format. The next two
chapters discuss the translation of policy documents/grand strategy of the upper echelons
into planning documents at the operational level. This operational planning guidance is the
vital link too often missing when field units begin to develop their tactical plans for
counterdrug efforts. A suggested model format is provided along with advice on how to use the
model in developing a campaign plan.
Chapter 7 covers some of the real world problems involved when attempting cohesive
planning in the interagency arena. What is reasonable to expect? What is involved in
coalition efforts? Can a Unified Action Plan be achieved?
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Ending with Chapter 8, this edition presents the authors’ conclusions regarding what
experience has shown in terms of preparation to conduct large-scale and sustained
counterdrug operations. What have we learned? What do we do well? What appears to be
inefficient or counterproductive? Finally, what can we do better that will enhance our
chances of success in combating the trafficking of illicit drugs.
The methodology used in preparing this book consisted of in-depth interviews with
responsible individuals who work or have recently worked in U.S. counterdrug efforts. We
thank them for their kindnesses in meeting with us and for the dedication they display and
the many hours they devote in combatting the drug problem. They included officials of the
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), the Departments of State, Justice,
Treasury, and Defense, and members of several specific federal and state agencies involved in
drug law enforcement. Interviewees ranged from those in Washington, DC, concerned with
high-level policy development to state government and regional-level law enforcement
officials, to local judges, prosecutors, and field agents involved in detecting, investigating, and
arresting individuals for trafficking in drugs. Military personnel interviewed ranged from
officers at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) level to National Guardsmen involved
in military support operations. Information from interviews supplemented data available
from ONDCP, congressional reports, Departments of State, Defense and Health & Human
Services documents, the U.S. intelligence community and various drug law enforcement
organizations. Scholarly journals and reputable media publications were also used. While
information from these various sources is appropriately attributed, the assessments and
conclusions are the authors’ alone.
We hope the reader will not only gain an insight into the existing supply reduction
organizational systems but also an appreciation of strategy development and the need for an
efficient planning mechanism to integrate and sustain U.S. drug law enforcement activities.
To these ends, this study was written.

William W. Mendel
Foreign Military Studies Office

Murl D. Munger
Strategic Studies Institute
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CHAPTER 1
UNDERSTANDING THE DRUG PROBLEM
OVERVIEW
The United States is facing a threat as dangerous to the national well-being and moral
fiber of its society as anything encountered in the past 200 years. From without and within,
our country is under attack from those who operate the illicit drug industry. In their pursuit
of profit and power, the drug traffickers have become as threatening to our social and political
institutions as any foe we may face in the next decade. They reap fortunes while sowing the
seeds of societal destruction.
During 1995, some 20 million Americans, about 1 in 9 of our citizens, used some form of
illicit drug and 12.8 million of those can be termed regular drug users. 1 Between 1992 and
1995, the rate of increasing drug use by teen-agers more than doubled. 2 The demand for
drugs has created a climate of fear in many neighborhoods as drug-related violence and street
crime are prevalent throughout the nation. Citizens are demanding greater protection–yet
combating drug-related crime is already overtaxing both our criminal justice system and our
penal system. Also in danger of being overburdened is our health care system. Those who use
and abuse drugs by sharing contaminated needles spread the AIDS virus and other diseases.
Those who seek medical and psychological rehabilitation to free themselves from drug
addiction are draining assets from those needing treatment of disorders unrelated to drugs.
We cannot deny that the situation is serious.
All responsible Americans have the obligation to help create and maintain a drug-free
society for the health and well-being of the people of the United States. Achieving this will
require a concerted national effort incurring considerable expense of time and resources. To
sustain support for any long-term counterdrug campaign, it is essential that the nature and
magnitude of the threat be understood by the American public. This chapter sets forth basic
information that portrays the drug situation of the late 1990s. Included are the principal
drugs of choice; where they come from and how they get here; some effects they are having on
American society and the basic approach taken to combat the drug problem.

THE DRUGS OF CHOICE
What Are They? The three principal drugs of abuse within the United States are
marijuana, cocaine, and heroin. Other dangerous drugs include methamphetamine, lysergic
acid diethyamide (LSD), phencyclidine (PCP), Rohypnol (a brand name for flunitrazepam),
and illegally obtained prescription drugs. All can markedly influence human behavior and
are either illegal or rigidly controlled because of the potential damage they can do to the user,
and the dangers improper use can pose for society. These drugs are being consumed by a
1

significant percentage of the populace and the perceived dangers that caused them to be
declared illegal have become manifest problems for our society.
Marijuana is the most frequently used illicit drug in America. Commonly believed to give
users a relaxed contentment or “mellow” feeling, it can also induce anxiety and hyperactivity.
Within the marijuana plant, it is the chemical compound THC (delta-9tetrahydrocannabinol) that impairs the user’s judgment and psychomotor performance,
lowers inhibitions, and can lead to short-term memory loss and decreased learning ability.
While the effects on the individual of long-term marijuana use have not been firmly accessed,
many medical and law enforcement experts feel that its use is a menace to public safety and a
“gateway” to other stronger and more dangerous drugs. Some 19.2 million Americans, (about
9 percent of the population over age 12) are believed to have used marijuana in 1995 and
about 12 million U.S. citizens regularly use it. 3 According to the 1995 National Narcotics
Intelligence Consumers Committee (NICC) Report, today’s marijuana is, on the average,
much more potent (3.3 percent to 6.6 percent THC) than that commonly used in the 1970s
(less than 2 percent THC). For the period 1992-95, as potency increased so did emergency
room admissions and many users combined marijuana with other drugs such as cocaine, PCP,
and alcohol (see Figure 2).

Emergency Room Episodes and
Drug Mentions

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

Total drug episodes (person cases)

371,208

393,968

433,493

460,910

508,895

531,800

Total cocaine mentions

80,355

101,189

119,843

123,423

142,410

142,494

Total heroin mentions

33,884

35,898

48,003

63,232

64,221

76,000

Total marijuana/hashish mentions

15,706

16,251

23,997

28,873

40,101

47,100

Source: Drug Abuse Warning Network, National Institute on Drug Abuse (1988-91) and Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (1992-1995).

Figure 2. Emergency Room Episodes and Drug Mentions.
Cocaine remained the drug most threatening to U.S. society as of late 1996, and is readily
available throughout the United States. In large cities multikilogram quantities can be
acquired while multiounce buys can be made in most smaller cities. An estimated 4.3 million
U.S. citizens used cocaine (either in powder form or the crystalline “crack” variety) in 1995. Of
these, at least 1.8 million could be classed as heavy users. 4 The dangers of cocaine use are not
well understood by most Americans, particularly teen-agers and young adults. Believed by
many to be a safe “recreational” drug which can bring a “high,” a strong feeling of euphoria
and well-being, its use can also damage both mind and body. Addiction is common. Prolonged
use can bring about decided psychological changes. Depression, feelings of paranoia, anxiety
and inability to concentrate or remember often result. The heavy user, particularly those
smoking the “crack” variety, can develop a severe psychosis requiring long-term psychiatric
care. Physical effects include neurological damage, arterial brain damage, irregular heart
2

beats, danger of heart attack or stroke and the possibility of instant death from unintended
overdose. (According to the NHSDA, there were 142,000 emergency room visits related to
cocaine during 1995.) It also costs considerable money to use cocaine. A “coke-head” could
spend over $200 per week on his habit while those hooked on the “crack” variety of cocaine
may easily spend over $500 per week. Few young people realize that “crack” use can become
quickly addictive and an overdose can easily be fatal. During 1995, the average purity of a
kilogram of cocaine arriving in the United States was 80 to 90 percent and there was no
shortage of supply. 5
Heroin use is on the increase. After years of a rather constant estimate of one half million
U.S. heroin addicts, the number is now between 600,000 and one million. 6 Heroin production
worldwide (heroin is a derivative of opium) showed an upward trend from 1990-1995 (except
for 1994 due to poor growing conditions in SE Asia) and the overall import purity of SE Asian
and Latin American heroin in the United States averages about 76 percent (See Figure 3). In
late 1996, heroin displaced cocaine and became the drug of choice in a number of communities
in the metropolitan Northeast and Pacific Northwest. The reasons for this increase are
unclear but probably include the greater availability and increased marketing of a high
quality, less expensive product. Competition between the heroin traffickers is now intense
and violence is commonplace. In September 1996, in the Boston area, heroin from SE Asia,

Figure 3. Price and Purity Data, 1995.
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South America and SW Asia could be purchased at bargain prices and with a purity that
exceeds 90 percent. 7 The higher purity nationwide is partially responsible for a more than
two-fold increase in heroin-related emergency room admissions between 1990 (33,884) 8 and
1995 (76,000).9
Heroin depresses the nervous system, and places the user in a tranquil state. For the
beginning user, anxiety, pain and the concerns of daily life are reduced or eliminated. For the
addict or prolonged user, life can become an endless search for normalcy as increasing
amounts of heroin are required to simply function in society. A vast majority of heroin users
inject the drug intravenously thereby subjecting them to disease, infection, allergic reaction
and overdose. As a consequence, addicts in their twenties face the same death rate as the
normal seventy year old. 10
Other dangerous drugs are continuing to create serious problems for our society. Of
these, methamphetamine (meth) currently presents the greatest threat. Cheaper and
longer lasting, this alternative to cocaine threatens to gain acceptance by drug users
nationwide. Clandestinely produced in Mexico and the United States, distribution is
controlled in most part by Mexican criminal groups and to a lesser degree by outlaw
motorcycle gangs. Methamphetamine (known in street slang as meth, crank, speed, or ice)
can be smoked, injected, snorted, or taken orally. A powerful stimulant, it produces euphoria,
greater alertness and a sense of increased energy. Physical effects include a rise in body
temperature, blood pressure and heart rate together with a dilation of the pupils. Meth, like
cocaine, stimulates the central nervous system but, unlike cocaine which is rapidly
metabolized, may take two days or more to be eliminated from the body. Abusers often
experience rapid mood changes and tend to engage in violent behavior. Withdrawal from high
doses of meth can lead to severe depression. Major use was previously confined to the
southwestern and western states, but by early 1997 meth is increasingly prevalent in the
prarie and midwestern states. Meth has become the drug of choice in certain areas of
California, Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, and Utah, and has created significant law
enforcement and public health problems in Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Diego, and San
Francisco. A crystal form of methamphetamine, known as “ice,” is prevalent in Hawaii. It is of
high purity and is smoked in a manner similar to crack cocaine. The majority of ice is imported
from South Korea and Taiwan. A new ephedrine-based methamphetamine produces effects
even stronger than crack cocaine and brings “highs” that can last up to 15 days.
Methamphetamine, and its structural analogs methcathinone (cat) and cathinone, are
dangerous and unpredictable drugs that are threatening to create widespread problems. 11
Three hallucinogens, LSD (acid, trips, blotter, etc.); PCP (angel dust); and MDMA12
(ecstasy, XTC, doctor, etc.), cause problems throughout the country. Readily available and
relatively inexpensive, they are favorites of many young drug users. Often in evidence at rock
concerts, they induce visual hallucinations, euphoria, relaxation, and emotional warmth.
Bad reactions include disorientation, anxiety, panic, and paranoid delusions.
Abuse of other controlled drugs continue to be a threat. In addition to long-time misuse of
legal pharmaceutical drugs such as morphine, codeine, and the depressant benzodiazepines
(Valium and Xanax), the illegal depressant, Rohypnol has become a serious problem.
4

Legally manufactured in Mexico, Colombia and Switzerland, Rophynol is increasingly being
smuggled into the United States. This so-called date-rape drug is 7-10 times more potent than
Valium and creates confusion, disorientation and short-term memory loss. Overdose could be
lethal. Public warnings regarding the potential dangers of this drug are needed, particularly
to young men and women of high school and college age.

HOW DO THEY GET HERE?
SOURCE COUNTRIES AND TRAFFICKING ROUTES
To meet this huge demand, traffickers daily move large quantities of marijuana, cocaine,
heroin, and other dangerous drugs into and throughout the United States. Figure 4 shows
worldwide smuggling routes for the three principal drugs of choice. Although no one knows
the true quantities of import tonnage or consumption, Figure 5 reflects the data available on
worldwide production of the three major drugs which is considered sufficiently reliable to
indicate both magnitudes and trends.
A large majority of the illicit drugs which enter the United States originate in Latin
America and the Caribbean region. Virtually all of the world’s cocaine and most of the
marijuana comes from Latin America and the Caribbean. While Asia remains the principal
source of heroin, South America is now providing a significant percentage of high grade
product. South American heroin is distributed nationwide in large part by the same
trafficking network that distributes cocaine. In fact, some higher level cocaine traffickers are
requiring that the regional and local distributors buy heroin as a prerequisite to obtaining
cocaine.13 Mexico is also a heroin producer with a brown powder form and the more common
“black tar” variety. Mexican heroin production is consumed almost entirely in the United
States, primarily in the southwestern, western and central states. The United States is a
major producer of marijuana and an exporter of the higher grades of this product. However,
no accurate data is currently available on total U.S. marijuana production.
It is generally accepted that a majority of the illicit drugs entering the United States do so
across the US-Mexican border. The estimated percentage is often stated as 70 percent
however no definitive evidence supports that figure and many DLEA members believe it may
be too high. In any event, considerable quantities of cocaine and heroin enter the United
States through Gulf Coast ports; Caribbean routes to Florida, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
Islands; both east and west coast ports of entry and from Canada. While it is true that
Caribbean Sea routes are constricted at the Yucatan Channel and the Windward, Mona, and
Anegada Passages and that trafficker use of the sea and air routes through the Caribbean has
been substantially reduced by U.S. interdiction efforts, the magnitude of the drug problem in
Florida and the fact that Puerto Rico/USVI have been declared a High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Area (HIDTA) shows that considerable use of Caribbean routes continues and
may be increasing. There is evidence of significant air transport via the Caribbean and east of
Bermuda into eastern Canada. 14

5

Figure 5. Estimate of Approximate Quantities of Illicit
Drugs Available for Consumption in the United States, 1993-95.
Perhaps the most used smuggling routes are along the coasts and over Central America
and Mexico. Many drug-carrying aircraft enter northern Mexico, transfer drugs to various
Mexican smuggling organizations which in turn bring them across the southwest border to
regional distributors in the United States (see Figure 6). Sea routes along the western coast of
Mexico and the United States are used not only for container-concealed drug shipments, but
mother ships also have been reported making sea drops in the Pacific northwest.
The large areas involved, plus limited interdiction assets and remarkable trafficker
initiative and sophistication, place the odds for success largely with the drug smugglers. This
is even more true for the air routes despite laudable successes in the Florida/Bahamas region.
Problems in detecting illicit drugs crossing the 2000 mile Mexican border are enormous. This
is due in large part to the massive flow of vehicular and foot crossings each day and the
practical constraints involved in trying to patrol such distances and inspect such a volume
with limited assets of men and modern technology. U.S. Customs officials, the U.S. Border
Patrol and other federal, state and local supporting forces are making magnificent efforts but,
under current conditions, will continue to have great difficulty stemming the overland flow of
drugs through and around the official crossing stations.
Opiates (heroin, opium, morphine) from Southeast Asia which formerly entered the
United States primarily in the western states now also enter along the east coast and across
the US-Canadian border. Similar drugs from Southwest Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
Iran) follow a different route through the Middle East and southern Turkey or Africa, then
enter the northeastern United States directly or through Europe or Canada. (It must be
stated however, that modern commercial air travel now permits the adventurous smuggler to
take varied routes and enter the United States at almost any international airport.)

7

Figure 6. Illicit Drugs Major Southwest
Border Crossing Routes.

THE PROBLEMS THEY CAUSE
The consumption of illicit narcotics by both casual users and addicts has profound
implications for the citizenry as a whole. The direct and indirect economic drain, the social
and political effects of drug-related crimes, and the individual and family problems resulting
from drug abuse must be corrected if we are to preserve a way of life commensurate with
traditional American values. Consider the following:
Economic Loss. The losses resulting from the “drug problem” are staggering, particularly
during periods of slow economic growth. On the global scene, the drug trade may absorb $500
billion annually. That exceeds the value of all U.S. currency in circulation. 15 The $140 to $150
billion total direct loss each year to the U.S. economy is more than American consumers spend
each year for gasoline and motor oil and more than three times the amount spent on tobacco
products.16 Amazingly, this is also more than the combined profits earned in 1995 by the top
100 U.S. companies on the Fortune 500 list.17
There is an indirect loss as well. Business and industrial leaders are aware that drug
abuse is reducing their profits through lost efficiency and diminished productivity, accidents,
8

medical expense, absenteeism, and theft by employees to support their habits. This type of
employee behavior can result in enormous indirect losses to the economy each year. Past
studies have shown that:

• Drug users are three-and-a-half times as likely to be involved in a plant accident.
• Drug users are five times as likely to file a worker’s compensation claim.
• Drug users receive three times the average level of sick benefits.
• Drug users function at 67 percent of their work potential. 18
Overloaded Criminal Justice System/Courts and Prisons. Besides pronouncing
punishment for crimes committed, the court system has traditionally served to deter
potential violators. Because of the magnitude of drug trafficking and substance abuse in
recent years, this is changing. American courts have become grossly overloaded with drugrelated cases. In Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, a Commonwealth Court Judge stated,
I frequently ask defendants why they commit certain offenses. Often, the answer is that the defendant needed drug money. Easily more than half of the theft cases, especially retail theft
cases, robbery and burglary cases are committed for the purpose of obtaining drug money. . . . I
think that it is safe to say that of non-DUI (alcohol) offenses, fully a third to forty percent are
drug offenses or drug related offenses.19

A Superior Court Judge in Los Angeles County stated that of the 30 cases per day average
for his court, 75 percent are drug related. 20 The same is true in other metropolitan areas
where a survey of 12 cities showed 60 to 80 percent of all male arrestees tested positive for
drug use (see Figure 7).

Figure 7. Percentage of Male Arrestees Testing Positive
for Drugs in 12 Cities.
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The large numbers of drug cases have had several significant results. Prosecutors can no
longer spend much time on cases involving small amounts of drugs. In many of these, the
small-time offender pleads guilty to a lesser drug charge, receives a short sentence (30-90
days), or receives probation. In some areas, he may never even face trial. In 1994, there were
14,514 drug offense convictions in the State of Pennsylvania. Of those convicted, only 64
percent were sentenced to jail or prison. Over one third (36 percent) received probation. 21
According to the Center for Addiction and Substance Abuse, as many as 60 percent of federal
prisoners and 80 percent of state prisoners are incarcerated for drug or alcohol related crimes.
Probation, lesser sentences, or early release may also result because of overcrowded jails
and prisons. Virtually all state and federal prisons are confining more felons than the
designed capacity. Figure 8 illustrates seriousness of the situation. Some county and city jails
may be even worse. The Los Angeles County jail, with a 1989 design capacity of 5,500
prisoners, was housing almost 8,000 inmates in November of that year (78 percent of whom
were convicted on drug related charges). 22 By November 14, 1996, the population had more
than doubled to a total of 19,079 inmates while the design capacity continued to lag far
behind.23 The end result of dockets and insufficient prison cells is more drug criminals on the
street and less deterrent value of the court and penal systems.

Figure 8. Prisoner Population as a Percentage
of Designed Capacity.
Social Damage. The dispassionate statistics showing the extent of drug abuse by
American citizens translates directly into human misery and financial despair. Young women
addicted to crack cocaine are producing thousands of babies each year who are malnourished
and have birth defects. Many are born addicted to cocaine. Women and men have turned to
prostitution and other criminal pursuits as a means to support their drug habits. The advent
of AIDS in the addict population portends a more rapid spread of the disease. In each home
where drug addiction exists, there is high potential for health problems, financial need,
disruptive behavior, and criminal acts. Data collected by crises intervention workers reveals
that 70 percent of adults calling for help indicated that cocaine was more important to them
than family or friends. Of these adult callers 45 percent admitted stealing from either
10

employers, friends, or family to pay for drugs. Of the teenagers calling, 89 percent admitted to
family problems because of their drug use and 48 percent said they sold drugs in their school
to support their own habits. 24 Such behavior strikes at the heart of American family life. It
contributes to lower social values and strains the fabric of our society. We must find ways to
counter these problems.
National Security Implications. Trafficking and consumption of illicit narcotics generate
national security problems at home and abroad. Considering the enormous sums of money
involved and the sophistication of the larger trafficking operations, efforts by drug cartels to
either buy the support of government officials or intimidate them must be expected. Such
activities are undermining governments friendly to the United States and have subverted the
loyalties of some U.S. political, judicial, law enforcement, and military personnel. Insurgent
and revolutionary groups in Colombia and Peru often support illicit drug trafficking as a
source of revenue. Private armies operating in southeast Asia are supported by traffic in
drugs and are degrading the effectiveness of the governments of Myanmar (Burma),
Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. Additionally, the tremendous social impact of widespread
U.S. drug abuse and the drain on the American economy have indirect but real national
security implications.
Recognizing the threat, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive
(NSDD) 221 declaring the international drug trade a threat to national security. President
Bush affirmed this condition in 1989, the U.S. Congress concurred and financed the
Administration’s “War on Drugs.” President Clinton restated and expanded this theme in
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)14. He went further by giving Cabinet rank to the
Director of ONDCP and in 1996 made the Director a member of the National Security
Council.
In reality, the three Presidents only confirmed the obvious. Whenever a nation is menaced
by forces capable of creating the social, economic, and political disruptions described above,
the national security of that nation is in jeopardy. The United States can ill-afford to have the
governments of other Western Hemisphere nations weakened by corruption, compromised by
the drug trafficker or fall prey to insurgents sustained by arms and equipment financed by
narcodollars. Not even a nation as powerful and prosperous as the United States can afford to
lose nearly $200 billion annually to an underground economy, in absorbing the medical and
rehabilitation expenses and in lost productivity. It cannot afford a degradation of social and
moral values among its youth as that which now endangers its younger generations.
Certainly no country should tolerate the drug-related deaths of 20,000 of its younger citizens
each year. 25

COMBATING THE PROBLEM
Drug trafficking on a large scale will end only when it is no longer profitable to continue.
Either the numbers of individuals wanting drugs must fall to an insignificant level or the
costs of doing business must become unbearably high. A combination of these would be the
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ideal. Such business costs are measured in terms of whatever the trafficker holds dear; his
fortune, his freedom, or his life.
It is unlikely that any single approach can solve the drug problem. Neither a “demand
reduction solution” or a “supply reduction solution” can do the job alone. The magnitude of the
drug threat is directly proportional to the sum of the quantity of illicit drugs being consumed
and the quantity of illicit drugs available. As long as there is demand, there will be those
trying to supply that demand. Likewise, as long as there is a ready supply, there will be
individuals susceptible to the lure of the drug life and those who will seek to spread that
lifestyle. The greater the demand for drugs and the greater the available supply, the greater
the threat to our society.
The National Drug Control Strategy recognizes that a dual approach is required. The 1997
version sets forth five strategic goals, each with several specific objectives, that guide the
national drug control effort. The five goals are:
1. Educate and enable America’s youth to reject illegal drugs as well as alcohol and
tobacco.
2. Increase the safety of America’s citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime
and violence.
3. Reduce health and social costs of illegal drug use to the public.
4. Shield America’s air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.
5. Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.
Goals 1 through 3 are demand reduction oriented, while goals 4 and 5 target the supply
side. Goal 4 has subordinate objectives which are both demand and supply reduction oriented.
The Clinton administration has requested $16 billion for FY 1998 to support national drug
control programs. Of the total request, $5.5 billion (34 percent) is targeted for demand
reduction; $8.4 billion (52 percent) for domestic law enforcement; $1.6 billion (10 percent) for
interdiction efforts; and $488 million (3 percent) for international programs. 26

Demand Reduction.
Demand reduction includes resources for treatment, education, prevention and research.
A combination of programs, all of which show promise, are now underway to help reduce the
demand for drugs. The most fundamental ones concern education, community involvement,
and a cooperative effort by management and labor to keep drugs from the workplace. The
education programs begin in grammar schools and continue through the college level to
inform young Americans of the harmful effects of drug use. The education approach continues
through media campaigns to educate youngsters and adults alike. Demand reduction is also
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fostered by a number of community action efforts designed to stimulate participation by
neighborhood organizations such as civic groups, churches, or other citizens’ organizations.
Another attack on drug demand is being conducted at the workplace where screening of job
applicants and testing of workers are gaining acceptance as means to curtail drug use.
Particular efforts are being made in the transportation industry where public safety is
threatened by those working under the influence of drugs.
As demand reduction programs become more successful, the burden of those involved in
supply reduction will ease. If fully implemented, programs suggested in the National Drug
Control Strategy can be effective.

Supply Reduction.
The second approach to curtail drug abuse and drug trafficking is by reducing the supply.
Supply reduction enhances demand reduction by limiting drugs available, and by making
them more difficult and more expensive to obtain. However the main purpose of supply
reduction efforts is to put the traffickers out of business. Whether it be by attacking the
production source, interdiction efforts on the drug routes, or the apprehension, conviction,
and incarceration of drug criminals in the United States, the objective is the same–to stop the
drug flow. The principal actors in the supply reduction operations are the various drug law
enforcement agencies and the organizations that directly support them.

The Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEAs).
A knowledge of the various agencies’ roles and missions and how they normally operate is
necessary before any attempt can be made at interagency campaign planning. At present
some 50 federal agencies are involved in some aspect of drug law enforcement. The Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) is the principal investigative agency and works closely
with other organizations such as the U.S. Customs Service (USCS); the U.S. Coast Guard
(USCG); the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP); and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in
apprehending drug law offenders. Chapter 2 will discuss in detail the various federal DLEAs
and how they interrelate. In addition to the federal agencies, there are myriad state and local
law enforcement groups that are at least partially engaged in counterdrug operations.
Despite marginal success in increasing their ranks, the DLEAs are making more drug
crime arrests, and vigorously searching for ways to apprehend even more of those profiting
from the drug trade. In general, they demonstrate a high degree of professionalism and
remarkable dedication despite frustration with what sometimes seems to be a never-ending
stream of drug traffic and the inability of the courts and prisons to handle the load.
In comparison with the money available to their criminal adversaries, DLEAs are
significantly underfunded. At present the drug trafficking networks appear to have better
transportation and communication equipment, more sophisticated firearms, and more
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effective intelligence support than do the DLEAs. Even though additional manpower was
recently authorized, both the U.S. Border Patrol and the U.S. Customs Service need more
manpower for border monitoring and investigations. Some border states have as few as three
U.S. Customs Service Agents to handle all investigations. The Drug Enforcement
Administration also needs more officers for intelligence gathering and investigating drug
cases.
DLEAs are making significant progress in interagency cooperation within and among
local, state and federal forces. Problems remain however. Turf battles occasionally create
some problems as the varying DLEAs compete for federal dollars while operating in
overlapping jurisdictions. Federal, state, and local law enforcement groups often have
differing perspectives that inhibit cooperation and intelligence sharing. Joint organizations
like Operation Alliance (along the southwest border); Project North Star (the U.S./Canadian
border) and the various HIDTAs and Organized Crime/Drug Enforcement Task Forces
(OCDETFs) have done much to enhance interagency cooperation. However, another problem,
now minor but potentially dangerous, are the instances of corruption found in DLEAs. With
so much drug money available for bribery, plus the added threats of violence to those who do
not cooperate, it is not surprising that some law officers are corrupted. Similar cases have
occurred in the U.S. military. Fortunately, the instances in both the DLEAs and the military
are relatively few.

Military Support to the DLEAs.
The Department of Defense and the several armed services have supported national
counterdrug efforts for many years by providing DLEAs with equipment and training
services and with limited operational assistance such as providing transportation platforms
and general intelligence data. Army and Air National Guard units have been the major
providers of military support within the nation’s boundaries. Operating in a state status (U.S.
Code, Title 32) and less restricted by the Posse Comitatus Act, they have provided men,
equipment, and services in a wide range of counterdrug activities. Since September 1989,
federal military forces have increasingly been involved in a comprehensive military support
role of counternarcotics activities. Defense Department assets support the National Drug
Control Strategy of attacking drugs at the production source, while in transit, and within the
United States. The Secretary of Defense has directed those Unified and Specified
Commanders, who can contribute, to assist in detecting and countering illicit drug entry into
the United States to the limits that law and mission availability permit. Joint Task Force 6 in
El Paso, Texas provides and coordinates federal military support to DLEAs throughout the
United States. This and three other joint task forces, each with specific areas of responsibility,
are described in Chapter 2. Careful to follow DOD policy and the Posse Comitatus Law which
prohibits the Federal military from conducting law enforcement activities such as searches,
seizures, or arrests, the military establishment has become a more significant provider of
support to the criminal justice community.
The military is also active on the demand reduction side with educational and counseling
services, medical assistance, drug testing, and drug offender programs. Reducing drug use
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within the military has been a success story. The major drug-related disciplinary and
efficiency problems of the 1970s and early 1980s have nearly vanished. Though military life is
much different from civilian society, perhaps some lessons learned by the military have
application in the civilian work place.

THE BOTTOM LINE
Dangers And Damage: The Bad News.
Drug abuse and drug trafficking pose dangers of far greater magnitude to the United
States than is commonly perceived. This lack of public awareness is due in part to a decline in
media coverage and a curtailment of the educational campaign and public service
announcements that were proving so effective as the 1990s began. (600 antidrug stories were
shown on the the three major television networks in 1989 compared with only 65 stories in
1995.) 27 For example, while most Americans are aware of drug-related problems in their
communities, few realize that over 200,000 Americans have died from the effects of drug
abuse during the past decade (more than twice the number killed during Viet Nam and
Korean Wars combined). Knowing that 292,131 U.S. service personnel were killed in action in
all of World War II, 33,870 were killed in action in the Korean War, and 47,000 were killed in
action in the Vietnam War should lend perspective to the threatening dimension of America’s
drug problem–and should enjoin the Nation’s commitment to counter the drug scourge. 28
Many Americans know that drug abuse can lead to health problems but they are unaware
that intravenous drug use is a major source of HIV/AIDS infection and over one third of all
AIDS deaths are drug related. 29 Little publicized was the 124 percent increase in heroin
related emergency hospital admissions between 1990 and 1994. During the same period,
there was also a 28 percent rise in overall drug related emergency admissions. Also little
publicized were the thousands of babies born each year to the mothers who use illegal drugs. 30
The toll in human misery is incalculable and the public must understand their families are
not immune to such suffering.
In addition to the social and human costs, there is an economic cost as well. By varying
degrees, all Americans pay for the over $50 billion that annually flows directly to the drug
dealers and the additional $80-$100 billion or more that is spent on reducing the demand for
drugs; limiting the supply available; fighting drug-related crime; giving medical and
counseling assistance to drug users and their families; or being lost through absenteeism,
accidents, embezzlement and nonproductivity. All economic groups and social classes in the
United States are affected by the drug problem.
Perhaps the more insidious and dangerous cost is what the drug problem is doing to the
traditional American way of life. At a time when some segments of society appear to tolerate
or even glamorize a lifestyle which includes the use of illegal drugs, the drug trafficker is
targeting the youth of America as never before. As basic standards of right and wrong are
being challenged by the drug counter-culture and family values are under attack, drugs are
available in most high schools and are finding their way to into junior high schools and grade
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schools. As a result, there is a reversal underway of the gains made during the late 1980s and
early 1990s. The rate of drug use among teen-agers doubled between 1992 and 1996 as
greater numbers of young people are being drawn into the drug scene. 31 If the trends of the
mid-1990s continue unabated, the domestic problems caused by drug abuse may become
catastrophic.

Hope for the Future: The Good News.
With so much attention devoted to the problems at hand and the bad news of increasing
drug use among the nation’s young, we sometimes fail to realize all the progress that has been
made. Since the end of the 1970s, there have been many successes. Overall drug use is down.
The number of regular users (use in the past 30 days) has decreased to 12.2 million in
1995–less than half the number of the early 1980s. Cocaine use has fallen dramatically, a
reported 30 percent decrease in the past three years. Both the Medellin and Cali cartels have
been damaged and a number of their upper-level leaders are in jail or have been killed. A
significant portion of Latin American cocaine, perhaps up to 30 percent, is being seized or
destroyed before reaching the market. Interdiction efforts have significantly impeded the
traffic of drugs through the Caribbean and disrupted the flow into the southeastern United
States. Peru and Colombia, with U.S. assistance, have dealt punishing blows to the drug
production and distribution systems in their respective countries. Mexico appears to be
increasing its counterdrug efforts. The United Nations has facilitated multinational
agreements designed to combat international drug trafficking. International cooperation has
increased the successes of our campaign against money laundering. Drug criminals are losing
over $700 million annually to the assets forfeiture program. Drug use in the workplace
dropped from 19 percent in 1979 to 8.1 percent in 1993. These are but a few of the positive
results stemming from demand and supply reduction efforts of the past. 32 They provide
encouragement and assurance that future victories will be forthcoming.
Success in reducing the drug problem from major threat to mere nuisance will most
probably result from the long-term pursuit of a multifaceted strategy which addresses both
the national and international dimensions of the problem. The strategy must also achieve a
proper balance in the distribution of resources for demand reduction and supply reduction
efforts. The National Drug Control Strategy of 1997 and the call for a future 10 year strategy
supported by 5-year planning and programming budget cycles provide an encouraging start
in this direction.
We must remember however, that national policy and national strategy are nothing but
words unless translated into practical concepts for counterdrug action–backed by adequate
resources. Strategic planning and campaign planning are essential for this process.
Following chapters set forth the current U.S. counterdrug organizational system. They
propose methods for developing subordinate strategies and operational plans for agency level
and below.
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CHAPTER 2
THE DOMESTIC COUNTERDRUG EFFORT
THREE LEVELS OF EFFORT
Three levels of effort apply to drug law enforcement throughout the United States. The
strategic, operational and tactical levels are a range of overlapping activities and planning
responsibilities. Drug law enforcement leaders translate national policy and strategic
objectives into supporting strategies and operational direction; and their operational plans
and instructions specify the tactical actions of law officers who must confront drug criminals
face-to-face.
At the strategic level, the President, cabinet officers, and congressional leaders establish
broad national policy and desired conditions. At this level, leaders set forth policy goals and
specific strategic objectives (what needs to be done to support policy and protect our
interests), strategic concepts (how we are going to do it), and priorities for resources (what will
it take in terms of money, manpower, time and so on to get the job done). The Director of the
Office of National Drug Control Policy assists the President by consolidating this strategic
guidance in the annual National Drug Control Strategy document (signed by the President),
and by providing oversight of national implementing actions. Law enforcement officers with
broad regional or functional responsibilities can design supporting strategies and plans to
accomplish the goals and objectives of these high-level strategies.
At the operational level are organizations and planners that translate the broad vision and
strategic intent of the national and regional leadership into practical direction to achieve
strategic objectives. Ideally, officials at this level would have the authority of law and
regulation to compel the synchronized efforts of the many supporting tactical elements that
are often involved in large and long-term law enforcement actions. With Federal, state and
local law enforcement agencies often participating together in counterdrug operations, it is
sometimes unrealistic to expect that an agreed formal “chain of command” will be
established. Rather, the “lead agency concept” is often used, where the seemingly most
involved agency leads a joint action and contributing agencies agree to cooperate and support.
Synchronization of such efforts can be accomplished through operational level planning
which phases joint-interagency operations and the application of resources.
At the tactical level the actual law enforcement “battles and engagements” are fought
within the intent of the strategic guidance and operational plans. At this level, the critical
investigative work is done. Here are found Federal, state and local drug law enforcement
personnel combined in functional task forces and small teams.
This chapter describes key government organizations and drug law enforcement agencies
(DLEAs) that are involved in fighting the supply side of America’s drug war within the
21

continental United States. It identifies positions and organizations with strategic,
operational, and tactical responsibilities for organizing and leading the drug law enforcement
system. See Figure 9.

Figure 9. Various Local, State, Federal Drug Law
Enforcement Agencies and Task Forces.

THE STRATEGIC LEVEL
At the top level of the U.S. counterdrug effort are the departments and administrations
that provide the policy direction for the drug war. A few have formalized their top down
guidance in strategies to provide a clear sense of vision, objectives and concepts to
subordinates. Following are a sample of some key activities that play an important role as
National Drug Control Program agencies.

Office of National Drug Control Policy.
The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), established in 1988, is headed by a
Director appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. 1 The Director
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is assisted by three component heads also appointed by the President: the Deputy Director for
Demand Reduction, the Deputy Director for Supply Reduction, and the Associate Director for
State and Local Affairs. The Director appoints a Chief of Staff and a fourth component head,
the Technology Director. See Figure 10.

Figure 10. The Office of National Drug Control Policy.
The Director of ONDCP enjoys considerable visibility as a Cabinet-rank member of the
Executive Office of the President charged by law to provide drug program oversight and
interagency coordination. He is also a Presidentially designated advisor on the National
Security Council, but has limited statutory authority to compel vigorous support for the Drug
Strategy. The Director can, however, advise the President on the performance of Federal
agencies in supporting the Drug Strategy.
The President’s Drug Policy Council oversees the implementation of the National Drug
Control Strategy and supports the Director, ONDCP, as the President’s senior drug policy
official. By Executive Order, departments and agencies are directed to cooperate with the
Council and provide “. . . assistance, information, and advice. . . .” 2 It meets quarterly to
encourage coordination among departments and agencies. This is a significant challenge in
terms of scope and complexity.
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Drug policy is coordinated among an immense span of interagency players–some 50
Federal departments or agencies, agencies of 54 state governments and territories, as well as
3,200 counties, and 13,000 city governments. 3 In 1992 the ONDCP staff was reduced from
about 140 managers and analysts to 25, then it bounced back to 40 people. In 1996 under a
new “Drug Czar,” the office began rebuilding to a staff expected to number about 150
(including 30 military staff). As indicated by the Director, “ONDCP engages in activities that
both meet the requirements of its authorization and represent the values and commitments of
the President and its Director.” 4
This is reflected in the ONDCP drug control priorities: (1) Treatment, (2) Prevention, (3)
Domestic Law Enforcement, and (4) Interdiction and International. 5 The National Drug
Control Strategy identifies five generalized goals (with subordinate objectives) directed
toward educating youth to reject drugs, reducing drug crime and related crime, health and
welfare costs, protecting the frontiers, and breaking the sources of supply. Thus, ONDCP
devises policies, objectives, and priorities for the nation’s counterdrug activities and
coordinates these policies with Federal, State and local efforts. Each year ONDCP develops
the National Drug Control Strategy for the President’s submission to the Congress. By law,
the Strategy is to include comprehensive, research-based, long-range goals for reducing drug
abuse and short term measurable (and realistic) objectives that are achievable in a 2-year
period.6
ONDCP also develops and executes the supporting National Drug Control Budget which
has increased annually since 1988 ($4.7 to $13.7 billion over the past 9 years–$15 billion
proposed for fiscal year 1997). The drug budget provides funding for the criminal justice
system, drug treatment and prevention, international counterdrug activities, interdiction,
research, and intelligence. For example, in the 1996 budget request, just 2 percent of the total
budget supported international drug control efforts, while over half of the budget was spent
on domestic law enforcement. 7
Budget process guidance to ONDCP originates in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. It
instructs the Director of ONDCP to “develop for each fiscal year, with the advice of the
program managers of Departments and agencies with responsibilities under the National
Drug Control Program, a consolidated National Drug Control Program budget proposal to
implement the National Drug Control Strategy, and . . . [to] transmit such budget proposal to
the President and to the Congress.” Moreover, the law requires the Director to “certify in
writing as to the adequacy” of each drug control agency’s drug budget request. That is, does
the agency’s proposed budget support the Strategy goals, objectives, and priorities? This gives
ONDCP some influence over the level of funding and content of agency budget requests.
Furthermore, once the budgets are certified, agencies cannot reprogram monies from the
drug program without ONDCP approval. 8
The Certification Process is one way by which the Director of ONDCP can make an impact
on an agency’s drug control policy and budget proposal. The certification process can affect the
way an agency formulates its forthcoming fiscal year budget for proposal to Congress, but it
does not evaluate appropriations already approved by Congress. Because few agencies have
dedicated drug accounts into which drug program resources are apportioned, most agencies
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use methods of estimating the parts of their appropriations that support the Drug Strategy. 9
This contributes to an involved system for certification that is the prominent feature of the
ONDCP 18-month budget process.
In the early spring of each year, ONDCP sends program and budget planning guidance to
the drug control agencies. Throughout the spring and summer, the ONDCP staff reviews and
certifies the budget proposals that are under development by about 50 bureaus and 17
departments. In the fall, as the Office of Management and Budget formulates the President’s
budget proposal, any final appeals to the certification process can be made. In February of the
next year, the budget is submitted to Congress, and if funds are appropriated on time, then
the new fiscal year budget begins October 1.
The Director of ONDCP can also influence drug strategy implementation by his direction
and influence over drug control programs and his leadership in several interagency
committees. One major strategic concept of the National Drug Control Strategy is the High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program–the HIDTA Program.
The HIDTA Program originated as a key feature of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 and,
by law, an integral part of the ONDCP strategy. Congress intended to provide “increased
Federal assistance” to areas of the United States that were having a harmful impact on other
areas of the country, were centers of illegal drug production, manufacturing, importation, or
distribution, and indicated a determination to respond to the drug threat. 10 The Director of
ONDCP designates the HIDTA areas after consultation with the heads of the drug control
agencies and the respective governors.
The National HIDTA Coordination Committee (which includes state and local
representatives) promotes interagency coordination among Federal, state and local drug
enforcement actions. The ONDCP chairs the committee, and the committee makes policy and
budget recommendations to the Director, ONDCP.
In the 1990 National Drug Control Strategy, five areas were originally designated
HIDTAs because of the seriousness of their drug trafficking problems and their impact on the
rest of the nation. They were New York City, Los Angeles, Miami, Houston, and the
Southwest Border area (Southern California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas).
Subsequent iterations of the National Drug Control Strategy announced the ONDCP
Director’s increase in the number and type of HIDTAs. In 1994, he designated an HIDTA in
the Washington-Baltimore area to address the extensive drug distribution networks which
serve hardcore drug users. That year he also designated Puerto Rico-U.S. Virgin Islands as a
Gateway HIDTA because of the significant amount of drugs smuggled through this region.
Three Empowerment HIDTAs were added in 1995: Atlanta, Chicago, and PhiladelphiaCamden. Designated in 1996 were five additional HIDTAs: Rocky Mountains (Colorado,
Utah, and Wyoming); Gulf Coast (Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi); Lake County,
Indiana; Midwest (Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, and South Dakota); and the Pacific
Northwest.11
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In the early years of the program the authors heard complaints from state and local
agencies that the HIDTA program favored Federal agencies operating in the designated
areas. After 7 years of development, the mature HIDTA program is one of ONDCP’s most
effective initiatives. Today, the HIDTA Program Director and National HIDTA Committee
ensure that approximately half of the Program’s $140 million (FY 1997) is provided to the
state and local level–primarily to multiagency task forces that fight drug crime. This is
consistent with the HIDTA Program Director’s strategic intent to push “power down” to the
local officers and agents who face the drug scourge every day.
The HIDTA resources will support 150-200 collocated officer and agent task forces,
mutually supporting local and state drug trafficking and money laundering task forces, and
information analysis and sharing networks. Some HIDTAs will support drug treatment,
treatment accountability systems, and drug use prevention programs. These HIDTA
initiatives are reviewed each fiscal year to measure their impacts upon regional drug threats,
and assess their viability for continuation in the program.
The ONDCP Director influences his Drug Strategy outcomes through various interagency
committees. The Counternarcotics Interagency Working Group (CN-IWG) develops national
counterdrug policy guidance over a broad range of issues related to both the domestic and
international dimensions of the Strategy. It is chaired by a National Security Council
member, or an Assistant Secretary. Its participants can include government officials at the
Assistant Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secretary levels. Sub-groups may include various
staff officers at the Director level of government. Other committees are the Research, Data,
and Evaluation Advisory Committee, the Prevention, Treatment, and Medical Research
Subcommittee, and a second subcommittee for Science and Technology.
The Interdiction Committee (TIC; was formerly the BIC, Border Interdiction Committee),
chaired by the Commissioner of Customs, advises the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator
(currently the Commandant of the Coast Guard) about interdiction priorities and policy. It is
also chartered to advise the CN-IWG concerning programs to enhance interdiction efforts. A
major function of this committee is to coordinate efforts to integrate “. . . international, border ,
and domestic interdiction efforts in support of strategy goals . . . [but] . . . No operational
authority is vested in the TIC.” 12 Its members are the Commissioner of the U.S. Customs
Service (initial Chairman), the Department of Defense Drug coordinator, the Assistant
Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, the Commandant of the
U.S. Coast Guard, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the
Commissioner of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Director of
Operations Joint Chiefs of Staff. The TIC is chartered to meet quarterly (at about the same
time as the DoD-JCS J3 Counterdrug Quarterly Planning Conference) at the leadership level
of agency principals or their deputies.
As described, the Director, ONDCP has no formal directive authority over the myriad
National Drug Control Program agencies. Instead, he places the National Drug Control
Strategy into action by his Presidential backing, moral presence, the development of a
coherent Strategy, the budget certification process, and interagency coordination among the
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departments of the Federal Government. Following are several leading departments that
support the National Drug Control Strategy. 13

Department of Justice.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) is a principal player in the counterdrug effort, with a
variety of activities to oversee. These include supervision of the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS). An example of DOJ’s direct role in the drug war is the
Southwest Border Project which targets major Mexican drug transportation organizations
dealing in heroin, marijuana, methamphetamine, and cocaine on the Southwest Border. The
Southwest Border Project is a joint DOJ-DEA-FBI program supervised by the Special Agentin-Charge of the DEA Special Operations Division. 14
The project is implemented by a DEA/FBI Southwest Border Regional Operations Plan
which emphasizes working jointly with Mexican agencies to counter the trafficking of illicit
drugs, money laundering and the large criminal organizations. The main idea is to increase
the pace of counterdrug operations on both sides of the Southwest border. Bi-National Task
Forces in Tijuana, Juarez, Monterrey and other locations, along with the Mexican
counterdrug infrastructure (such as Ministry of Justice (PRG), Mexican Federal Judicial
Police (MFJP), the National Institute for the Combat of Drugs (INCD), and the National Drug
Control and Planning Center (CENDRO)), will assist U.S. DLEAs to cut trafficking routes
and put effective investigative and prosecutorial pressure on major drug trafficking
organizations. The plan requires the close coordination of multiple U.S. DLEAs and the
Mexican counterdrug authorities to achieve an end goal of incarcerating the major drug
traffickers in the region and dismantling their organizations.
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), a Justice Department activity, enforces
narcotics and controlled substance laws. It is the primary investigative agency for major
interstate and international drug violations. DEA is responsible, within the policy guidance
of the Department of State and the Chiefs of U.S. missions, for cooperation with counterpart
agencies abroad. DEA’s Special Agents-in-Charge (SACs) operate under the policy guidelines
of the “Administrator’s Vision,” the capstone of the Strategic Management System. Included
in this system are strategies for countering the distribution of cocaine, heroin and
methamphetamine. The typical components of these strategies include legislation, law
enforcement, training, chemical regulation, international cooperation, environmental
protection, education and addiction treatment.
In guiding DEA operations, a central theme of the “Administrator’s Vision” is a law
enforcement strategy “emphasizing common goals and cooperation with our counterparts
who have drug enforcement or drug intelligence responsibilities. . . .” 15 The operational focus
of DEA strategy is placed on major national and international cases; major regional cases;
violent drug organizations, gangs, local impact issues; and domestically produced drugs.
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A major mission of DEA is the management of a national narcotics intelligence system.
DEA chairs the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (reports on drug
production and trafficking, abuse trends), and manages the El Paso Intelligence Center
(strategic and tactical case-related drug intelligence).
DEA has 20 domestic Field Divisions (the newest is Puerto Rico) and 72 offices in 51
foreign countries, with new offices opened up in Beijing and Moscow. While DEA is well
known for its overseas activities in Colombia, Bolivia and Peru, about 90 percent of DEA
investigative work is actually done in the United States. 16
Located at DEA headquarters is an Interagency Coordinating Group (ICG), a coordinating
center for Federal efforts in money laundering investigations. Its mission is to coordinate
Treasury Department and DEA financial drug investigations, provide DLEAs with access to
files and information, and to provide training assistance to DLEAs and private industry
(especially banking). Members of the ICG are from DEA, FBI, Customs, IRS and the U.S.
Postal Service. Most investigative effort is currently directed toward international
investigations.17
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) shares concurrent jurisdiction (with DEA) over
investigations of drug violations. The FBI has experience with prosecuting organized crime,
and therefore, it focuses its efforts against major trafficking organizations and gangs in the
United States. In order to collect information for prosecution, the FBI also maintains a
network of agents overseas.
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) tasks include the prevention of unlawful
entry into the United States. Its subordinate organization, the Border Patrol (USBP), works
to deter illegal entry and the smuggling of contraband into the United States. INS is headed
by a commissioner, who reports to the Attorney General.
Operational functions of the INS include enforcement and examinations programs
conducted by 33 districts and 21 border patrol sectors throughout the United States. Four
regional offices provide administrative support to the field offices. INS also maintains three
district offices in Bangkok, Thailand; Mexico City, Mexico; and Rome, Italy. 18
The INS mission is to facilitate the entry of persons legally admissible to the United
States, provide assistance to people seeking resident status or naturalization, and grant them
benefits under the Immigration and Nationality Act. 19 INS also attempts to prevent unlawful
entry, employment and receipt of benefits to foreign people who are not entitled to them.
Within the limits of its resources, INS apprehends and removes aliens who enter or remain
illegally in the United States.
Since September 1993, the INS-Border Patrol has increased efforts on the Southwest
border to deter the illegal crossing of drug smugglers and other “illegals” by strengthening
officer presence. This concept has been seen in a number of operations with names like
“Operation Blockade,” “Operation Hold the Line,” Operation Gatekeeper," and “Operation
Safeguard.” The result has been very positive wherever intensified protection is focused. 20
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The National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, is a
multiagency organization of about 200 agents, analysts and technicians. The 1990 National
Drug Control Strategy established the requirement for an agency as a coordinating center for
law enforcement intelligence. NDIC is under the direction of the U.S. Attorney General, but
works with and in support of DLEAs at Federal, state and local levels.
The mission of NDIC is “to collect and consolidate multisource drug information to
produce organizational and strategic intelligence analyses for use by national policy makers,
diverse law enforcement entities, and the intelligence community.” It also promotes
information sharing and compatibility standards for drug intelligence collection systems. 21
The main effort at NDIC is devoted to strategic and organizational intelligence and
document exploitation. Analysts develop finished intelligence on the infrastructure of
significant trafficking groups, their methods of operation, financial activity, communications
systems and relationships with other criminal groups. Figure 11 provides the NDIC
organization.
Strategic intelligence is developed concerning illegal drugs, their production,
transportation and distribution. Typical program areas include Asian, Colombian Jamaican,
Mexican, Nigerian-West African, and Russian drug trafficking organizations. Special studies

Figure 11. National Drug Intelligence Center.
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include topics such as hallucinogens, and cocaine trafficking in Europe and Africa. The
document exploitation project electronically scans large amounts of documents so that they
can be organized, stored, retrieved and sorted in support of law enforcement investigations. 22
NDIC products include situation reports, national estimates, organizational estimates and
profiles, warning reports, and other current intelligence assessments.

Department of the Treasury.
The U.S. Customs Service is Treasury’s principal border enforcement agency. Customs
interdicts and seizes contraband at U.S. ports of entry and border areas. It is responsible for
ensuring that all goods entering the United States comply with U.S. laws and regulations;
collecting duties, taxes, and fees; intercepting contraband; and enforcing the laws and
regulations of other U.S. Government agencies.
As a move to more aggressively interdict illicit drugs crossing the Southwest border,
Customs is leading a Treasury Department priority effort called “Operation Hard Line.”
Since January 1995, Operation Hard Line had increased inspection resources on the border
according to the Treasury Department. Preliminary results have been a 24 percent increase
in illicit drug seizures (measured in pounds) and a 51 percent decrease in port
runnings–attempts to ram a vehicle or run on foot through a port. 23
“Operation Gateway” was initiated in March 1996 to intercept the flow of illicit drugs
through Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. It involves the joint efforts of Customs with DoD
and the Coast Guard. Gateway concepts include expanded maritime and air enforcement,
outbound cargo examination, small vessel searches and enhanced technology support. In the
first six months of Operation Gateway, Customs seized 68 pounds of heroin and 2,727 pounds
of cocaine in Puerto Rico (a 100 percent increase in heroin and 300 percent increase in cocaine
over the same period in 1995).
Under U.S. Customs The Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center (DIACC), located
on March AFB, Riverside, CA, was developed as a result of the National Interdiction
Command and Control Plan (based on a Presidential requirement to streamline interdiction
efforts). The DIACC evolved from the Customs Command, Control, Coordination, and
Intelligence (C3I) Center concept. The DAICC mission is to interdict air targets of interest
entering the United States. It is further discussed later in this chapter.
Also, the U.S. Customs National Aviation Center (CNAC) at Oklahoma City, OK, allocates
and schedules Customs’ long-range surveillance aircraft. It coordinates tracker and
interceptor aircraft across Customs operational boundaries, and it serves as a back-up to the
DIACC.
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) has become engaged in the
counterdrug effort because of the involvement of numerous drug trafficking organizations in
smuggling multiple kinds of contraband in addition to illicit drugs. For instance, some of the
Mexican trafficking organizations originated from historically established smuggling groups
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or families who now smuggle guns, cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamine. Illicit
weapons smuggling has become a problem because of the rise of numerous guerrilla and
criminal groups operating inside Mexico.
The Internal Revenue Service supports the drug interdiction effort through its mission of
administering and enforcing the tax laws. It is especially effective in tracking large sums of
money to counter money laundering attempts at home and abroad. In this regard, the
Department of the Treasury created the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)
in 1989 to develop intelligence on financial crimes. This is a multidiscipline activity with
participants from Internal Revenue Service and other government and law enforcement
agencies. Through analysis of its data, the FinCEN detects irregularities that indicate
criminal activity such as money laundering.

Department of Transportation.
The Department of Transportation provides U.S. Coast Guard and Federal Aviation
Agency (FAA) support to drug interdiction. The FAA assists investigative agencies by
providing information and special agent support concerning aircraft and pilots to help
counter drug smuggling by general and commercial aviation.
The U.S. Coast Guard plays a major role in drug traffic interdiction. It works with U.S.
Customs within the 12-mile coastal limit, and working with other U.S. Government agencies
and other governments, the Coast Guard is the primary agent to interdict the seaborne flow of
drugs into the United States. For instance, Commanders, Coast Guard Pacific and Atlantic
Areas respond to maritime border incursions from the Pacific and Gulf coasts, and when
feasible, coordinate operations with the Mexican Navy. The Coast Guard shares
responsibility for air interdiction with U.S. Customs. Since 1994, the Commandant of the
Coast Guard has also served as U.S. Interdiction Coordinator (USIC).
This additional duty came to the Commandant as a result of Presidential Decision
Directive 14, which called in part for streamlining counterdrug intelligence and command
and control centers. Three Joint Interagency Task Forces (Joint Interagency Task Force
South [JIATF-South] in Panama; JIATF-East, Key West, FL; JIATF-West, March AFB, CA;
and the Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center (DAICC), March AFB were identified
as the new centers for interdiction efforts in the April 1994 National Interdiction Command
and Control Plan. The plan tasked the USIC to “oversee the coordination of this effort.” 24 A
USIC Charter of May 1994 provided the Commandant with a “. . . framework for
implementing the various facets of oversight coordination.” 25
The Interdiction Coordinator is charged to ensure that assets committed to international
interdiction are adequate. He works in concert with the Counternarcotics Interagency
Working Group to enhance interdiction efforts first in the source countries, then in the transit
zone. The USIC oversight coordination authority extends throughout the Western
Hemisphere, but does not include the borders of the United States.
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The USIC ensures that assets are committed against targets cued by tactical intelligence
in situations where detection, arrests and seizures are most likely (critical hubs and choke
points). He reviews needs for source country and transit zone support and monitors
interdiction activities to see that detection and monitoring efforts support law enforcement
agencies. In addition, the USIC monitors intelligence support to international interdiction to
ensure that the national interdiction centers are provided access to tactical information
necessary to perform their mission. In this regard an Anti-Drug Network (ADNET) helps to
ensure that the JIATFs and the DIACC are interconnected and are provided access to the
tactical information and data bases.

Department of the Interior.
Under the Department of the Interior, the Bureaus of Land Management and Indian
Affairs and the National Park Service directly support the National Drug Control Strategy
through their efforts to maintain public access to Federal Lands and prevent the use of these
lands by the illicit drug trade. The Department of the Interior has provided the lead or
participated in interagency marijuana eradication efforts involving numerous state and local
DLEAs as well as the military.
Federal lands are attractive to drug criminals because of the freedom from surveillance
and anonymity they afford in growing marijuana, transporting drugs, and establishing
methamphetamine labs. All of this puts citizens using recreation lands in great danger when
they happen upon these activities.

Department of Defense.
The Secretary of Defense has identified five key mission areas for supporting DLEAs.
These include providing training and operational support to drug-source nations; supporting
the DEA’s efforts to dismantle the cocaine business overseas; detecting and monitoring the
illicit air and sea drug transportation network; supporting the stateside Federal, state and
local DLEAs; assisting with the demand reduction strategy in the local community and
within DoD. 26
Out of the DoD Counterdrug Budget, well over half is spent on projects to stop the flow of
illicit drugs to consumers: Caribbean detection and monitoring; counterdrug command and
control networks (ADNET); Southwest border support (see JTF-6 below); counterdrug
operations in the Bahamas, Caicos, and Turks Islands (OPBAT); radars; National Guard
marijuana eradication; military working dogs, and the like. See Figure 12.
One-fifth of the DoD drug budget goes to overseas (source nation–Bolivia, Colombia, Peru)
support activities such as detection and monitoring, reconnaissance, training, intelligence
and planning support to U.S. DLEAs. Nearly 90 percent of this money is spent on operations
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Figure 12. Department of Defense Drug Control
Funding Request, FY 98.
and maintenance (aircraft, radar, riverine operations). The rest is spent on procurement and
research.27
While efforts to assist host nations have seen a number of positive results in the way of
increased police and military operational effectiveness, increased professionalism and
concern for individual rights and the rule of law, there has not been a reduction of the flow of
illicit drugs into the United States. In fact, the success of U.S. efforts in stopping the flow of
cocaine by small aircraft from Bolivia and Peru to Colombia has served to push drug traffic
onto the rivers and trails–and into Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela. 28 Similarly,
the effective detection and monitoring of drug traffickers through the Caribbean by DoD
assets has made Mexico the route most favored by Latin American drug thugs for moving
illicit drugs into the United States.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
(ASD SO/LIC) serves as the DoD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support
(DEP&S). The Secretary has stated that the DoD Coordinator, DEP&S is the single focal
point for DoD’s counterdrug efforts. In turn, the DoD Coordinator chairs quarterly meetings
with the Joint Staff, the four military Services, Comptroller, General Counsel and other
principal decisionmakers to ensure the success of the Department’s counterdrug programs. 29
The Coordinator is assisted by a Deputy Assistant Secretary and a DEP&S staff of about
25 people organized in three functional divisions: Plans and Support (P&S–Heroin, Transit
Zone, Mexico, Domestic, Source Country); Program and Budget (P&B); Demand Reduction
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and Systems (D&S). This office broadly oversees DoD’s responsibilities as a National Drug
Control Program agency. DEP&S provides policy guidance through the National Guard
Bureau to enjoin the participation of National Guard units. These units function under state
governors in accordance with Title 32 of the U.S. Code. The DEP&S staff promulgates policy
guidance and monitors DoD counterdrug missions and programs such as detection and
monitoring, building the counterdrug command and control system, and providing excess
equipment and direct support to the DLEAs.
Detection and monitoring (D&M) of Air and Maritime Transit of illegal drugs into the
United States was assigned to DoD as a lead agency responsibility under the Fiscal Year 1989
Defense Authorization Act. Especially through the Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs)
commanded by Atlantic, Pacific and Southern Commands, DoD has developed an effective
D&M radar network covering three million square miles of the Caribbean Basin and portions
of the Atlantic and Pacific. DoD also provides D&M support along the Southwest border and
Andean ridge (the Peru to Colombia drug route).
Integrating command, control, communications, and intelligence (C 3I) capabilities for the
drug law enforcement community was also mandated by the 1989 Defense Authorization Act.
After an initial effort through 1992 to integrate C3I assets at the strategic and operational
levels for (essentially) the Federal agencies, DoD is now turning its assistance effort to the
state and local DLEAs. The C3I mission accomplishments are impressive: over $150 million
of communications equipment has been passed to the DLEAs; an anti-drug network (ADNET)
connects DoD counterdrug elements with the DLEAs and a command management system
(CMS) connects U.S. Southern Command to ADNET and to the U.S. Embassy counterdrug
elements. Supporting this communications set up are intelligence centers and assigned
analysts to support ongoing operations.
Excess equipment for law enforcement agencies is provided by DoD through its
Counterdrug Support Office (CDSO). This is discussed later in the chapter (see CDSO).
Direct support to law enforcement agencies is provided by U.S. Active Duty and Reserve
Component forces that respond to DoD and U.S. combatant command taskings for
operational and nonoperational support. Operational support includes units and military
personnel in support of DLEAs and host countries. Nonoperational support is a broad
category which can include facilities, training opportunities, intelligence, equipment loans,
counternarcotics funding, and personnel support to non-DoD agencies. In this last category,
the services are providing 88 DoD detailees to assist the DLEAS, including 30 military staff
assigned to ONDCP.
In order to make the best use of operational and nonoperational supporting resources, the
DoD Coordinator (DEP&S) has established clearly defined policies, procedures and
priorities.30 Before honoring a DLEA request for support, there must be a valid counterdrug
nexus, and there must be military training value associated with the counterdrug support. In
the case of operational support, units must receive a mission related benefit, and for
individuals, support must be tied to military skills. The National Guard Bureau has approved
an exception to this policy for supporting U.S. Customs and Postal Service inspections.
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Priority for DoD counterdrug support goes to DLEA multijurisdictional, multiagency task
forces that are in a HIDTA, then to individual DLEAs in a HIDTA. Third priority is to
multijurisdictional, miltiagency task forces not in a HIDTA, then lastly to individual DLEAs
not in a HIDTA. This prioritization directly supports the intent of Congress as outlined in the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 and is consistent with the National Drug Control Strategy.
Approval authority for nonoperational support rests with the services and defense
agencies. The transfer of excess property has been redelegated from DEP&S to the Defense
Logistics Agency’s Counterdrug Support Office (CDSO). Operational support to DLEAs
within the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands rests with JTF-6 (see below).
Support involving large units of 400 personnel or more or extending more than 179 days must
be approved by the Secretary of Defense. 31
DoD-Mexico Cooperation was seen by the DoD Coordinator (DEP&S) as a necessary
precursor to supply reduction success. “Unless we engage Mexico and do much more,” he said,
“the DLEAs will not be fully successful.” 32 Thus through the military-to-military process and
in coordination with the Department of State, DoD has initiated cooperative efforts with the
Mexican military. In a bilateral working group, Secretary of Defense Perry met with Mexican
Secretary of Defense Cervantes in October 1995 and April 1996 to consider a range of
cooperative activities such as force modernization, disaster relief, and drug interdiction. A
high-level contact group (Director, ONDCP; Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; Mexican Foreign Minister, and Mexican Attorney
General) meets annually to discuss U.S.-Mexico border issues and counterdrug cooperation.
DoD is providing specialized training to Mexican units to conduct counterdrug missions
against drug traffickers. This will result in 12 special forces counterdrug teams for use by
military region commanders. Coastal and riverine training is provided to the Mexican Naval
Infantry. Upon congressional approval, 73 UH1 helicopters will be transferred to the Mexican
Defense Ministry. Also planned are a combined threat assessment and a combined strategy.

U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM).
U.S. Atlantic Command is the principal combatant command for providing military
support to domestic law enforcement agencies. USACOM is also active in providing support to
U.S. counterdrug initiatives with host nations, especially in the Caribbean and Mexico.
USACOM’s intelligence and operational support is provided with priority to U.S. and host
nation DLEAs operating with Mexico, along the U.S. Southwest Border, and in the Puerto
Rico and Virgin Islands areas. The command employs its military resources through Forces
Command (its Army Component) and several other subordinate military organizations.
Among these is Joint Interagency Task Force East (JIATF-East) located at Key West, Florida.
The JIATF-East mission is focused on the detection and monitoring of drug trafficking ships
and aircraft approaching the United States through the Caribbean and along the Atlantic and
Pacific coastlines. When U.S. Southern Command assumes full responsibility for the
Caribbean region, it is likely that JIATF-East will become a Southern Command unit. The
JIATF is discussed in greater detail below.
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Forces Command exercises oversight of domestic military support to the DLEAs. To
manage this function, FORSCOM has an 8-man Counterdrug Division at its headquarters in
Atlanta, GA.
FORSCOM oversees a 6-man Information Analysis Center located with the U.S. Embassy
in Mexico City, to facilitate counterdrug cooperating activities with Mexican authorities. It
also provides the oversight function for Joint Task Force Six located at El Paso, TX. The JTF-6
commander has a staff of 156 personnel to do the actual work of supervising operations and
providing resources to support the DLEAs in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
Islands. JTF-6 is discussed later in this chapter.
Through JIATF East and JTF-6, USACOM conducts operations based on intelligence
assessments that promise a high pay-off against drug targets. Typical targets could include
fast maritime surface vessels in the Western Caribbean, multi-ton maritime surface
shipments in the Eastern Pacific, known high volume transshipment points along the
Southwest Border, and intelligence-cued air and maritime traffic through the Eastern
Caribbean to Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
In summary, the line of communications for providing active duty and Reserve DoD
support to the DLEAs located in the United States starts with the President and Secretary of
Defense, via the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (assisted by the Joint Staff Counternarcotics
Division–CND–discussed in Chapter 3), to USACOM, to Army Forces Command, and to JTF6. Support to the DLEAs by the National Guard is managed differently.

National Guard Bureau and State Military Forces.
The National Guard was an early advocate of military support to counterdrug activities
and is today an eager and valuable participant. States such as Arizona, California, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, New Mexico, Tennessee, and Texas have long been involved in
supporting drug law enforcement and have developed considerable expertise in combating
the drug trafficker.
In October of 1995 the National Guard Bureau (NGB) consolidated Army and Air Guard
counterdrug programs and formed-up a Counterdrug Directorate to manage the revitalized
program. The Director of the NGB Counterdrug Directorate is a senior colonel who manages
four interlocking staff teams. These include the Finance, State Plans, Air Operations, and
Special Projects Teams. They manage a huge program. In any given day, the National Guard
will have about 1300 operational missions (large and small) and about 3970 personnel on
duty.33
The Guard provides support for cargo inspection in support of U.S. Customs at ports of
entry, aerial and surface reconnaissance, ground and air operations in support of the Border
Patrol, marijuana location and eradication efforts in support of state and local law
enforcement agencies, intelligence analysis and linguist assistance. Virtually all states now
have significant counterdrug programs that include both demand and supply reduction
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activities. The Guard provides nearly one million man-days of support to counterdrug
missions and conducts about six thousand operations per year.
The Guard’s domestic interdiction program is the largest in DoD. In a Title 32 status while
working for the state governors, the Guard is especially useful to support law enforcement.
Nevertheless, in recent years, the National Guard budget has been reduced from $230 million
in 1993 to $158 million in 1996. This budget reduction has been accompanied by a reduction of
Guard-assisted drug interdiction results over the same period: cocaine down from 78 to 68
metric tons; heroin seizures down from 1508.2 to 741 kilos; marijuana plants down from 206
to 105 million; processed marijuana down from 404 to 373 metric tons.
The Guard also conducts demand reduction initiatives within its own ranks. The New
Mexico and the District of Columbia National Guard have been particularly involved in
demand reduction programs, and throughout the Nation, the Guard has been the leader in
bringing anti-drug education into the local schools and communities. The Guard’s emphasis
on education as one means to counter the drug scourge is seen through its development of
counterdrug training centers for military, law enforcement and civilian leaders–each with
the mission of enhancing interagency cooperation and military support to civil authorities.
The National Guard Bureau Training Centers include the Regional Counterdrug
Training Academy at Meridian, MS, develops counterdrug teamwork at the tactical (strike
force) level; the Multi-Jurisdictional Counterdrug Task Force Training Center at St.
Petersburg, FL, provides operational level multiagency training; the National Interagency
Counterdrug Institute (NICI) at San Luis Obispo, CA, as the flagship institution, provides
college-level (and accredited) training to mid-level and senior managers in the law
enforcement, civil and military sectors to increase their skills to lead and follow in the
interagency environment.
The National Interagency Counterdrug Institute is especially important to the
counterdrug effort for its unique courses that help leaders implement the demand reduction
and supply reduction objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy through interagency
teamwork. The Drug Prevention and Demand Reduction Course trains students to develop
effective drug prevention and demand reduction programs and integrate the skills and
resources found at the Federal, state and local levels. The course focuses on exercises, case
studies and the planning process. Subjects include health model pharmacology, legal issues,
public affairs, and community mobilization. The Counterdrug Managers’ Course trains
students on the process for planning and conducting effective interagency counterdrug
operations in both supply and demand reduction. Students are typically law enforcement,
military and community leaders and planners. Subjects include national strategy;
operational planning; military, Federal, state and community organizations and
perspectives; intelligence systems; legal issues; and public affairs. The course relies on case
studies and exercises. 34
Finally, The State Adjutants General (TAGs), working under the policy guidance of the
National Guard Bureau, provide essential National Guard troop support to DLEAs under
Title 32 of the U.S. Code. This support is funded by DoD through the National Guard Bureau
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(a strong and effective promoter of military support to drug law enforcement), but must be
approved by the State Governor. Each spring the State TAGs develop their proposed
counterdrug budgets for the next fiscal year. In June these budgets are put before a joint
board of officers from the DoD Office of Drug Enforcement Policy and Support and the
National Guard Bureau. In this way, the TAGs’ counterdrug budgets are ranked in a priority
listing that determines each state’s share of the roughly $100 million of Guard counterdrug
funding. State troops operating under Title 32 are not subject to the Posse Comitatus law
which prohibits Federal troops (Active and Reserve) from conducting law enforcement
activities. As a matter of policy, however, all National Guard troops avoid participation in
such law enforcement actions as seizing and arresting civilians and do not participate in
intelligence activities that are proscribed by law and Executive directives.

THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL
Other organizations critical for success in the drug war are at the middle level of
counterdrug law enforcement. They are positioned to take guidance from the strategic level
and to develop the operational direction needed to coordinate law enforcement activities at
the tactical level. The following are examples of organizations that work routinely at the
operational level.

Operation Alliance.
Since 1986, Operation Alliance has been the senior interagency coordinating center for
promoting the integration of multiagency law enforcement skills and assets and for
deconflicting law enforcement operations along the Southwest border. In March 1996, the
Interdiction Committee recommended Operation Alliance as the single point of contact for
coordinating and deconflicting law enforcement support requests for military active duty and
reserve (Title 10) support to DLEAs throughout the United States, Puerto Rico and the Virgin
Islands. This recommendation was then forwarded to ONDCP for approval as a part of its new
policy (under development) for the Southwest Border area. 35 See Figure 13.
Alliance creates and promotes interagency cooperation and coordination among DLEAs in
the fields of interdiction, intelligence, and investigations. It sets priorities for military
support to the DLEAs in the United States, and it promulgates plans for interagency
cooperative operations. Alliance establishes that there is a valid counterdrug nexus involving
proposed military support to law enforcement agencies, a significant DoD policy imperative.
In this regard, it works closely with JTF-6, collocated with Alliance at Biggs Army Air Field,
Fort Bliss, TX.
The Operation Alliance Joint Command Group (OAJCG) functions as a coordinating and
planning group. Membership includes 27 Federal, state and local DLEAs and military
organizations. 36 Originally the OACG was envisioned as a committee of field commanders
that would make operational decisions; today the group has several participants from the
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Figure 13. The Southwest Border Region,
Showing the Southwest Border HIDTA Counties.
Washington arena. Group meetings are chaired by the Senior Tactical Coordinator of
Operation Alliance who has influence in establishing its agenda. The Director of the
Southwest Border HIDTA participates as a member of the OAJCG.
The command group serves as a consensus-building and coordinating forum to ensure
intelligence sharing among participants, to examine appropriate investigative responses to
drug seizures, and to define objectives and performance measures for operations. In essence,
the OAJCG was established to plan and guide the coordinated efforts of Operation Alliance
and to promote effective liaison between participating agencies.
To run Alliance on a daily basis, three tactical coordinators are provided, one each by the
Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Border Patrol.
The senior tactical coordinator position is rotated among the three tactical coordinators every
2 years. The three tactical coordinators take guidance from their own agencies. In addition,
the senior tactical coordinator operates under the policy guidance of the ONDCP Interdiction
Committee (TIC, an interagency committee with Customs, DEA, and INS representation)
and the Operation Alliance Joint Command Group. See Figure 14.
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The authority of Operation Alliance as a National Drug Control Program Agency to
coordinate SW Border drug law enforcement activity can be traced through the ONDCP
Interdiction Committee and participating Alliance agencies (Customs, Border Patrol and
DEA) to The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (21 USC 1502). This requires the Director, ONDCP
to “coordinate and oversee the implementation . . . of the policies, objectives, and priorities
established [by the Director].” The National Drug Control agencies are those U.S.
Government departments and agencies that are tasked under the National Drug Control
Strategy, or designated by the President, or tasked jointly by the head of a department or
agency and the Director, ONDCP. 37

Figure 14. Operation Alliance Tactical Coordinator' s
Reporting Chains.
Title 21, therefore, obligates government Drug Control Program agencies to support
ONDCP’s strategy, yet it does not define specific command relationships for getting the job
done. By extension, Alliance functions under the Title 21 authority of the ONDCP
Interdiction Committee and the Federal, state and local interagency consensus established in
the Joint Command Group quarterly meetings. Further, by the procedure of identifying
participating DLEAs in operational and tactical actions, Alliance provides a focus for support
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which creates unity of effort. Still, Alliance has no formal command or policy authority over its
participating OAJCG agencies, or over agencies in other regions.
The Operation Alliance Coordination Center is managed by the senior tactical
coordinator with assistance from the senior management team (the other two deputy tactical
coordinators). A permanent Alliance staff of about 14 full time and 6 part time people assists
the regional law enforcement agencies. Functional staff management includes these areas:
requests for military assistance, strategic and operational planning and support; logistics
support; statistics; liaison. Operation Alliance responds to requests for operational support
from all DLEAs in the continental United States. See Figure 15.
The planning process of Operation Alliance illustrates the use of consensus-building to
encourage joint operations. The first Operation Alliance Southwest Border Drug Control
Strategy was published in July 1990. It was created by a writing team representing the
membership of the Joint Command Group, and approved by the OAJCG and an ONDCP
interagency committee. In the process for writing the Alliance 1992 Strategy II, joint
campaign planning was introduced as a way to implement strategy objectives. It was
envisioned that an overarching SW Border Campaign Plan would be written in two parts: a
concept for the campaign with priorities and objectives; and supporting plans for operations
or programs to carry out phased objectives. The primary contribution of these initial plans
was to establish an agreed set of common objectives for all DLEAs. 38

Figure 15. Operation Alliance Coordination Center.
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The current Alliance plan is a well-crafted plan of campaign for the Southwest border
region for interdiction and investigations that extends its objectives and concepts in three
phases through September 1999. The objective is to disrupt drug trafficking and dismantle
major drug trafficking organizations.
The Operation Alliance “Southwest Border Project/Action Plan” incorporates the Justice
Department’s Southwest Border Project (particularly the DEA/FBI SWB Regional
Operations Plan), the U.S. Border Patrol Southwest Border Project/Action Plan for ground
interdiction, U.S. Customs air interdiction, U.S. Coast Guard maritime interdiction, the JTF6 Southwest Border Support Plan, and the actions of other Federal, state and local agencies.
As much as possible, U.S. agencies will work with Mexican counterdrug agencies to attack
drug trafficking, money laundering, and the large criminal drug organizations.
The Operation Alliance Special Operations Notification System (SONS) is an ongoing
program to ensure coordination and deconfliction of law enforcement operations in the four
Southwest states. SONS provides information on ongoing and planned law enforcement
operations without compromising operational security. SONS promotes coordination and
officer safety. Under the SONS system, Alliance compiles information about special
operations such as drug interdiction, weapons smuggling, money laundering, eradication,
chemicals and labs, fugitives, gangs and so on. The information is provided to agencies in
routine reports. Agencies may also request that information on their operations not be
disseminated.
Alliance Military Support Priorities are determined by Alliance planners based on DLEA
input. This assists Alliance and JTF-6 to establish long-range requirements for Title 10
military support to these agencies. A periodic survey of Southwest border and metropolitan
HIDTAs and Federal, state and local DLEAs establishes their most important military
support needs. The information helps Alliance and JTF-6 establish strategic and operational
support plans. Recent Alliance survey results show a consistent (5-year) interest in these
categories of support (by priority): Personnel Support, Training Support, Air Support,
Ground Support, Engineer Support, and lastly Maritime Support. Concerning the specific
types of support, assistance from intelligence analysts and training for DLEA intelligence
analysts and planners are consistently top priorities. Engineer and maritime support are
generally low priorities except for the Border Patrol and the U.S. Coast Guard. 39
Alliance deconfliction of requests for military assistance includes coordination with
Project North Star (northern states mainly along the border with Canada) and the Senior
Law Enforcement Advisory Board (central states) as well as the HIDTAs. Alliance also
maintains close liaison with the National Guard Title 32 support efforts. Requests for
assistance are considered in a national context and coordinated with JTF-6 for action.
While Alliance has traditionally focused its coordination efforts on the Southwest border
with Mexico, a similar coordinating organization was formed to coordinate law enforcement
support and activities on the northern border with Canada–this is Project North Star.
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Project North Star.
Project North Star is a drug law enforcement coordinating center established in 1990 at
Buffalo, NY. Its mission is to assist northern tier law enforcement agencies with information
sharing, operational planning, coordination, and resource acquisition. Unlike Operation
Alliance on the Southwest border, Project North Star has been able to incorporate foreign,
cross-border participation. Canadian law enforcement actively participates as an equal
partner in North Star projects. Leadership of North Star resides in the Director of
Enforcement. This position rotates annually between a Chief Border Patrol Agent and a U.S.
Customs Supervisory Special Agent who each report to their agency counterparts in
Operation Alliance. The Director of Enforcement chairs meetings of the Joint Coordination
Group (JCG), a multiagency committee that sets policy guidance.
Because the North Star area is very large, its area is divided into three regions: West,
Central, and East, each with a Joint Command Group for administration and coordination. 40
Within these three JCGs, each state can have four members (representing state, county,
municipal, and national guard organizations); a Royal Canadian Mounted Police officer
represents each of the Provinces, except that Ontario and Quebec each have a Provincial
Police representative. See Figure 16.
An Executive Steering Committee helps the Director of Enforcement maintain strategic
oversight of this diverse organization. Its 11 members are the chairmen and co-chairmen of
the Regional JCGs, a Royal Canadian Mounted Police representative, plus chairmen of
functional committees such as the Technology and Training Committees. 41 Additional
support was given North Star by the Immigration and Naturalization Service Border Patrol
and the U.S. Customs Office of Enforcement which “have directed their field offices to
coordinate all border special operations through the North Star Coordination Center in
Buffalo, NY.” 42
The coordination center is staffed with about 20 personnel, including representatives from
the Border Patrol, Customs, National Guard Bureau, the New York National Guard, and
JTF-6. Requests for military assistance to DLEAs in the northern states are consolidated at
North Star, then passed to JTF-6, and coordinated with Operation Alliance. The operating
focus at the coordination center is on intelligence, interdiction, training, and investigation
support.
The planning process at North Star has made use of the three Joint Coordination Groups
to build consensus as a regional strategy is being developed. Sequestered for a week in June
1992 at a small conference facility in North Carolina, about 18 Canadians and Americans
representing the JCG membership hammered-out the Project North Star Strategy, named
“Polaris.” It was coordinated with American and Canadian agencies for approval.
The Polaris Strategy sets a goal of identifying, interdicting and destroying criminal
organizations. To accomplish this it provides a vision for near, mid and far term periods. In
the near (2-year) term, priority for resources is placed on intelligence, law enforcement
training, and public education. Law enforcement officials from both the United States and
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Figure 16. Project North Star Joint Coordination
Group Regions.
Canada have stated that the drug education process is a top priority that can reduce the
demand for drugs. 43 A large share of the North Star effort is placed on demand reduction
programs to inform the public about the myth of drugs, especially children in the grade
schools.44
Polaris mid-term goals center on investigations, interdiction, and prosecution. North Star
DLEAs focus on specific weaknesses of criminal organizations. For example, intelligence is
used to target specific criminal organizations and special effort is placed on the problem of
cross-border money laundering. 45
The far-term goal of the strategy is to continue the destruction of kingpin drug
organizations while the JCGs assess the strategic situation for future needs. 46
In addition to the Polaris strategy, Project North Star has assembled a system of planning
documents to pass strategic guidance to the JCGs. A Drug Threat Assessment has been
produced with the staff assistance of Forces Command, and a campaign plan has been
developed by each of the Joint Coordination Groups.
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The Senior Law Enforcement Advisory Board.
Although Project North Star provided the prioritization, coordination, and validation
functions of military support requests along the norther tier of states, and Alliance
historically provided these functions in the Southwest, there was a need for this service in the
central United States. Therefore, DoD formed the Senior Law Enforcement Advisory Board
as a supporting working group to assist the Commanding General, JTF-6 with this task. 47
Working with Operation Alliance and JTF-6, the board reviews and prioritizes law
enforcement requests for military support. See Figure 17.
The Board is made up of one representative from the International Association of Chiefs of
Police (IACP), National Sheriffs’ Association (NSA), and eight Federal agencies. These
agencies are the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Department of the Interior, Drug
Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S.
Customs Service, U.S. Forest Service; and the U.S. Marshals Service.
Operation Alliance, along with Project North Star and the Senior Law Enforcement
Advisory Board, are important for the interagency coordination and military support
priortization and validation they bring to the counterdrug effort. In a similar way, the HIDTA
Program validates ONDCP funding support.

Figure 17. Senior Law Enforcement Advisory Board Area.
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HIDTA Program the Operational Level.
The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program (introduced in the ONDCP section
above) focuses on the major retailers and wholesalers of illicit drugs through efforts to
integrate the drug enforcement capabilities of Federal, state and local law enforcement
agencies.48 The HIDTAs in the field function mainly at the operational level of counterdrug
effort, with some strategic level interaction in the multiagency environment. These
organizations have tasks at both the strategic and operational levels. They are responsible for
developing strategies for their areas while providing sufficient operational planning and
direction to ensure that measurable, strategic objectives are achieved. There is a need for
strategic planning (a HIDTA strategy) to implement the policy guidance from ONDCP, and in
some instances, a need for operational level plans (a HIDTA campaign plan) for linking the
activities of several task forces in a coherent manner to achieve a strategic objective.
The HIDTAs have been directed by ONDCP to develop strategies that begin with an area
assessment to establish a baseline of criminal activity and intent. Then a strategy is to be
written incorporating measurable strategic objectives. Specific initiatives (operations) are
conducted, supported by HIDTA budgets. Finally the HIDTAs are tasked to report to ONDCP
annually on how well their budgeted initiatives have affected the baseline of criminal activity
in their area. Indicators of success are based on statistical data, observed changes in
operational modes made by drug criminals as a result of HIDTA initiatives, and the impact on
dismantling or disrupting significant drug trafficking organizations. 49
Each HIDTA area has similar organization: one or more collocated joint law enforcement
task forces (officers and agents from state and local agencies, plus Departments of Justice and
Treasury); an intelligence-sharing center; and a multiagency executive committee that
develops the area strategies and operational initiatives (with supporting budget). The range
of HIDTA joint operations includes interdiction, investigations, prosecution, treatment, and
drug abuse prevention. How much funding a HIDTA gets depends upon the joint performance
of participating agencies in achieving measurable objectives. 50 The Southwest Border HIDTA
is discussed in some detail below because it is unique and for its close relationship with
Operation Alliance.
The Southwest Border High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (SWB HIDTA) differs from
the metropolitan HlDTAs by its vast area covering the border regions of California, Arizona,
New Mexico, and Texas. This is shown in Figure 13. It does not incorporate the Los Angeles
and Houston HlDTAs, which are separate operating areas. The Southwest Border HIDTA
Director is located in San Diego.
There are five regions with Executive Committees representing regional partnerships in
Southern California, Arizona, New Mexico, West Texas, and South Texas. They are the
California Regional Border Alliance Group in San Diego; the Arizona Alliance Planning
Committee in Tucson; the New Mexico Regional Executive Committee in Albuquerque; the
West Texas Regional Executive Committee at El Paso; and the South Texas Regional
Executive Committee in San Antonio. The chair and one or two delegates from each of these
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committees sit on the Southwest Border Executive Committee which is chaired by the
Southwest Border HIDTA Director.
These Regional Executive Committees support and overwatch the federal, state, and local
law enforcement task forces that receive the HIDTA funds. They assess the criminal threat,
develop and revise strategies, design initiatives and update them, and program and monitor
funds. The Task Forces are expected to reside in a centrally located facility, be mutually
supporting, share intelligence, and be in a major city under the control of a state HIDTA
executive committee.
According to Richard Y. Yamamoto, HIDTA Director, Office of National Drug Control
Policy, the purpose behind the current organization of the SWB HIDTA is to achieve efficiency
through eliminating bureaucratic layering in the funding process and to push “power down”
to the federal, state, and local task forces. Thus, HIDTA funding and program guidance is
directed through the HIDTA Coordinator in San Diego to the State-Regional Executive
Committees, and then to the collocated task forces in Arizona, California, New Mexico, and
Texas. This places national support directly at the tactical level.
The South Florida HIDTA also holds a unique place in the HIDTA Program by its
oversight responsibility for the HIDTA Assistance Center. The Assistance Center is a
training organization formed to support all the HIDTAs throughout the Nation. Its central
mission is to support the HIDTA agents in the field with a program of professional
development and technical courses. The Center emphasises multidisciplinary and
multiagency training for personnel of all Federal, state and local agencies in a wide variety of
subjects such as aircraft drug smuggling, strategic planning, and link analysis. 51
A Community Empowerment Program (CEP) developed by the South Florida HIDTA
complements its supply reduction and interdiction mission. John Wilson, Director of the
HIDTA’s State and Local Programs has created a generic model that can be tailored to fit
specific communities in other HIDTAs. The CEP has a broad range of measurable objectives
such as reducing drug trafficking in the community, decreasing people’s dependence on public
assistance, education, and role model mentoring. An important thrust of the CEP is finding
ways to help the youth of empoverished neighborhoods.

Joint Task Force 6.
Joint Task Force 6 (JTF-6) was established by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on
November 13, 1989, at Fort Bliss, TX. JTF-6 supports the National Drug Control Strategy
goal of countering the flow of illicit drugs across U.S. borders by coordinating military support
requested by counterdrug law enforcement agencies (DLEA). Priority of support is to the
High Intensity Trafficking Areas (HIDTA). 52
JTF-6 works closely with Operation Alliance in planning and coordinating Department of
Defense active and reserve component (Title 10, USC) support to Federal, state and local
DLEAs. By working with the Governors’ state Adjutants General, JTF-6 also integrates
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National Guard units (under Title 32, USC) into joint support operations. In 1995 the JTF-6
area of responsibility (AOR) was expanded from its original four-state Southwest Border
region to include support responsibilities for the entire United States, Puerto Rico and the
Virgin Islands. The Joint Task Force is organized with a commander, deputy commander, and
a joint staff (J1 through J6). Its chain of command runs upward through the Army’s Forces
Command to U.S. Atlantic Command and the Secretary of Defense. Figure 18 depicts the staff
organization of JTF-6.
Requests for military counterdrug support are submitted by DLEAs to JTF-6 through one
of four law enforcement review agencies: Operation Alliance (which is collocated with JTF-6;
Project Northstar in Buffalo, NY (linked to Operation Alliance): any of the HIDTAs; and the
Senior Law Enforcement Advisory Board for LEAs not covered by one of the above-mentioned
agencies. These agencies not only screen support requests to ensure (among other factors)
that there is a valid counterdrug nexus, but also to prioritize the requests when there are
competing support requests. When support to a DLEA is approved, JTF-6 will attempt to
source the mission with a volunteer Title 10 unit. The unit operates in direct support of the
supported LEA but under the tactical control (TACON) of JTF-6. When a mission is referred
to a National Guard unit, command of that unit remains with the state military authority,
and the unit directly supports the DLEA. 53

Figure 18. Joint Task Force 6 Organization.
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JTF-6 provides planning and tactical intelligence support to military units conducting
counterdrug missions. The JTF-6 intelligence directorate primary mission is to provide
terrain analysis and threat information to military units only–DLEAs receive law
enforcement intelligence through their own channels from elements such as the National
Drug Intelligence Center and the El Paso Intelligence Center. The leadership of units
participating in JTF-6 missions attend an initial planning conference which prepares them
for duty in the law enforcement environment, and they must brief an operations order for
JTF-6 approval before deployment. Military support is further categorized by JTF-6 as
operational, general support, rapid support, intelligence, and engineer.
Operational Support involves military units providing tactical support through the
execution of mission related training. This includes such activities as aviation medical
evacuation, aviation operations, ground reconnaissance, sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles,
and ground transportation. Ground reconnaissance, for example, consists of two types of
missions. One involves covering large terrain areas to seek out marijuana growing sites or
identify smuggling routes and clandestine airfields. The other type of mission involves forces
occupying listening posts/observation posts on likely smuggling routes. These missions can
involve elements from squad-sized to several hundred soldiers or Marines. They typically
avoid civilian contact and rely on night vision devices and daylight long-range vision means. 54
Of 131 operational support missions conducted during Fiscal Year (FY) 1996, 5.3 percent
were ground sensor employment; 23 percent were aviation reconnaissance and support;
transportation was 3 percent; medevac was 9.4 percent; controlled delivery of sensitive drug
material was 12.2 percent; and ground reconnaissance was 46.6 percent.
General Support is the provision of military skills and expertise through military training
teams and technology demonstrations. For example, the U.S. Army Military Police School
may be requested to conduct a Counterdrug Investigations Course or the U.S. Army
Intelligence School may be requested to demonstrate the counterdrug capabilities of various
unmanned aerial vehicles. Of 124 general support missions during FY 96, nearly all (96
percent) were mobile training teams.
Rapid Support refers to the capability of JTF-6 to quickly respond to actionable
intelligence through use of a rapid support unit (RSU). Consisting of an attached Special
Forces company (B Team) and 4-6 “A-Teams,” the RSU can operate anywhere within the JTF6 AOR. The RSU is especially capable of conducting special reconnaissance missions
(detection-oriented operations) designed to enhance LEA interdiction efforts. Of 85 RSU
missions during Fiscal Year 1996, 69 were ground reconnaissance and 16 percent were mobile
training teams.
Engineer Support involves road repair, vertical and horizontal construction. Typical
missions include constructing border fences, lighting, and LEA training facilities. At Tucson,
Nogales, and Douglas, AZ, 87 miles of roads have been upgraded to assist the U.S. Border
Patrol; at San Ysidro, CA, both fencing and roads help control the drug traffickers’ access to
U.S. territory. An engineering assessment of the tunnel built under the border at Otay Mesa,
CA, has helped the DLEAs understand ways to combat this drug threat. 55 During FY 1996, 24
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engineer support missions were distributed as follows: fence construction and repair, 50.1
percent; engineer assessments, 13.6 percent; facilities, 13.6 percent; and roads, 22.7 percent.
Intelligence Support is the provision of specialists that can assist DLEAs with training
and analysis processes. Typical missions include photo imagery interpretation, translator
and linguistic support, and analyst support. Intelligence Support is the use of trained
military intelligence analysts, translators, and linguists to provide DLEAs with enhanced
case analysis, language capabilities, and intelligence architecture analysis support. During
FY 1996, 349 intelligence analysts and translators were provided to DLEAs for missions like
drug trafficking organization analysis, link and pattern analysis, intelligence data base
construction and management, situation briefs, and linguistic support. 56
The JTF-6 strategy guides these operations on a daily basis. The commander’s intent is to
provide good military training while supporting the DLEAs counterdrug mission. Thus,
strategy objectives are to support law enforcement in reducing the domestic drug scourge;
assist with improvements to illicit drug interdiction and intelligence; and provide wartimerelated training for military units and people.
A JTF-6 Southwest Border Support Plan was developed during FY 1996 to support the
DOJ Southwest Border Project and the Operation Alliance implementing counterdrug plan
(discussed above). Priority regions and their avenues of approach and mobility corridors
along the 2000 mile border have been identified. Intelligence will drive the phased application
of military resources against major drug trafficking organizations.
The concept is to contribute to the proficiency and effectiveness of the DLEAs in their
interdiction operations at and between Ports of Entry by means of reconnaissance,
intelligence support and engineer projects that detect and disrupt drug smuggling. Mobile
training teams also will be used. The Commander, JTF-6 wants to achieve at least a 50
percent disruption of the drug smuggling operations of the large drug organizations. The plan
calls for these operations to continue until October 1999.
JTF-6 is an active organization, conducting 530 missions during FY 1996. For example,
JTF-6 provided the DLEAs with about 12,000 pages of translated documents, trained 4,000
law enforcement officers, constructed or improved 23 miles of roads and 8 miles of fence in
border areas, and upgraded 6 law enforcement facilities, for a savings of $5.4 million to law
enforcement agencies. The JTF trained a total of 1525 military personnel during the same
period. Although JTF-6 provides tactical intelligence support to its units and personnel, it is
not involved in processing intelligence for law enforcement. This mission is done by law
enforcement organizations such as the DEA-sponsored El Paso Intelligence Center.

El Paso Intelligence Center.
The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) was organized in 1974 by the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), the U.S. Customs Service (USCS) and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS). EPIC operates under an advisory board chaired by DEA’s
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Office of Intelligence. Participating in this intelligence center are 15 member agencies. 57
Associate member agencies represent the 50 states (plus Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands,
American Samoa, Guam, District of Columbia). The Bureau of Prisons, National Marine
Fisheries, Amtrack, and JTF-6 are also associate members.
The EPIC mission is to collect, process, and disseminate intelligence information
concerning illicit drug and currency movement, alien smuggling, weapons trafficking and
related activity. EPIC intends to disrupt the flow of illicit drugs at the highest trafficking leve l
by means of exchanging tactical intelligence dealing with drug movement, and it supports
other programs of interest to its members.
Supported by the data bases developed by its participating members, EPIC assists law
officers with case inquiries and lookouts. Inquiries can involve drug trafficking; immigration
violation suspects (alien smuggling, suspect fraudulent documents, criminal aliens); FAA
information regarding pilots and aircraft; fugitives; weapons and explosives trafficking; and
stolen vehicles, weapons and aircraft. Lookouts are requested by EPIC members for
individuals entering the United States from foreign countries on commercial carriers,
vehicles entering the United States, and suspect aircraft within the United States,
Caribbean, Northern Mexico, Panama, and Canada. Lookouts provide tactical, time-sensitive
information used by case officers for immediate requirements and are not generally used for
long-term monitoring of people or conveyances.
The EPIC organization includes four major staff sections: Information Management,
Watch Operations, Tactical Operations, Research and Analysis. EPIC also has DoD liaison
officers, and a statistics element. The organization has a staff of about 260 personnel; 60
percent of these are from DEA. To accommodate this large staff, the EPIC physical plant is
undergoing an expansion. See Figure 19.
The EPIC Research and Analysis Section provides real-time operational leads to law
enforcement officers based on its analysis of information available in the automated
databases of the EPIC Information System. The section provides analytical support to
ongoing investigations and operations, and produces trend analyses for use by law
enforcement agents. Information developed from analysis that links separate investigations
by various offices and agencies together is passed by the section to agents in the field.
A number of ongoing programs benefit from EPIC research with information such as
modus-operandi, intelligence on organizations under investigation, and movement trend
intelligence. Some program examples are Operation PIPELINE (movement of drugs and
drug currency via the U.S. interstate highway system by private auto); Operation BAY
WATCH (movement of illicit drugs through Central America and Mexico to the United
States); Operation CHARLIE “T” (drug movement by sea and air in the Pacific); Operation
JETWAY (movement of narcotics and drug currency by commercial aircraft in the United
States); Operation CONVOY (movement of drugs and drug money by commercial vehicle);
and Operation WINTER NIGHT ( smuggling of narcotics into the United States by
commercial air, sea, and land cargo).

51

Figure 19. El Paso Intelligence Center Organization.

DLEA Field Management Structure.
The local (tactical) actions of law enforcement activities such as the Drug Enforcement
Administration, for example, are supervised by field offices that have defined geographic
regions. The U.S. Customs special agent-in-charge and Customs management center
(SAC/CMC) and the DEA field division agent-in-charge are at a level to synchronize tactical
actions within their separate organizations or in the interagency arena. The District Offices
of the U.S. Attorneys can influence tactical actions via HIDTA policy direction and case load
guidance for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces and the like.

The Joint Interagency Task Forces–The JIATFs.
The Joint Interagency Task Forces (see Transportation Department, Coast Guard, above)
are DoD-sponsored interagency task forces. They have an organic intelligence gathering
capability, and they have assigned DoD personnel and DLEA liaison officers.
JIATF East (formerly JTF-4) is a subordinate joint command of U.S. Atlantic Command
located in Key West, FL. JIATF-East coordinates surveillance (detection and monitoring) of
the air and sea approaches to the United States through the Atlantic Ocean, Eastern Pacific
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(east of 92 degrees west longitude), and Caribbean Sea. Its principal mission is to help DLEAs
reduce the flow of drugs and other contraband from Latin America. The Director of JIATF
East is a Navy admiral, and Customs and the Coast Guard provide deputy directors. By DoD’s
Unified Command Plan, after June 1, 1997 the Caribbean Sea area will likely fall under the
Area of Responsibility of U.S. Southern Command; thus, it is possible that JIATF East will
transfer from the operational command of Atlantic Command to Southern Command.
JIATF West (formerly JTF-5), at March AFB, CA, is a subordinate joint command of U.S.
Pacific Command (USPACOM). JIATF West’s mission is to detect and monitor maritime and
air drugtrafficking in the Eastern Pacific, west of 92 degrees west longitude. JIATF West
develops intelligence concerning heroin and other illicit drugs coming into the United States
from Southeast and Southwest Asia. It also supports host nations that are in the U.S.
commander-in-chief’s area of responsibility.

Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center (DAICC).
The Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center (DAICC) at Riverside, California was
reorganized under guidelines that restructured the nationwide radar surveillance system to
enhance coordination of the detection, interception and apprehension of aircraft that illegally
cross into U.S. airspace carrying drugs and other contraband. The DAICC monitors 150 miles
seaward around Puerto Rico and 100 miles seaward around U.S. coastlines. (The DAICC has
a subordinate operations center in Puerto Rico to extend radar coverage into the Caribbean.)
In consideration of the Posse Comitatus law, the DAICC provides the law enforcement
interdiction and apprehension functions to counter air drug trafficking criminals that enter
U.S. territory. The DAICC provides radar detection and monitoring for the Southwest border
of the United States. Some emphasis is placed on the northern region of Mexico, near the
border, where air and ground activity indicate a high probability of drug smuggling activity
inbound to the United States.
From the DAICC, air controllers can vector jets and helicopters to intercept and track
potential drug trafficking aircraft entering U.S. territory. Receiving the hand-off of inbound
radar tracks of suspected drug trafficker aircraft from military-based Joint Interagency Task
Forces (JIATFs) precludes the inadvertent involvement of U.S. military personnel in law
enforcement activities on U.S. soil. 58
The DAICC Director and his assistant are Customs officers who report for administrative
purposes to the Customs National Aviation Center (CNAC) in Oklahoma City. The DAICC is
an interagency operation, with representatives from FAA, Coast Guard, and Border Patrol
manning the Center. 59 The DAICC operates under the oversight coordination of the U.S.
Interdiction Coordinator and with other interagency task forces also described in Chapter 3.
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Counterdrug Support Office.
The Counterdrug Support Offices (CDSO), located at Fort Belvoir, VA, and Segundo, CA,
replace four former Regional Logistics Support Offices which are now closing down. The
CDSO is a Defense Logistics Agency staff that facilitates the transfer of excess Defense
property to domestic law enforcement agencies under Section 1208 of the Defense
Authorization Act of 1990 and 1991. State and local agencies, working through their
designated state agent or coordinator, have equal access to Defense property and support.
Under this program, about $1 billion was passed to DLEAs during fiscal year 1995,
including sophisticated equipment such as helicopters. The criteria for approving what type
of support can be transferred to DLEAs rests with the DoD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement
Policy and Support. 60 Support can include temporary loan of equipment, training from
various service schools, and transfer of excess DoD property.

THE TACTICAL LEVEL
This section describes some of the many Drug Control Program activities at the tactical
level, fighting the battles and engagements of the drug interdiction effort. Law enforcement
counterdrug efforts at this level are often case-specific. The result can be isolated arrests and
prosecutions that are useful in their own right. Yet, they may not support a larger strategy or
campaign that encourages Federal, state and local officers to work together to put criminals
in jail. The increasing emphasis on task force organizations have addressed this situation by
bringing a sense of focus to law enforcement efforts. After the municipal police department,
sheriff’s office, or state police, the fundamental building block at the tactical level has become
the task force organization.

The Task Force Organization.
While there is no overarching guidance or standing procedure for forming-up and running
task forces, the Federal Government has encouraged task force organizations as a way to
integrate skills and resources in the pursuit of counterdrug objectives. The use of task forces
gives local agencies flexibility in attacking the drug problem, and asset forfeiture rules have
ensured the viability of task forces. 61 The International Association of Chiefs of Police
reported that 72 percent of the departments they surveyed participated in multijurisdictional
counterdrug task forces. 62 A recent survey conducted by Operation Alliance of 350 counties in
four Southwest states provides some insight about the nature of task forces today. 63
The Alliance survey found that in 60 percent of 182 task forces located in Texas, New
Mexico, Arizona, and California, state and local agencies were the predominant level of
participating agency. About 31 percent of task forces are composed of all three government
levels: Federal, state and local. On average a task force will have about 6 or 7 participating
agencies.
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About 86 percent of task forces are permanently collocated and ongoing, with 27 percent of
the task forces overall having their own intelligence units or groups. Funding through the
HIDTA Program, the OCDETF Program, and the Bureau of Justice Assistance has
encouraged the development of task forces that are ongoing and have their own intelligence
centers. Several examples of task forces follow.
The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) is a Department of
Justice program which integrates law enforcement agencies and skills to identify and
dismantle large, sophisticated drug trafficking organizations. OCDETFs are located in core
cities across the United States with the purpose of attacking the criminal organizations that
are inflicting significant violence or major property loss on the community.
The OCDETF process reviews significant drug cases in meetings chaired by an Assistant
U.S. Attorney. About a dozen agencies are represented in these meetings where cases may be
presented for committee review. When a case is seen to have broad implications requiring
significant resources, the case is transferred from the individual agency to OCDETF for
further action. A task force is established with agents from appropriate agencies assigned to
the case.
In a large HIDTA such as Houston, 20 or more agents may be dedicated to an OCDETF
case (although the agents may work several cases simultaneously). These are usually
interstate cases that local police forces cannot work by themselves. In order to fund the
OCDETF, each participating agency requests money from its department in Washington,
plus the Department of Justice apportions OCDETF money as requested by the U.S.
Attorneys’ offices. 64
On the Southwest border, over 40 law enforcement elements working in the OCDETF
Program concluded “Operation Zorro II” in the spring of 1996. Operation Zorro resulted in the
arrests in Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, El Paso and Midland, TX, of operatives working for
the suppliers in Colombia and distributors in Mexico that smuggled cocaine into the United
States. In the Midwest, OCEDETF units focused on large crack-dealing gangs such as the
Gangster Disciples and Vice Lords. Together, these Illinois gangs were selling over 500
kilograms of crack cocaine per year. Through 1996, Operation CRACKSHOT has decreased
gang-related violent crime by 70 percent and resulted in dozens of indictments and
convictions of gang leaders. 65
The DEA, State and Local Task Forces are units with dedicated investigators and staff.
They were established to “promote cooperation between DEA and State and local law
enforcement officials, with the goal of immobilizing local drug trafficking groups.” 66 They
pursue open-ended drug problems such as money laundering, the Jamaican connection, and
Nigerian smugglers.
A recent innovation is the DEA Mobile Enforcement Team (MET) concept to target violent
organizations involved in drug trafficking. MET teams have been operational since March
1995, working out of 15 domestic divisions to aid local law enforcement agencies and
communities. DEA has deployed 24 teams to such locations as Selma, Alabama and San Luis
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Obispo County, California. These teams “provide trained personnel to do intelligence
appraisals; money to make undercover buys and to pay informants to penetrate criminal
organizations; sophisticated investigative and technical tools; and money to relocate
witnesses to avoid reprisals from violent drug traffickers.” 67 The mission of MET is to identify
violators, collect, analyze and share intelligence, and manage investigations and
prosecutions to a successful culmination. Also, the DEA State and Local Task Force Program
addresses the need of local communities.
Numerous other organizations of federal, state, and local governments at the tactical level
are grouped together under the term Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEA). Examples of
Federal, state and local DLEAs include: State Departments of Justice and Public Safety,
State Police, metropolitan police, county sheriffs, prison officials, U.S. Marshals Service
agents, Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs) aboard U.S. Navy ships, and
even U.S. Forest Service agents cutting marijuana plants on Federal land.
These tactical elements are often effective when organized as interdisciplinary teams, or
“task forces,” guided by a strategy and operational plans for action. Deputy U.S. Attorney
General Jamie Gorelick credits the task force concept with reducing violent crime in virtually
every major city in the country, much of it associated with narcotics. “And while I wouldn’t tell
you that we’ve made interagency competition magically disappear overnight, we do have task
forces of Federal, state and local law enforcement officials working effectively together all
around the country.”68 The task force concept has proven effective within state and local
domains.
Pennsylvania, for example, has over 1,000 police departments, some with only 10 officers.
Over the past 6 years, the Pennsylvania State Attorney for Organized Crime and
Counternarcotics has put together a Municipal Drug Task Force Program with participation
by about 800 police departments supporting some 5,000 law officers.
Using a DOJ grant, funding from the state legislature, and asset forfeiture money, the
state program evolved to counter drug crime at the local level. The Municipal Drug Task
Force Program is guided by an oversight board of chiefs who facilitate interagency
agreements for multijurisdictional law enforcement. Currently, Pennsylvania has 9 Task
Forces (ranging from 10-30 people) located around the state. Typically the Task Force has
representation from the State Bureau of Narcotics Investigation, State Police, local police,
and a full-time state attorney to augment the team. 69
These Pennsylvania task forces and their officers represent the foot soldiers who fight the
war against drugs every day in every state. As one state officer said, “From a law enforcement
perspective we are doing fine, but law enforcement isn’t the answer–drug use is up because of
a lack of a consistent anti-drug education system.” They recognize that the “drug war” will
ultimately be won through demand reduction efforts, but meanwhile they are willing to hold
the line against drug criminals.
Their unselfish and heroic actions deserve thoughtful policy direction and a cogent
national drug strategy backed-up by coherent operational plans. The diversity of these
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operations requires some unity of effort to synchronize their actions at the operational and
tactical levels. The system for countering drug trafficking in overseas areas resides in
different domains than discussed here. The next chapter looks at the U.S. organizations that
prosecute the drug war overseas.
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CHAPTER 3
THE OVERSEAS EFFORT
OVERSEAS STRATEGY
Integrating the skills and resources represented by the large number of government
agencies under a coherent strategy and implementing plans is a significant challenge. To set
the stage for a later discussion of strategy and planning, this chapter briefly identifies the
overseas part of our national drug control strategy (Latin America focus), provides a view of
government agencies involved, and identifies some of their counterdrug operations.
The U.S. National Drug Control Strategy is meant to “break foreign and domestic drug
sources of supply,” and “shield America’s air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.” 1
Bilateral and multilateral efforts are intended to destroy drug trafficking organizations and
dismantle the means of growing and producing illicit drugs. This supply reduction strategy
calls for intelligence sharing, eradication of drug crops, assistance for crop substitution, and
continued interdiction of the drug trade in the transit zone and within host nations (such as
Bolivia and Peru). These actions are consistent with wider U.S. national security strategy
goals for promoting democracy and sustainable development abroad. 2
The U.S. strategy reflects the commitment made at Cartagena, Colombia, in February
1990. There, the U.S. President, with the Presidents of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, pledged
“to step up efforts within their own countries to interdict illegal drugs and to increase
coordination and cooperation among them to facilitate this fight.” 3 The Presidents agreed
that future U.S. assistance would be based on counterdrug performance and sound economic
planning, and that interdiction efforts would be in the context of demand reduction and
economic development.
The Declaration of Cartagena gave credence to the concept of an internationally
coordinated attack against illicit drug production and trafficking and criminal organizations,
combined with economic development for the region. It was the foundation for what was
popularly called “the Andean Ridge Strategy.” At the outset, military and law enforcement
cooperation was important because principal drugtrafficking activities would have to be
disabled. The combined efforts of U.S. and international agencies would be needed. It
suggested the need for coordinated interagency strategies and campaign plans.
In May 1993 a Presidential review of the international counterdrug strategy determined
that too much effort was being placed on interdiction in the Caribbean. It suggested that
resources should be shifted to the drug source countries to enhance host nation interdiction
and training and support in order to counter drug kingpins and their money laundering. The
result of the review was Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 14, which now serves as the
framework for U.S. overseas counterdrug strategy and the basis for interagency planning.
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PDD 14 provided concepts for interdiction at the U.S. border, in the transit zone, and in the
drug source counties, but it also shifted emphasis away from interdiction in the transit zone to
favor helping the host nation. An interagency effort was directed to provide sustainable
development (especially Colombia, Peru, Bolivia); attack the drug kingpins, their essential
chemicals, and money laundering; and help shore-up host government institutions through
training and foreign assistance. 4
Thus, U.S. overseas counterdrug strategy reflects the agreement at Cartagena,
subsequent Presidential Directives, and the goals of the National Drug Control Strategy.
Current counterdrug objectives can be summarized this way: develop bilateral and
multilateral intelligence sharing to thwart drug trafficking by air, land, and sea; use
technology to help stop the flow of drugs; conduct maritime and aerial interdiction in drug
transit zones; destroy major drug organizations; reduce and eradicate drug crops; attack drug
essential chemicals and money laundering; strengthen host nation institutions and political
will. Meanwhile, the United States will reduce domestic drug production. To accomplish all of
this, a key concept is to “make greater use of multilateral organizations to share the burdens
and costs of international narcotics control.” This complex and interrelated set of activities
requires interagency and international coordination and highlights the need for a coherent
approach to planning. 5
In recent years, a top priority has been to stop cocaine, then other drugs such as heroin,
marijuana, and methamphetamine. Because virtually all cocaine is grown in Latin America,
counterdrug organizations and efforts there provide the model for this discussion, although
major drug trafficking industries centered in Thailand, Pakistan, Nigeria, and other
countries are also important cases. Following is a review of the principal organizations
overseas that support U.S. counterdrug policy. A view of the relationships among key
overseas U.S. players is seen in Figure 20.

THE STRATEGIC LEVEL
Strategic level players who write, coordinate, and oversee our international drug supply
reduction effort are discussed here. Direction for overseas initiatives begins with the
President, who often transmits his drug strategy decisions into the interagency arena
through the National Security Council.

National Security Council.
The National Security Council (NSC) is the principal forum for national security issues
that require Presidential decision.6 Its statutory function is to advise the President on the
integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security so as to
enable the departments and agencies of government to cooperate effectively. 7 It develops
interagency policies and strategies for Presidential consideration. Once the President makes
a decision, the NSC Staff assists in the promulgation of national security directives and
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Figure 20. Key U.S. Overseas Players.
coordinates and monitors their implementation. The NSC is chaired by the President. He
presides over meetings with his cabinet members, statutory advisors (such as the Chairman,
JCS and Director of Central Intelligence) and other advisors, depending upon the subject at
hand. The NSC is supported in information fusion and policy development by the NSC Staff
and its interagency groups.
Below the NSC, the interagency groups in the NSC system are the Principals Committee,
the Deputies Committee, and various Interagency Working Groups (IWG). As the senior subcabinet forum, the Principals Committee is chaired by the National Security Advisor and
composed of the NSC cabinet-rank leaders, minus the President and Vice-President. The subcabinet level Deputies Committee is chaired by a deputy national security advisor and has a
membership made of deputies and under secretaries of the departments and agencies. By
Presidential decisions and directives of the executive secretary of the NSC, IWGs are formed
to provide the routine assessment, coordination and policy development for issues of concern
to the NSC members. See Figure 21. 8
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Figure 21. National Security Council.
Most of the important ground-work leading to Presidential policy decisions is done at the
IWG level by members who typically are at the assistant secretary, deputy assistant
secretary and staff (action officer) levels of departments and agencies. Chairmen may be from
the NSC staff, departments, or agencies, depending upon the issue under consideration.
These interagency groups constitute the principal mechanism for developing advice for the
President. They formulate, recommend, coordinate, and monitor the implementation of
national security policy and strategy.
A representative sample of working groups active since the publication of the first
national drug control strategy in 1989 is instructive. The Andean counterdrug
implementation working group, chaired by ONDCP and NSC, was formed to oversee the
implementation of Department of State plans and to evaluate host nation and U.S. agency
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performance. A Cartagena working group, chaired by State Inter-American
Affairs/international Narcotics and Law Enforcement, dealt with Presidential counterdrug
agreements in the Document of Cartagena, especially for economic cooperation and trade.
The heroin strategy working group, chaired by the State Department developed a policy
approach toward heroin. Other functional groups included the military initiatives working
group, transit and secondary source working group, and foreign intelligence working group.
All of these have proven helpful in coordinating policy development for international
initiatives in the drug war. Upon Presidential approval, the elements of the Federal
Government, such as the Department of State and the Drug Enforcement Administration,
implement the policy developed by such groups. Today, the counternarcotics interagency
working group (CN-IWG), chaired by ONDCP, brings together the principal officers of
government for counterdrug policy meetings.

Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP).
The Director of ONDCP assists the President in developing and disseminating
international counterdrug policy and providing leadership for counterdrug matters in the
interagency and international areas. ONDCP leads the development of the classified annex to
the national drug control strategy. This is written to give direction for classified activities tha t
are required to fully implement the international goals of the President’s strategy:
Goal 4: Shield America’s air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.
Goal 5: Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.
The classified annex provides guidance to agencies of the U.S. Government for
implementing Presidential Decision Directive 14 on international drug control activities and
Presidential Decision Directive 44 concerning the U.S. international heroin control strategy.
By his participation in international fora, the director plays a direct role in enjoining
cooperation and unity of effort in bilateral and multinational efforts to counter the drug
scourge.
ONDCP also provides the Chairman for the CN-IWG where he leads the process of
developing policy recommendations for Presidential decision. Thus, ONDCP is a central actor
in the interagency fora which function under the NSC system of committees and working
groups. ONDCP has an additional role in supervising the High Level Contact Group for
Cooperation between the United States and Mexico.

Department of State.
The Department of State (DOS) is a key participant in the interagency process. It is a
major contributor of goals and concepts for international initiatives in the national drug
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control strategy assembled by ONDCP. Several bureaus of DOS are active in developing
policy aims for overseas counterdrug activities.
The Under Secretary for Political Affairs handles DOS crisis management and integrates
political, economic, global, and security issues. He oversees six geographic bureaus which
coordinate the conduct of U.S. foreign relations: African Affairs (AF); East Asian and Pacific
Affairs (EAP); European and Canadian Affairs (EUR); Near Eastern Affairs (NEA); South
Asian Affairs (SA); and Inter-American Affairs (for Latin America and the Caribbean—ARA).
The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is
subordinate to the Under Secretary for Global Affairs. Created as International Narcotics
Matters in 1978, INL is the State Department point of contact for all international illicit drug
matters. In 1994, the INL mission was changed to include responsibility for international
crime that threatens U.S. security.
The INL mission is to coordinate international drug control programs of all U.S.
Government agencies and to provide policy direction to U.S. missions abroad. INL negotiates
cooperative agreements with foreign governments and represents the United States at the
United Nations and other drug control organizations. It administers the International
Narcotics Control Program under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. INL is also
charged to promote international law enforcement initiatives, improve international law
enforcement cooperation, and develop training programs to strengthen police and criminal
justice institutions in democracies. 9
The INL Bureau plays both diplomatic and programmatic roles. It uses diplomacy to
convince other governments and international organizations to halt the flow of illegal drugs
into the United States. It supports programs that provide assistance to foreign governments
to eradicate narcotics crops, destroy illicit laboratories, train interdiction personnel, and
develop education programs to counter drug abuse by their populations. 10 INL purchases
personnel services and goods, and it funds host nation contracts in support of overseas
counterdrug initiatives.
INL is staffed with 126 personnel. Of these, 28 American foreign service officers, 18
foreign service nationals, and about 180 contract employees are in jobs overseas; 80 civil and
foreign service staff work in Washington. The bureau is organized by functional programs,
such as international criminal justice, policy and planning, and regional activities (Latin
America, Asia-Europe-Africa). It provides administrative, policy, and technical guidance to
narcotics assistance sections (formerly units) located with the Ambassador’s staff (country
team). See Figure 22.
The Chief of Mission–the Ambassador–represents the President, but takes policy
guidance from the Secretary of State via regional and other bureaus. Responsible for all U.S.
activities within the host nation, the Ambassador interprets U.S. national drug policy and
strategy and oversees its application. He uses his country team to assist in translating
strategy or policy into operational direction within the country. For counterdrug issues, the
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Figure 22. The Bureau for International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs.
deputy chief of mission is often tasked to be the embassy or mission coordinator for Narcotics
affairs (CNA).
The CNA coordinates all INL program activities and keeps abreast of host nation
counterdrug activities. He provides policy oversight for counterdrug activities of all
government agencies at the mission, initiates requests for INL-funded projects, and is the
point of contact for visitors from U.S. Government national drug control program agencies.
The Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) is headed by a narcotics affairs officer (NAO) who
participates as a member of the country team and reports to the CNA. With INL’s new
responsibility for international crime and law enforcement issues, the NAS has become
involved in crime issues as well as the counterdrug strategy. The mission of the NAS is to
manage routine counterdrug actions in cooperation with the host government. The NAS
works with the host government to develop narcotics control programs–crop control and
eradication, law enforcement, interdiction (with DEA), demand reduction, and related crime
programs. The section also prepares the annual budget request for narcotics control funds
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and provides oversight of host nation use of U.S.-provided support. 11 For procurement
requirements, INL is authorized to use USAID acquisition regulations in addition to those of
State.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
USAID is responsible for the design and conduct of development assistance programs
worldwide. It administers U.S. economic and humanitarian assistance designed to promote
sustainable development in countries in Africa, Asia, the Near East, the new independent
states of the former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin America and the
Caribbean. USAID programs address issues of health and population, the environment,
economic growth, and supporting democracy. AID promotes conditions that expand markets
for U.S. goods and services in developing countries. It funds technical assistance and
commodity assistance, trains thousands of foreign students each year at American colleges,
and supports development research.
In the counterdrug strategy, AID helps the Andean Ridge countries to diversify their
economies and depart from dependency on the coca industry. AID attempts to help host
countries achieve lasting economic growth, strengthen democratic institutions, and improve
respect for human rights. AID also sponsors anti-drug education programs. 12

Transportation Department.
The Transportation Department’s U.S. Coast Guard intercepts and apprehends drug
traffickers on the high seas and (with host nation permission) in foreign waters. It employs
aircraft and cutters in support of the interdiction part of the drug control strategy. The Coast
Guard provides law enforcement detachments aboard U.S. Navy ships to support maritime
detection, interception, and apprehension of drug smugglers. It also works with drugproducing and transshipment countries in a program of on-site training.
The Commandant of the Coast Guard has been appointed by the Director, ONDCP to be
the U.S. interdiction coordinator (USIC). He is responsible for monitoring and overseeing the
U.S. interdiction program in the Western Hemisphere, near U.S. borders, in narcotrafficking
transit zones, and in host countries (with permission) to optimize interdiction effectiveness.
To ensure that assets are adequate, the commandant coordinates with USG departments and
agencies that have overseas interdiction missions, to include embassies and military
commands.
The U.S. interdiction coordinator provides “oversight coordination” over four counderdrug
coordination centers (see discussion of JIATFs in Chapter 2). Joint Interagency Task Force
South (JIATF-South), a U.S. Southern Command unit in Panama, looks at the hemisphere
from Belize southward through the Andean Ridge. JIATF-East, at Key West, FL, is a U.S.
Atlantic Command unit that monitors the Caribbean north of Venezuela-Colombia and up
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the Atlantic Coast. It is also responsible for Mexico. As DoD’s Unified Command Plan assigns
responsibility for the Caribbean region to U.S. Southern Command after mid-1997, Southern
Command is likely to take over operational command of JIATF-East.
JIATF-West, March AFB, CA, a U.S. Pacific Command unit, has an operating area in the
Pacific and southward to South America. The Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center
(DAICC), March AFB, a U.S. Customs unit, monitors 150 miles seaward around Puerto Rico
and 100 miles seaward around U.S. coastlines. (The DAICC is discussed in Chapter 2.) These
joint task forces are composed of drug law enforcement officers (especially Customs and Drug
Enforcement Administration), and military officers of all services, and often have foreign
liaison offices.
The JIATF East and West are essentially information and intelligence fusion centers that
conduct the DoD-assigned mission of detection and monitoring of suspected drug trafficking
aircraft and vessels headed toward the U.S. border. The JIATFs pass this information to the
Coast Guard (or Navy ships with Coast Guard law enforcement detachments aboard) and to
the DAICC. The U.S. Customs’ DAICC performs the law enforcement mission of vectoring
Customs aircraft to intercept smugglers, follow them to ground, and arrest them. The Coast
Guard performs the law enforcement function of arresting criminals at sea. Because its
extended counterdrug mission throughout Latin America provides some interesting
examples, JIATF-South is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

Department of Defense.
Three of the five counderdrug mission areas identified by the Secretary of Defense directly
concern overseas initiatives: training and operational support to drug-source nations;
supporting the DEA to dismantle the cocaine business; and, detecting and monitoring (D&M)
illicit air and sea smuggling traffic. 13 The ASD (SO/LIC) Drug Enforcement Policy and
Support staff develops, coordinates and oversees policy and planning for these overseas
counterdrug missions. DoD, as the lead agency for D&M, operates the JIATFs (discussed
previously) through U.S. combatant commands. DoD provides training and technical
assistance to host nations, and it is responsible for integrating the counterdrug C3I network
that has been especially effective throughout Latin America. The Joint Staff plays an
important role in supporting the Secretary’s counterdrug plans.
The J3 Operations Directorate, Counternarcotics Division (CND) is the Joint Staff focal
point for strategic, policy and budgetary matters associated with military support to the
national drug control strategy. CND monitors military, political and intelligence situations
and develops courses of action to support counterdrug strategy. 14
For strategic direction CND relies upon the President’s national drug control strategy and
Presidential decision directives which implement the international parts of the strategy.
Other strategic guidance comes from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, who play direct roles in coordinating the counter narcotics actions of the
combatant commanders-in-chief (CINCs). Finally, CND representatives attend various
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interagency meetings held under the aegis of the National Security Council and ONDCP
where international drug policy is developed.
In the Counternarcotics Division, the Strategy and Policy Branch is responsible for plans,
policy and strategy relating to Defense counterdrug efforts worldwide. It concentrates on
supporting drug source nations in their fight to dismantle drug cartels, detection and
monitoring activities, and drug law enforcement agencies along the Southwest border and
within the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas identified in the national drug control
strategy. The Programming, Budget, and Requirements Branch reviews the DOD program
and budget and ensures that resources are on hand to support the operational requirements
of the counterdrug strategy. 15 See Figure 23.

Figure 23. J3 Operations Directorate,
Coudnternarcotics Division.
The U.S. Combatant Commands support the national drug control strategy in response to
their regional counterdrug threat situation, missions, and concepts of operations. This
section narrows the discussion to U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) activities as it
is most directly involved in countering overseas cocaine trafficking.
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U.S. Southern Command maintains operational direction over U.S. military activities
throughout Latin America from its headquarters at Quarry Heights, Panama. (In 1997 it
began establishing a new headquarters in Miami, FL). Every year, SOUTHCOM’s service
components, special operations component, and two joint task forces deploy and support over
50,000 troops in the southern region. They conduct a range of operations supporting U.S.
interests in Latin America: reducing inter-state and regional tensions; encouraging military
accommodation to civilian control, human rights and the rule of law; engaging with regional
nations and their military establishments; and stopping the production and flow of illicit
drugs into the United States. 16 For the counterdrug part of its strategy, SOUTHCOM
programs support U.S. ambassadors, drug law enforcement agencies, and host nations to
counteract illicit drug trafficking and its negative effect upon regional countries and their
citizens.17
The SOUTHCOM area of responsibility (operating area) of Central and South America is
strategically significant for its geography which lends support to drug production,
manufacturing and trafficking. Foremost, the Andean Ridge is the only region in the world
that produces commercially viable coca leaves. Drug trafficking is facilitated by the operating
area’s maritime characteristics, with 23,000 miles of coastline on the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans, and major river systems that are navigable for thousands of miles by ocean-going
vessels. For instance, the Amazon river is navigable from Iquitos, Peru to the Atlantic Ocean
by 20-foot draft ships.
Many of the central areas of South America sustain fluvial societies, and this environment
makes government presence and the rule of law difficult to establish. Since June 1997, the
SOUTHCOM area of responsibility has incorporated the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of
Mexico–along with the additional challenges of dealing with drug trafficking routes through
the island nations. Also, since road networks are limited, most nations of the region have a
seemingly limitless number of small (often illegal) airstrips (pistas) that are needed to
facilitate communications by legitimate businessmen and narcotraffickers alike.
In this environment, current threats facing SOUTHCOM include illegal migrations and
refugee flows, international crime and terrorism, environmental degradation, rapid
population growth, drug trafficking, weapons proliferation, and regional instability such as
the Amazon border dispute between Ecuador and Peru. Throughout this huge area,
SOUTHCOM deals with 32 sovereign nations (but not Mexico) and 12 protectorates in
pursuit of its strategic objectives.
SOUTHCOM’s strategic objectives are to defend U.S. interests and to promote and
enhance democracy and stability in Latin America. A few of the ways the command intends to
achieve these objectives is by combating terrorism, drug trafficking and international crime.
The success of these actions is linked to other SOUTHCOM concepts: promoting cooperative
security measures; conducting military-to-military contacts; strengthening democratic
institutions and human rights practices. Success in the counterdrug effort will require the
coordinated application of these programs throughout the region. This synergism is created
through the interagency cooperation of leaders at the operational level of the drug war. 18 An
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example of this is seen in Operation LASER STRIKE, a counterdrug operation conducted at
the request of the U.S. interdiction coordinator.
The LASER STRIKE operation evolved from the DEA interdiction concepts developed
under the Support Justice (later Steady State) series of programs in the Andean countries in
1991 through 1994. Under the Support Justice program, Operation GHOST ZONE in the
Chapare region of Bolivia proved the effectiveness of combined riverine, ground, and
especially air interdiction to shut down the flow of coca product to refiners in Colombia. It was
a brilliant plan conceived with the help of SOUTHCOM planning assistance. 19 A follow-on
operation called GREEN CLOVER concentrated detection and monitoring assets in source
countries to support interdiction.
The impact of these operations against the Peru-to-Colombia “air bridge” is that coca leaf
and base prices paid to coca farmers have dropped. “As a result, an increased number of
farmers expressed interest in U.S. AID alternative development programs in the region.” 20
Meanwhile, drug traffickers are finding new routes through Brazil and Bolivia. Operation
LASER STRIKE, begun April 1996, continues with increased intelligence support to U.S.
country teams and host nation DLEAs. It also includes increased support to Peruvian and
Colombian counterdrug forward operating bases.

Additional Federal Departments.
Numerous additional federal departments support the national drug control strategy’s
international initiatives. They are briefly mentioned here to round-out the view of the
overseas counterdrug effort.
The Treasury Department is responsible for money laundering control programs and its
U.S. Customs Service works to disrupt the smuggling of contraband and drugs through U.S.
ports of entry. Customs has the authority for investigating drug-related crimes, including
smuggling and money laundering. As suggested in the discussion of the DAICC above,
Customs has developed a sophisticated electronic and visual interception capability to hunt
down drug smuggling aircraft. It also provides technical assistance and training programs to
host countries. Customs is active in joint enforcement operations with drug money
laundering, transit and source countries as targets.
The Justice Department has the lead in counterdrug cases and prosecuting drug
criminals. It also works with Department of State to negotiate extradition treaties and
mutual legal assistance treaties.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) works in foreign countries to collect
information supporting drug-related investigations of major drug organizations. It conducts
long-term domestic investigations aimed at prosecuting the leaders in major criminal
organizations and dismantling these organizations. In prosecuting drug criminals, the FBI
often attends to domestic and overseas dimensions of the case.
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The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) conducts investigative work overseas with
foreign law enforcement agencies. It provides technical support and training to these
organizations to disrupt the production and transport of illicit drugs. DEA coordinates drug
intelligence collection and works with host countries on counter narcotics operations. For
example, in the summer of 1986, Operation BLAST FURNACE was organized by DEA to
destroy coca-processing facilities in Bolivia. Operation GHOST ZONE in 1992 interdicted
Andean Ridge transit routes (air, land, rivers) that linked coca growers in Bolivia to cocaine
processors in Colombia. This successful concept of operations continues today in similar
operations throughout the Andean Ridge, with air interdiction especially effective in Peru.
In Bolivia, DEA officers direct the embassy drug intelligence center (EDIC) which
includes a tactical analysis team and operations planning group. The EDIC coordinates
investigations and interdiction operations in the Chapare Valley and Beni Region with the
Bolivian National Police. 21
In Colombia, DEA targets the cocaine production and transportation vulnerabilities of
Colombian drug criminals. Operation SELVA VERDE is a combined interdiction program
with the Colombian National Police (CNP) that has seized 25 metric tons of cocaine base and
cocaine-hydrochloride, 63 metric tons of marijuana, 120 kg of heroin and morphine, and
destroyed 52 cocaine production facilities (1995 figures). Operation SKYWEB is a joint DEACNP aircraft interdiction effort that has successfully targeted the drug mafia’s general
aviation fleet.
In Peru, a combined Peruvian national police (PNP)-DEA intelligence program has
reported the interdiction and seizure of six drug aircraft in 1995. US Southern Command has
reported for 1995 that the Peruvian air force shot down nine and seized 2 aircraft. 22 (These
figures may be overlapping.) A PNP-DEA major violators task force (MVTF) of some 30 PNP
investigators are at work dismantling kingpin drug organizations. At the same time the PNP
has been highly successful in its operations to dismantle the Sendero Luminoso (Shining
Path–SL) and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). The Sendero has had a
long-standing relationship with narcotraffickers in Peru. DEA’s overseas activities highlight
the multiagency, international dimension of counterdrug planning and operations.

THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL
Several organizations are in good position to translate U.S. policy and strategy objectives
into operational direction and synchronize counter narcotics tactical actions within the host
countries. These organizations reside at a level below the strategic players. Given the
authority to coordinate and the comity of participating agencies, they could make a major
contribution toward unity of effort in the overseas drug war. Most prominent of these are the
U.S. Ambassadors’ country teams.
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The Ambassador’s Country Team.
The US diplomatic mission to a foreign country includes representatives of the U.S.
departments and agencies present in the country. On average, the State Department supplies
only about 38 percent of the U.S. Government employees working at an embassy; the rest are
from DOD (36 percent), DOJ (5 percent), Department of Transportation (3 percent), along
with others such as Treasury, Agriculture, and Commerce. 23 The President gives his
ambassador direction and control over these U.S. Government personnel, except for those
assigned to another mission, international agency, or a DOD combatant command (the U.S.
CINCs).
The country team organization facilitates interagency coordination within the embassy.
The composition of a country team varies widely, depending on the desires of the chief of
mission, the in-country situation, and the number and levels of U.S. departments and
agencies present. The principal military members of the country team are the defense attache
and the chief of the security assistance office (SAO). The U.S. regional combatant commander
(the CINC) can be represented by the SAO chief or another officer in meetings and
coordination conducted by the country team. 24
The country team meets in various configurations to address issues, but when it
assembles to coordinate in-country counterdrug actions, it is usually chaired by the CNA
(most often the deputy chief of mission acting as coordinator for narcotics affairs). Principal
players can include the Chief, Security Assistance Office (SAO), Chief of Station, DEA
narcotics attache, INS attache, Customs attache, Narcotics assistance section (Department
of State, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs), FBI legal attache, U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Information Service, and the Defense
Attache.
Many country team members maintain direct communications with parent organizations
located stateside as well as directive authority for any related subordinate teams they may
have operating within the host country. For example the narcotics attache maintains a link
with DEA in Arlington, VA, while he also directs actions of DEA teams in the field. The same
stovepipe effect is true of the legal attache (FBI), security assistance officer (Defense Security
Assistance Agency and Unified Command), Defense attache (Defense Intelligence Agency),
public affairs/USIS Officer (U.S. Information Agency), the narcotics assistance section officer,
and so on. In addition, the Treasury Department’s U.S. Customs Service, Justice
Department’s U.S. Border Patrol, and Transportation Department’s Coast Guard send
training teams to numerous countries to assist in professionalizing those host nation
institutions.
This mixed group demands the close attention of the Ambassador and his CNA to ensure
coordinated action within the host country. This underscores the necessity of effective
strategic and operational planning on the part the Ambassador and his country team
members.
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USSOUTHCOM Subordinate Commands.
Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South), is located at Howard Air Force Base,
collocated with the U.S. Air Force Southern Command (USSOUTHAF) Joint Air Operations
Center. JIATF-South is a SOUTHCOM unit which operates under the combatant command
of USCINCSOUTH and the policy guidance of the Commandant of the Coast Guard, acting as
the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator. 25 JIATF-South assists host nations to destroy drug
trafficking organizations, drug crops, and drug production facilities; and track and seize
drugs scheduled to be shipped to the United States. The JIATF-South integrated system of
detection and monitoring includes riverine and land operations as well as air surveillance. Its
activities include detection and monitoring, intelligence, training, planning, logistics, and
communications in support of U.S. and host nation law enforcement. 26 It passes the
movement information of suspected drug trafficking aircraft and ships to U.S. and host
nation law enforcement agencies for seizure. Its area of operations is Belize southward
through the Andean Ridge.
JIATF-South is organized under the command of the SOUTHCOM Director of Operations,
J3. Other SOUTHCOM staff divisions participate in the JIATF. In addition it has an
interagency targeting cell made up of representatives from JIATF-East, Customs, Defense
Intelligence Agency, DEA, and SOUTHCOM staff and air component officers. See Figure 24.

Figure 24. Joint Interagency Task Force South.
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Most successful to date has been the interdiction of airborne drug routes, especially in
Peru. This can involve cuing and initial detection, airborne monitoring, tracking the target,
and finally, host nation pursuit using reaction forces. Flights of E3C Sentry airborne warning
and control system (AWACS) aircraft extend coverage by JIATF-South supported TPS-43
radars based at Lago Agrio, Ecuador; Yurimaguas, Peru; and, Araracuara and Leticia,
Colombia. Relocatable over the horizon radar (ROTHAR) operating from Puerto Rico, Texas,
and Virginia extend coverage into Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru. During its 12-hour, air-refueled
flights over the Andean Ridge, the AWACS affords a real-time link to host nation air forces for
intercepting drug trafficking aircraft. 27
The JIATF’s combined air interdiction operations with host nations have changed the way
drug criminals have to operate in Peru. “[Air space] . . . control has been so tight that aircraft
don’t come in any more,” a police commander has said, “the drugtrafficking is starting to
spread out to the south–down to the Bolivian border, and into Brazil.” 28 Indeed, since 1995
and this partial success of the Andean Ridge Strategy, the Brazilian border town of Tabatinga
on the Amazon River has swelled with several thousand Peruvians directly and indirectly
involved in the illegal contraband trade. 29 SOUTHCOM owes part of its operational success to
the intelligence and planning assistance teams that work with U.S. Government agencies
and the host nations.
Tactical Analysis Teams (TAT), organized and deployed by the JIATF, provide
intelligence support to the country teams. They work under the direction of the SOUTHCOM
J2 counterdrug intelligence officer. These small intelligence teams focus intelligence
collection assets (imagery, communication) to support country team planning and
counterdrug operations. The TATs provide a real-time link between the country team and
U.S. SOUTHCOM. There are now ten TATs in Latin America.
Planning Assistance Teams (PATs–11 currently) are helping host nation and country
team officials plan and conduct counterdrug operations in embassy and field locations in
Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia, Equador, Peru, and Bolivia. For example, the operations
planning group and tactical analysis team of DEA’s EDIC in Bolivia are manned by TAT and
PAT personnel provided by SOUTHCOM. The PAT and TAT program is one way that
SOUTHCOM’s service component personnel directly participate in overseas counterdrug
support activities.
Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-B) located at Soto Cano Airbase, Comayagua, Honduras, is a
support facility of about 500 service personnel whose mission is to conduct training, perform
contingency planning, and support nation assistance projects within Honduras. 30 Current
activities include humanitarian and civic assistance missions in Honduras and providing
staff training for regional military leaders. The airbase can support counterdrug aircraft that
are involved in JIATF-South missions, and it has a C5B Galaxy aircraft capability to facilitate
the off-load of heavy equipment. JTF Bravo is in an excellent location to support U.S.
Government and host nation agencies in their efforts to gather information about, and
conduct operations against, the transiting of drugs and other contraband through Central
America.
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USACOM Subordinate Commands.
In addition to JIATF-East previously mentioned, U.S. Atlantic Command provides an
information analysis center (IAC) to assist the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico and his country
team. The IAC falls under the staff supervision of the Army Forces Command (FORSCOM)
Director of Operations, and it takes its interagency lead for in-country actions from the
country team’s DEA attache. The IAC currently has five communications and information
analysts, and it will probably add logistical and operations planners to complete its
organization at about 9 people.
The Information Analysis Center is a communications link that provides counterdrug
information to support country team cooperative programs with Mexican authorities and
U.S. DLEAs in Mexico. The IAC develops information products (such as terrain and
movement analysis), assists with operational planning, analyzes multiagency counterdrug
information, and provides tracking and technical data to Mexican and U.S. DLEAs. 31
The IAC sustains a 24-hours-a-day communications and analysis center that coordinates
overflight and air safety information to U.S. aircraft. It assists the hand-off of counterdrug
actions from U.S. assets to Mexican authorities in order to deal with drug criminals within the
sovereign territory of Mexico. In this regard, the IAC coordinates support to the Mexican
Northern Border Response Force (NBRF), a Mexican counterdrug law enforcement team that
intercepts drug criminals. As the focal point for DoD detection and monitoring requirements
for Mexico, the IAC is an important asset for coordinating with JTF-6, in El Paso, TX,
operations that are close to Mexico’s northern border. The IAC’s communication and
coordination functions are critical for ensuring that counterdrug law enforcement efforts on
the U.S.-Mexico border enjoy international and interagency cooperation and are conducted
safely at the tactical level.

THE TACTICAL LEVEL
The United States has provided functional teams that assist host countries to fight the
drug war at the tactical level. In most cases, these are training teams that work with host
country counterparts to help them improve their law enforcement and military capabilities,
develop planning and logistics skills, and encourage conduct appropriate for government
officials and institutions in a democratic society.
U.S. Customs Service often provides teams for counterpart training in nations around the
world. The DEA has agents working with host country officials to develop intelligence about
narcotrafficking, and they contribute training and planning assistance to enhance front-line
law enforcement capabilities. Narcotics assistance section agents and contract personnel
coordinate with the host country to spray drug crops with defoliants, while U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) personnel seek to construct crop substitution and
economic development programs. Military training teams working in a supporting role under
the Ambassadors’ country teams endeavor to improve the viability and professionalism of the
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host country military structure while contributing to humanitarian assistance and nation
building projects.
These illustrations evidence the need for the close coordination and cooperation of these
teams. In the overseas arena, the tactical activities are coordinated by the U.S. Ambassador
through his country team process and by the Unified Commander (CINC) through joint
planning procedures. When compared with their stateside counterparts, both the
Ambassador and the CINC have considerably more authority to effect tactical crossdepartment coordination within their domains.
If we are going to be successful in projecting the national drug control strategy overseas, it
will be with the cooperation of the international community. The Ambassador’s country team
and his country plans will remain the most effective means of guiding our counternarcotics
efforts within the host nations. Regional approaches will be difficult to implement until
multilateral agreements provide the foundation for combined law enforcement and military
actions.
With the large number of U.S. agencies engaged in overseas counterdrug activities, the
need for a coherent strategy and implementing campaign plans is apparent. The following
chapters propose models for planning the counterdrug effort. These are useful for
coordinating counterdrug activities at the strategic and operational levels.
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CHAPTER 4
A STRATEGY PROCESS
THE STRATEGY REQUIREMENT
The dimensions of our counterdrug effort, reaching throughout the United States and
overseas, and involving a seeming infinite number of drug law enforcement agencies, make
evident the need for strategies and plans. The diversity of counterdrug activities makes the
case. On any given day, DoD is conducting detection and monitoring, Transportation
Department (Coast Guard, USIC) is conducting maritime interception, Treasury
Department (U.S. Customs) is conducting aerial interception, Justice Department (DEA) is
leading the attack on drug kingpins, U.S. AID is administering sustainable development, and
the State Department (NAS) is conducting aerial spraying of herbicides in a country overseas.
It is easy to see that strategies and plans are critical for getting things organized and
integrating such a wide range of activities.
The National Drug Control Strategy establishes policy and a general sense of direction for
the counterdrug effort. The National Drug Control Program agencies need supporting
strategies too, in order to effectively direct a myriad of subordinate actions.
The concern for “greater efficiency and effectiveness and less unnecessary cost” was
expressed by President Clinton as he signed The Government Performance and Results Act
(GPRA) of 1993. In the President’s words, the Act “requires the formulation of strategic plans,
of setting yearly goals and . . . measuring and reporting how well programs actually perform.” 1
The intent of Congress is to improve program efficiency and effectiveness through
performance budgeting at Washington’s top levels of government, but the basic ideas of
GPRA (strategic objectives and concepts, relationship of goals to performance) also apply in
the field to our leading counterdrug organizations. 2
Strategic plans are needed to establish objectives, tell subordinates how the outfit will
accomplish the objectives, and what resources are in place to get things done. Then, at the end
of the planning period, an evaluation of performance can offer feedback on what works well,
and what needs improving.
Strategic plans are important for telling strategists in other organizations what you are
doing for the long haul. Thus, they can accommodate to your concepts in their strategies and
can know how to support you. And, the long-range nature of a strategy makes it important as
a compelling rationale for future funding requirements.
While there is a clear need for a strategy, it is not clearly agreed what strategy is or what a
strategy document should look like when it is written down for others to see. A good
counterdrug strategy should coordinate the instruments of counterdrug power to achieve
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objectives that will contribute to national security and a vision for “success” in the
counterdrug effort.
These instruments of counterdrug power are the organizations and skilled personnel
competent at anti-drug education, drug abuse rehabilitation, technology, criminal justice
(investigation and prosecution), finance and accounting, interdiction, detection and
monitoring, and intelligence. The strategist also makes use of traditional elements of power
whenever they are appropriate and available: the diplomatic, economic, military, and
informational elements that are often accessible for overseas initiatives.
All this must be put into a strategy document, but how does one go about writing the
strategy? Following is one approach to consider. While this is not a performance budgeting
process, it is consistent with, and fits into, the GPRA framework used at the top levels of the
government.

DEVELOPING THE STRATEGY
One distinguished strategist summed up the definition of strategy this way: Strategy
equals Ends (objectives towards which one strives) plus Ways (courses of action) plus Means
(instruments by which some end can be achieved). 3 Constructs involving anything less are
simply wishful thinking. This formula enjoins the strategic planner to fully account for What
is to be done, How he plans to do it, and what Resources will it take to get the job done. The
message is clear; any viable strategy requires the planner to examine his operating
environment (assessment), then identify:

• Measurable Objectives
• Concepts for Operations
• Resources
The extent of imbalance among these three elements of strategy will suggest the degree of
risk inherent in the strategy. A partial strategy written without regard to resources is at
grave risk. Here, the authors take a direct approach to conceptualizing strategy: first look
at the strategic environment, then establish strategic objectives, and concepts for
accomplishing them. Determine what resources will be needed to make the strategy
effective. Finally, consider a plan or method of evaluating how well the strategy is
working–so that it can be adjusted.
First, Examine the Environment. National interests drive U.S. Government behavior in a
region of the world, in the local community, or in a functional policy area such as countering
illicit drugs. A statement of interests should be expressed as a desired end state or condition.
Counterdrug examples at the national level might be stated this way:
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The United States has an interest in:

• Safe communities free from drug crime and terror
• Educated citizens resistant to illicit drugs
• Effective drug treatment programs within the community and the criminal justice
system

• Border security that resists penetration by drug smugglers
• Strong allies that can fight illicit drug production and trafficking in overseas areas.
Once interests are identified, the planner can identify political, economic, geographical,
social, and law enforcement factors, trends, and events that affect these kinds of interests.
In other words, what is going on within your domain that has an effect on your
counterdrug interests. When completed, this examination of the strategic environment
becomes the “threat assessment” that establishes a baseline of criminal activity from
which you can later measure the success of your strategy. A threat assessment is likely to
be a large, stand alone document. Thus, a good approach is to use a synopsis of the threat
assessment in your strategy document (examine the environment), and place the full
assessment in an annex to your strategy.
There are likely to be specific factors of criminality that adversely impact your interests.
Consideration of these will help you to decided what should be done.
Second, Establish Strategic (Measurable) Objectives. In each case where our counterdrug
interests are threatened by drug criminals or found to be at risk in some other way, strategic
objectives should be identified to protect, defend, and enhance the interest(s). In this way, the
planner identifies what needs to be accomplished with our counterdrug resources to protect
our interests. Such objectives are best stated with action verbs and should include some way
to measure progress toward achieving the objective. Objectives supporting our interests in
“safe communities free from drug crime” could be stated this way (using a High Intensity
Drug Trafficking Area for this example):
The HIDTA will:

• Dismantle the money laundering operations of the two major drug trafficking
organizations now operating in Western Texas not later than January 1, 1998.

• Defeat maritime parasitic smuggling operations of the Pena Gang in San Diego County
by the end of FY 97.

• Identify causal factors of drug trafficking and abuse and incorporate these factors into
the FY 98 HIDTA strategy objectives and concepts.
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When an objective cannot be written in terms that can be evaluated easily or measured in
some way to determine later success, consider developing one or more supporting
performance objectives. Because of the multiagency environment in which we plan and
operate, strategic objectives may not be exclusively law enforcement. Law enforcement
activities may be supporting, parallel, or complementary resources for a wider strategic
objective developed by another agency of government.
Third, Formulate Concepts for Programs or Counterdrug Operations. Concepts are
courses of action that tell how our power resources will be used to achieve strategic objectives.
The concept should be explicit enough so that organization members and supporting agencies
can clearly see how things are going to be done, so that it can serve as a basis for their planning
and programming. Collectively, concepts should address all strategic objectives identified in
the assessment process. One concept (related here to interest and objective) could be stated
this way:
Interest: Safe communities free from drug crime and terror.
Objective: Dismantle the money laundering cells of the two major drug trafficking
organizations in Imperial County by January 1, 1998, to include bankers, financiers,
investment counselors, attorneys, accountants, realtors, couriers, and those involved with
the financial management of the drug cartels.
Concept: An interagency cooperative program headed by the San Diego Financial Task
Force (SDFTF) will incorporate seven critical activities: intelligence gathering and analysis;
detection and analysis of currency transactions; financial audits and accounting; undercover
techniques; electronic surveillance; asset forfeiture and seizure; and use of designated
investigator-prosecutor teams to focus effort.
As planners develop a strategy, it is likely that there will be a number of objectives and
concepts identified to support or protect each interest, and there may be a degree of overlap
among them. The final step is identifying necessary resources to support the objectives (what)
and concepts (how).
Fourth, Determine Required Resources. Here the strategist needs to determine what it will
take in terms of law enforcement organizations, training, practice exercises, logistics
(materiel, services and maintenance), military support, and so on. The need for resources
must be considered in light of each concept. Resources should be defined clearly enough to tell
planners and participating agencies what will be needed to do the job (organizations, mandays, hardware, dollar costs, and so on).
Formulating a strategy requires that the planner think broadly about the resources
needed. Statements of required resources should be simple and direct and not drift into a
count of night sticks and batteries. Resources are stated in terms of major items of equipment,
training programs and major funding requirements, and so on. Here are some notional
examples:
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Resources:

• To support on-going investigation and prosecution during FY 97, $410K will be required

for operations and maintenance funding for five Regional Border Alliance Group
collocated task forces: San Diego Integrated Narcotic Task Force; Imperial County
Multiagency Narcotic Task Force; Operation Alliance; San Diego International
Airport/Harbor Narcotic Task Force; and the San Diego Financial Task Force.

• To support analysis of currency transactions, $80K operating funds will be required to
sustain Operation BORDER EXCHANGE IV during FY 97.

• Computer equipment is required to access the Western States Information Network and

other RISS Projects, EPIC, NADDIS, U.S. Army Forces Command Intelligence Center,
and the state data bases; start-up costs (hardware, software, installation) is $12K for FY
97, with $4K required for each of the three following FYs.

• To support Border Patrol interdiction efforts in Roosevelt National Forest, one Army

reconnaissance and observation team and one Spanish translator will be required for
each of six 2-week operations during FY 97.

The resources section of the strategy provides a strong rationale for budget decisions and
the apportionment of resources by your higher headquarters.
The resources section should include input from all available sources. For example,
beyond considering funding from the National HIDTA Program, a HIDTA could receive
resources (money, equipment, people) from federal, state and local agencies, from private
agencies, and from asset forfeitures. These should be included in the budget. If such inputs
are not firmly assured at the time the strategy is published, then these additional inputs can
be identified as budget assumptions–but they should be recognized.
At the conclusion of this chapter, an example strategy of a notional HIDTA is provided. It
includes two “displays” which outline the resources needed to support the strategy. In the
figures, the resource requirements are carried forward for a 5-year period. This can be useful
to establish a foundation for long-term vision and to keep all members of the HIDTA on
course.

EVALUATING THE STRATEGY.
Prior to the annual update of the strategy, conduct an evaluation of successes and failures.
Review the success of the strategy; evaluate how well it did; describe and explain why parts of
the strategy may not have achieved success. Describe how well the strategy fits with the
strategies and operations of higher headquarters and other parallel agencies. Describe how
any strategic objectives, concepts or resources need to be changed to better meet the strategy’s
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vision, and indicate how the higher headquarters can help. Apply the lessons learned to the
revised strategy.
In sum, the process suggested above requires that interests in the national counterdrug
effort which are at risk need measurable objectives to protect, defend, and enhance these
interests; objectives will require strategic concepts (courses of action) to indicate how to do the
job; and strategic concepts will need adequate resources to get the job done. The construct
reflects the imperative that a strategy requires full consideration of ends, ways, and means.
While this formula may seem a bit involved, the hardest task is to write the initial strategy. In
subsequent years, updating the strategy will be easier.
Americans have a great deal of experience with strategic planning, in corporate America,
scientific enterprises, and in governmental operations. The DLEAs can take advantage of the
strategy process for large-scale, multiagency counterdrug endeavors to promulgate a vision
and strategic direction. And while there has often been little specific guidance available about
the process for writing a strategy, the formula suggested here (strategy = ends + ways +
means), is a common-sense framework that can help.
Appendix A provides an example of a strategy that will be useful to planners tasked with
producing a DLEA strategy document. The Annex below provides an abbreviated format. The
format lends itself to modification to meet administrative and organizational requirements.
The next chapter moves from strategic planning to the idea of campaign planning–a way to
place strategic concepts into operation.
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ANNEX
STRATEGY FORMAT
Copy No._______
Organization’s Name
Location and Date
NAME of STRATEGY
I. INTRODUCTION.
II. STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT. (Attach lengthy appraisal, assessment as an appendix
or enclosure)
A. Organizational Interests.
B. Significant General Factors Affecting Interests.
C. Law Enforcement and Criminal Factors Affecting Interests.
1. External Factors.
2. Internal Factors.
III. NATIONAL POLICY AND STRATEGIC GUIDANCE.
A. Vision, Intent, Missions of higher-level leaders and organizations.
B. Policy Guidance, Goals, Objectives of higher-level leaders.
IV. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES. [ENDS]
A. Director’s/SAC’s/Leader’s Vision.
B. Strategic Intent.
C. Mission of the Organization.
D. Strategic Objectives [what].
1.
2.
X. Etc....
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V. STRATEGIC CONCEPTS [how] for Operations and/or Programs. [WAYS]
A.
B.
X. Etc....
VI. RESOURCES. [MEANS]
A. Requirements (resources for each objective/concept/program).
B. Other Requirements.
1. Operations and Maintenance.
2. Training.
3. Administration.
4. Contingency.
VII. STRATEGY REVIEW.
(Plan for annual review of the strategy: measuring success, assessing the changing
environment, updating the strategy with refined/new objectives and concepts, and deleting
objectives/concepts that do not prove effective.)
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CHAPTER 5
OPERATIONAL PLANNING:
FILLING THE GAP BETWEEN STRATEGY AND
TACTICS
The first National Drug Control Strategy suggested that_". . . a truly integrated, effective
and efficient national strategy requires that various law enforcement authorities coordinate
their efforts when drugs are involved." 1 This chapter offers the thesis that the ideas of
military strategy and campaign planning can make a significant contribution toward unified
counterdrug action. The issue is not limiting the authorities and jurisdictions of the many
drug law enforcement agencies; rather, it is synchronizing the inherently interdisciplinary
counternarcotics effort among well-established, if overlapping, domains.
In the last chapter, the idea of strategic planning was introduced. Here, some techniques
of military planning are suggested as a way to place counterdrug strategy into action. The
chapter describes a campaign planning process and suggests that the process can be applied
to counterdrug planning. Finally, the chapter posits several tenets of campaign planning for
guiding counterdrug operations.

OPERATIONAL ART
In military parlance, operational art is the employment of forces to attain strategic or
operational objectives through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and their
major operations. Operational art translates strategy into operational and, ultimately,
tactical action. No specific level of command is solely concerned with operational art.
Operational art is the skill that causes strategic intent to influence operational design and
tactical action. Operational art facilitates the top-down relationships among national
military strategy, theater strategy, theater campaigns (strategic level), subordinate
campaigns (operational level), and tactical battles. In turn, campaigns are “a series of related
military operations aimed to accomplish a strategic or operational objective within a given
space and time.” 2

Campaigns.
Campaigns are the way a commander employs and sustains his forces in a phased series of
unified or joint actions to achieve strategic objectives. The synergistic effect of these phased
operations creates an advantage, or leverage, which makes the opponent’s position
untenable. An important characteristic of the campaign is the authority given its commander
to synchronize air, land, and sea efforts to attain his objective. 3
91

Campaigns can be conducted at the strategic and operational levels. At the strategic level,
campaigns achieve theater of war strategic objectives by the conduct of a series of related
unified operations. When there are several lines of action within a theater of war, the
commander-in-chief (CINC) may establish subordinate theaters of operation. Each theater of
operation commander could conduct subordinate (operational level) campaigns to achieve
both the CINC’s strategic objectives as well as supporting operational objectives by the
conduct of a series of related joint and service operations.

Campaign Plans.
A theater campaign plan translates strategic intent into operational focus for
subordinates. It provides the theater commander’s intent–what he plans to do with his
resources to achieve strategic objectives. This includes a description of the condition or
desired end-state he wants to achieve. The campaign plan provides broad concepts for phased
operations and sustainment. The plan defines the initial phases(s) of the campaign clearly
and establishes what spells success at the end of the campaign; however, to the extent that
the commander comprehends the potential for war’s “fog and friction” which may affect
planning and operations, the mid-phases of the campaign may show less definition.
Campaign plans, therefore, are supplemented with contingency plans to provide flexibility in
dealing with changing situations.

Center of Gravity.
Both strategic and operational level campaign plans orient on the enemy’s center of
gravity (in order to put him at a disadvantage, rob him of the initiative or will to continue, and
defeat him). The center of gravity has been described by Clausewitz as the “hub of . . . power
and movement, on which everything depends.” 4 The Joint Chiefs of Staff Basic National
Defense Doctrine (Final Draft) describes center of gravity in these terms:
The characteristic, capability, or locality from which an opposing nation or alliance derives its
freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight is called the enemy strategic center of gravity. If it can be reduced to a singular capability, that . . . should be the . . . objective. If complete destruction or neutralization of the center of gravity is not feasible, major inroads against several
components thereof may provide . . . [success].5

The center of gravity is not a vulnerability or a weakness. Rather, it is easiest to discern in
terms of that main concentration of an opponent’s power which can interpose itself between
us and our strategic objective, thus causing our campaign to fail. Other components that are
considered during the process of identifying the center of gravity have been described as
decisive points, critical nodes, intermediate objectives and the like.
In a counterdrug campaign, examples of an enemy's center of gravity could include key
individuals (first and second echelon leaders); key nodes in the distribution system; major
transportation assets, communications capabilities; or, perhaps most important, the
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financial war chest, i.e, major money caches necessary to sustain operations. In identifying
the enemy’s center of gravity, one might ask what could win for the enemy or what is vital to
the enemy to accomplish his strategic aim. 6

Unity of Effort.
Most important is that the campaign plan synchronizes the varied and diverse actions of
subordinate commands to achieve a synergistic effect in attacking the center of gravity and its
components. Such synchronization enjoins unity of effort, the prerequisite for success.
Unity of effort is created by establishing command relationships among the commander,
his subordinates, and those other commands and agencies charged to support him. This
authority, written into the plan, is based on law, treaties, regulations, and standing
procedures.
Of course, the campaign plan can exact unity of effort by way of its commander’s precise
mission statement, his statement of intent (what he intends to accomplish), and his phased
concept for operations throughout the campaign. The plan organizes the terrain and key
functions to delineate responsibility, and it composes forces into unified and joint forces for
the operations of each phase of the campaign. The campaign plan provides a theater logistics
concept for sustaining the command throughout the campaign. This includes logistics goals
and priorities for each phase of the campaign. It describes, by phase, direction for procuring
resources, establishing logistics bases for operations, and opening and maintaining lines of
communication (supply) to the fighting forces. The campaign plan, therefore, provides a
logical and powerful rationale to justify the funding programs requisite for success.

CAMPAIGN PLANNING PROCESS.
Having discussed the campaign plan’s contents and its relationship to strategy, it is now
useful to address the process–how to do it. Here, a conceptual procedure for writing the plan is
suggested. Reduced to its essentials, operational art requires the leader to answer these
questions: what condition must be produced to achieve the strategic objective; what sequence
of actions is most likely to produce that condition; and how should resources be applied to
accomplish that sequence of actions? The process for campaign planning describes the
leader’s vision for fighting and articulates his intent.
This process is a cognitive and conceptual exercise of conducting an assessment (estimate
of the situation); developing campaign design through assigned missions, concepts of
operation and logistics; establishing theater organization and command relationships;
writing these into a plan; and leading its execution.
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Assessment.
In the assessment a myriad of variables must be considered. Intelligence resources are an
essential aid in the assessment for both historical and predictive information of enemy
capabilities and intent. Yet other information is also critical in assessing the strategic
situation: political-diplomatic considerations, personalities of key leaders, the cultural and
religious environment, geography and climate, and so on.
Staff techniques used by the military services can facilitate this assessment process. Joint
planners look at command, control, and communications countermeasures to thwart the
enemy’s capability to perform his mission. For example, Air Force planners (targeteers) look
for “critical nodes” in enemy command and control systems in order to disadvantage the
enemy at points where he is vulnerable.
The Army’s intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is a process uniquely suited to
effect predictive intelligence fusion. The IPB process integrates known enemy procedures and
activities with environmental factors and relates these to the mission at hand. IPB “provides
a basis for determining and evaluating enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable
courses of action. These staff processes are helpful in assessing the situation at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels. The excellent staff analysis at JTF-6 (see Chapter 2) has
demonstrated the usefulness of IPB for supporting law enforcement counterdrug activities.

Design.
Campaign design addresses the concepts of center of gravity (discussed above), lines of
operation, culminating points, and offense and defense. The line of operation connects the
force with its base of operations at the rear (where it gets its reinforcements and supplies) and
its objective at the front (where it operates against the enemy). This is important for
developing a zone of supply, communication, transportation, and the like. Another concept for
campaign design is the notion of culminating point–the point in time and space at which the
offensive becomes overextended and offensive combat power no longer sufficiently exceeds
that of the defender to allow continuation of the offense.
This is a useful concept as it reminds the leader to generate sufficient resources to enable
him to achieve the strategic objective before reaching the culminating point–running out of
steam! Conversely, when on the defensive, the leader draws his enemy to culmination, then
strikes him when he has exhausted his resources. This goes hand-in-hand with the essential
decision of offense or defense, and various combinations of these at both strategic and
operational levels.
Other classic elements of design are self-explained but deserve mention. Also considered
are objectives, sequence of operations (deployment, phased employment, sustainment),
intelligence architecture, maneuver, firepower, and deception. So, many factors are
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considered in designing the traditional military campaign, and some of these can be helpful to
the interagency planner as well.

Organization and Command Relationships.
While considering the conceptual constructs described above, the campaign planner
decides how to get organized. Both area and functional organization are considered. Often a
combination of area commands (theaters, regions, sectors, zones) and functional commands
(air support, transportation, intelligence) is decided. As the organization is determined, the
command relationship among units and their commanders must be described based upon the
authority given the commander by law, regulation, or directive. Command relationships
answer the question, “Who’s in charge?" Also described are subordinate and supporting
relationships. When authority for establishing firm relationships is not granted the leader,
his campaign is placed at risk in execution by the competing demands within participating
organizations.
In any event, command relationships should be described in specific terms: command,
operational control, tactical control, attachment, coordinating authority, or support. Each of
these must be defined in the plan so that all participants understand their meaning.

Writing the Plan.
With all this conceptualizing, it eventually becomes necessary to write the commander’s
vision into a coherent command and control instrument—the campaign plan. The best format
is the simple military order: friendly and enemy situation (assessment); mission; execution
(phased concept of operations); logistics (sustainment); and command and communications.
(See Figure 25.) The Annex, Campaign Plan Format, suggests a detailed format for a
campaign plan that can be helpful to DLEAs.

Leadership.
Finally, as the campaign plan is published, the leader must supervise its execution by his
technical competence, his timely commitment and positioning of resources, and his presence.

CAMPAIGN PLANS: HOW DO THEY APPLY TO THE DRUG
CONTROL EFFORT?
The campaign planning process can be helpful in tying together the broad strategic
objectives and concepts of the national drug control strategy, other strategies and policy, and
the tactical efforts of federal, state, and local drug law enforcement agencies. The campaign
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Figure 25. Example Plan Format.
plan is an effective command and control instrument that fills the gap between strategy and
tactics.

The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas–An Example.
The HIDTAs could design campaign plans to accomplish the strategic objectives of their
strategies. While strategies are generalized and long term, the campaign plan accomplishes a
particular strategic objective of the strategy in the near term–perhaps a year or so. This could
synchronize the efforts of diverse DLEAs and task forces in the HIDTA area, such as DEA,
state, and local task forces, organized crime drug enforcement task forces, and police and
sheriffs’ departments in a phased manner to achieve the objectives of strategy. This kind of a
plan would logically justify the apportionment of HIDTA money to the DLEAs in accordance
with the phases of a campaign.
A coherent campaign plan at the HIDTA (or Operation Alliance, Operation NORTH
STAR) level would be especially helpful to those who provide support to the DLEAs. The
Counterdrug Support Office (CDSO), Joint Task Force Six, State Adjutants General
(National Guard), National Guard Bureau, and the Joint Staff all would provide improved
support if they could develop supporting plans in line with an overall campaign plan. Such a
campaign plan would go a long way to answering the lament, “Who’s in charge here?”
The DLEA task forces that exist throughout the nation, and other mid-level DLEAs, could
also make use of the campaign planning technique. Especially in task forces with many
players and large operating areas, the campaign plan can help to create a unity of effort.
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Tenets of Campaign Planning.
The following tenets of campaign planning can guide the supply side counterdrug
planning process. These tenets describe what a campaign plan is and does:

• Orients on the center of gravity of the threat;
• Provides concepts for operations and sustainment to achieve strategic objectives;
• Displays the commander’s vision and intent;
• Provides the basis for subordinate planning and clearly defines what constitutes
success;

• Phases a series of major operations and their tactical actions;
• Provides operational direction and tasks to subordinates; and,
• Composes subordinate forces and designates command relationships. 7

CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the campaign planning process described in this chapter is not
important for the written plan–a document to be placed on the shelf. Rather, it is the process
itself that is significant–the process of the leader’s vision and guidance, the planning
conferences, the liaison visits, the building of consensus toward specific goals, and the
continuous talking together at all levels. The campaign planning process provides a structure
and sense of direction which can encourage a community of cooperation, even where formal
authority and command relationships are inadequate.
The following chapter withdraws from this theoretical construct to describe current
strategic planning and suggests a model for campaign planning at the operational level.
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CHAPTER 6
PLANNING THE COUNTERDRUG EFFORT
The previous chapter offered a campaign planning process and tenets which can be
followed in developing a military campaign. Several examples of the strategy and
campaigning process employed today, as well as some ideas for using the campaign planning
model at the operational level, follow. First, we will look at national level strategic direction
practiced within the Department of Defense and the Drug Enforcement Administration
within the Justice Department. Then, we will review regional strategies and campaign plans.
The chapter concludes with a notional campaign plan format (see Annex) adapted for use at
the strategic and operational levels of the drug war. A fictional example of how this format can
be applied is also provided in Appendix B.

STRATEGIC DIRECTION–THE NATIONAL LEVEL
In developing strategy and campaign plans, the first step is conducting an assessment of
the strategic environment or situation. While many variables (discussed in Chapter 4) are
considered, the most compelling task is assembling the strategic guidance, missions, and
tasks promulgated by higher authorities. This is a difficult chore because the reality of high
level, interagency bureaucracy finds that our key civilian and military leaders often work for
several bosses. So strategic guidance can come from many directions. After getting the lay of
the land, the leader can begin to provide his own strategic guidance to subordinates. The
military describes this process as estimating the situation and providing initial and
subsequent commander’s planning guidance.

Department of Defense.
One historical example of the product of this process is seen in the Department of Defense
“Guidance for Implementation of the President’s National Drug Control Strategy” (Appendix
C).1 This document is historically significant because it was instrumental in getting the
military fully involved in supporting the DLEAs. It drew upon Presidential and congressional
guidance to frame its strategic concepts, briefly assessed the drug threat, and identified tasks
required by the President and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.
The broad concept of supply interdiction that it outlined was repeated from the President’s
drug control strategy: attack the flow of drugs to the United States in source countries, in
transit, and within the United States. It was a broad policy statement that underscored the
Secretary’s intent to use DOD assets to support the national drug control strategy.
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As a supplement to the DOD guidance document, the Secretary provided a memorandum
of instruction to his staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It directed the
department to “undertake immediately the initial actions set forth . . .” in the
memorandum–such as training assistance, establishing regional logistical support offices
providing equipment to DLEAs, and expanding the National Guard effort. 2 At high levels of
authority, a memorandum is a likely policy document for providing direction.
In this manner, several unified and specified commanders received memorandums of
instruction which told the combatant commanders what to do and synchronized their actions
in accordance with the DOD Guidance. For example, Atlantic Command was tasked to deploy
a Caribbean counterdrug task force (which became JTF-5, later JIATF-East); Pacific and
Southern Commands were to combat drug production and trafficking in coordination with
host countries; and North American Aerospace Defense Command was to complement and
support the DLEAs through detection and countering illegal drug trafficking.
In subsequent years, this initial guidance has been supplemented by Presidential
Decision Directives, policy guidance from the DoD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy
and Support, and strategic guidance emanating from the Joint Staff. These are examples of
sources for strategic guidance that helps the planner get started on developing a strategy or a
campaign plan. Other departments of government have similar documents, but DEA made a
strong effort in the early 1990s to make strategic guidance readily available to its agents in
the field.

Department of Justice and Its Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA).
Through the summer of 1990 the DEA developed a draft DEA Strategic Management
System (SMS). It was produced in the Office of the Assistant Administrator for Investigations
and Planning with assistance from military planners. DEA’s SMS set forth the objectives and
priorities for dealing with its environment in three levels of documents: at the macro level was
the drug strategy; supplementing the strategy were program directives and regional and field
plans.3 The full system is organized this way:

• Strategic Management System–Administrator’s overarching strategy
• Domestic field management plans–annually by each domestic office
• Foreign Regional Operation Plans–for drug source and transit regions:
—

South America regional operation plan

—

Central America and Mexico regional operation plan

—

Caribbean regional operation plan
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—

Far East regional operation plan

• Southwest Border regional operation plan (with FBI and other agencies).
Budget cut-backs in the mid-1990s gave the SMS a temporary set-back. As one DEA
strategist indicated, there was a problem with strategic goals that were not linked to the
declining budget. By placing budgeteers and strategists in the same office, DEA has been able
to keep strategic objectives and concepts in line with finite resources. The SMS continues as
an important guiding document.
Currently the DEA strategy provides an assessment of the environment and provides the
administrator’s strategic vision (what he will accomplish) and mission. Subordinate
functional plans concern such things as training, intelligence, investigations, and
management. Several “sub-strategies” orient on categories of drugs: cocaine, marijuana,
heroin, diverted legal drugs, and chemically produced drugs.
Field management plans are required of special agents in charge at various domestic field
divisions and offices. In turn, the special agent-in-charge (SAC) provides DEA headquarters
his “SAC Outlook” in a format designed under the SMS. To support the SACs plans, the DEA
Operations and Management Office prepares a “Tasking Book” for each functional or critical
area to coordinate Administration support of the SACs in the field. 4
The DEA SMS represents an important example of departmental strategy and planning.
It is designed to coordinate the planning and operations of the administration headquarters
with 20 field divisions within the United States, and offices in 44 foreign countries. How good
it is and how much it plays a central role in leading the counter drug war depends upon the
interest and involvement of key leaders in the strategy’s development and execution. It is a
practical and logical planning system designed to synchronize effort at the strategic,
operational and tactical levels. The SMS applies within DEA and carries no authority across
departmental lines; however, by establishing vision and direction, it would assist supporting
agencies to efficiently focus their help in useful areas if it were disseminated widely.

STRATEGIC DIRECTION AND CAMPAIGN PLANNING–
THE REIONAL LEVEL
The pattern for direction at regional levels includes broad strategies and specific action
plans. In the U.S. joint military arena, unified commanders (such as U.S. CINCSOUTH)
write theater strategies and augment these with campaign plans. The same approach, if less
structured, can be found in civilian agencies. The military and civilian regional planning
efforts described below represent current efforts to bridge the operational gap in the drug war
with strategic and operational direction.
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U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)–Strategy and Campaign
Plans.
Southern theater strategy and operations are focused on nontraditional threats.
SOUTHCOM mission areas include: regional cooperative security measures; encouraging
Latin American militaries to consider security roles appropriate to national requirements,
civilian control, human rights, and the rule of law; developing SOUTHCOM plans and
resources to remain actively engaged with regional nations and their military
establishments; and supporting the national drug control strategy and U.S. drug law
enforcement agencies to reduce illicit drug production and trafficking.
Rather than attempting a Southern Region counterdrug strategy that would tie-together
all U.S. counterdrug activities in Latin America, the Southern Command supports the
Ambassadors’ counterdrug initiatives and the actions of U.S. and host nation law
enforcement agencies in the region. The supporting “counterdrug campaign” is conducted by
Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South).
JIATF-South (mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3) provides the strategic and operational
direction for Southern Command counterdrug activities. As the leading U.S. military
organization, it provides the operation orders that direct military counterdrug support.
Typically, these tasks include assisting host nations to destroy drug trafficking organizations
and drug crops, leveling drug production facilities, and tracking and seizing drugs scheduled
to be shipped to the United States. (SOUTHCOM is revising its strategy and plans in light of
its forthcoming move from Panama to Miami, Florida in the 1997-2000 time-frame.)

OPERATION ALLIANCE–A COALITION STRATEGY.
In 1990, the Director of Operation Alliance (who was also the SW Border HIDTA
Coordinator at that time) produced a drug control strategy for his region. Although Operation
Alliance lacks the authority to compel the cooperation of DLEAs in the drug interdiction
effort, the strategy has served as a means of consensus building. Using the guidance of the
national drug control strategy, authors nominated by the Operation Alliance Joint Command
Group wrote the initial draft during a strategy authors’ convention. Some 21 Southwest
Border agencies provided authors to build the strategy. 5 The result is a generalized document
which announces a consensus on the strategic situation (threat), strategic objectives, and
support requirements and resources needed for drug interdiction in the Southwest Border
area.
The Operation Alliance strategy provides the agreed framework for drug law enforcement
actions in the Southwest Border area, yet by definition, strategies lack the specific
coordinating guidance by which subordinates must operate. For this, campaign plans are
used. Indeed, the essence of operational art is achieving the objectives of strategy through
campaigns.
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The reason for campaign plans, after all, is that we seldom have the resources at hand to
achieve strategic objectives at once. The strategic situation is complex, the enemy difficult
and our resources limited. We, therefore, visualize a desired end-state or condition and phase
the application of resources over time toward its achievement. The phases of a campaign
represent a series of major operations, or events, along the path toward success. Given such a
phased plan, subordinates can plan their major operations in coordination with each other,
and supporting agencies can estimate when, where, and why their support will be needed. For
these reasons, Operation Alliance has recommended that law enforcement agencies jointly
develop a campaign plan, with the participation of JTF-6 Staff, to address operations in the
SW Border area.
An Operation Alliance campaign plan would be a useful planning vehicle for coordinating
DLEA activity over a period of time. The Operation Alliance campaign plan would enable
JTF-6 to program military resources over time to support DLEA operations. Such a phased
plan would assist the DEA SAC, the Customs SACs and CMCs, and the Chief, Border Patrol,
in programming their resources to support the phases of the Alliance campaign as requested
by the DEA, Border Patrol, and Customs tactical coordinators.
Finally, by establishing a plan for action within the limits of its own domain, an
organization can generate the dynamic effect of pulling along the participation of other
agencies because the plan is cogent and compelling in its support of the President’s national
drug strategy. This effect can be seen in USCINCSOUTH’s strategy and campaign plans
discussed above. Lacking the authority over U.S. Ambassadors and various stovepipe
activities throughout Latin America, the USCINCSOUTH regional strategy and campaign
plans have encouraged coordinated counterdrug and counterinsurgency effort because they
set logical objectives, and provide concepts and resources. It is no surprise that
USCINCSOUTH’s coordinating efforts have been most successful in areas where he has had
the resources to commit. Money talks, and it is the glue which binds together disparate
agencies with common goals. Campaign plans, if well-conceived and properly presented,
provide sound bases for congressional budgetary support of counterdrug efforts.

CAMPAIGN PLANNING–BRIDGING THE OPERATIONAL GAP
The idea for a campaign plan to bridge the gap between strategy and tactics has equal
application with other mid-level agencies. The campaign planning methodology could also be
helpful to coordinate various field divisions within single agencies such as DEA and Customs.
For example, in developing the DEA domestic field management plans, the SAC of various
field divisions could use the campaign planning process and tenets cited in Chapter 5 to
ensure a coordinated effort to attain the goals of the DEA strategy and program directives.
The DEA foreign regional operations plans mentioned earlier are considered by DEA
planners as campaign plans for specific areas. 6
In overseas areas, a country team campaign plan can be effective in coordinating the
activities of its members in harmony with a logical, phased plan. Members of the Security
Assistance organization, who already coordinate their actions under the CINC’s campaign
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plan, could help the Deputy Chief of Mission in designing the campaign and supervising its
execution.
There should be no illusions about the effectiveness of such campaign plans when
participating agencies determine not to cooperate. Because operational leaders in the drug
war lack command authority, the tenets of campaign planning (described in the previous
chapter) will be imperfectly satisfied. Even with this problem, it is better to proceed by a plan
of vision than to operate on a near-term basis without a sure sense of strategic destiny. From
the review of counterdrug planning in this chapter, it is apparent that the effort and guidance
provided has been largely at the strategic level. Strategic objectives and concepts are
important but necessarily generalized. At lower echelons, campaign plans are harder to write
and specifics are needed. There is no mystique associated with campaign plans–research,
planning conferences, coordination, and hard work. The campaign plan is simply another
plan with a certain style.

Predictive Intelligence Support.
Timely and effective intelligence support will be critical for law enforcement agencies in
developing their campaign plans. “To be truly dynamic, campaign planning must have a
predictive intelligence fusion process.” 7 Military staff officers assigned to DLEAs from the
military services bring to drug law enforcement planning such critical capabilities and
techniques as the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process. In his article on
“Counterdrug IPB,” Christopher M. Schnaubelt describes the process in these terms: defining
the environment; describing the effects of the environment upon drug traffickers; evaluating
the criminal threat; and determining the criminals’ likely courses of action. 8 As the services
lend more of their intelligence support to the counterdrug effort, organizations such as EPIC,
the NDIC, and the Customs DAICC could benefit from predictive intelligence techniques such
as IPB.

A FORMAT AND NOTIONAL PLAN
This chapter has described current strategic planning and suggested that law
enforcement agencies will find campaign planning useful as they prosecute the drug war. To
help the DLEA planner tackle the task of campaign planning, the authors suggest a format
(see annex that follows) that has proven useful to military planners; and to give the DLEA
planner a sense of the flavor and style of a campaign plan, a notional plan has been written.
Appendix B illustrates how this format can be used in counterdrug planning. A
countermarijuana campaign for federal lands in northern California, Oregon, and
Washington is described.
Clearly format is much less important than content, but the authors suggest that a
universally accepted format would be helpful in improving communications among the many
organizations involved in counterdrug operations. When organizations opt to use other
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established formats, the “campaign planning Tenets” found at the end of Chapter 5 will
provide a solid touchstone for effective planning.
The following chapter addresses what is feasible in developing a national counterdrug
structure that can plan campaigns and provide the command and control necessary to
conduct America’s war on drugs.
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ANNEX
CAMPAIGN PLAN FORMAT FOR DLEAs
(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)
Copy No.______
Issuing Task Force/ Agency
Place of Issue
Date/Time Plan Signed
DRUG INTERDICTION campaign plan: (Number or Code Name)
References: Maps, charts, and other relevant documents
1. Situation. Briefly describe the situation that the plan addresses.
a. Strategic Guidance. Provide a summary of directives, letters of instructions, memoran dums, and strategic plans, including plans from higher authority, that apply to the plan.
(1) Relate the strategic direction to the situation in your domain.
(2) List strategic objectives and tasks assigned.
(3) Constraints: List actions that are prohibited or required by higher authority
(rules of engagement, legal, jurisdictional).
b. Criminal Forces (the drug threat). Provide a summary of criminal intelligence:
(1 ) Composition, location, disposition, movements, and strengths of drug traffickers t hat can
influence your domain.
(2) Strategic concept. Describe criminal intentions.
(3) Major criminal objectives.
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(Note: Consider an intelligence annex for adding detailed information.)
(4) Idiosyncrasies and operating patterns of key personalities and organizations.
(5) Operational and logistics capabilities.
(6) Vulnerabilities.
(7) Center of gravity. Describe the main source of the criminal’s power.
c. Friendly Forces. State here information on friendly Drug Law Enforcement Agencies
(DLEAs) or supporting military forces not assigned or attached that may directly affect the organization:
(1) Intent of higher, parallel and supporting agencies, task forces, units.
(2) Intent of higher, parallel and supporting foreign agencies.
d. Assumptions. State here assumptions applicable to the plan as a whole. [Remember that
assumptions are contingent conditions, the absence of which will make you revise your plan.]
2. Mission. State the task(s) of the organization and the purpose(s) and relationship(s) to
achieving the strategic objectives(s). State in terms of who, what, where, when and why.
3. Execution.
a. Overall Concept. State the broad concept (how) for the deployment, employment, and logis tics support of participating DLEAs during the counterdrug campaign overall. In the narra tive paragraph, include this information:
(1 ) Area or functional organization (geographic or technical area for each participating
DLEA).
(2) Objectives for overall campaign.
(3) Phases of major events or operations of the campaign.
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(4) Timing. Indicate the expected time periods of each phase. EXAMPLES: Phase I, DDay–D+45, or Phase I, March 29–August 1, etc.
b. Phase I (Timing for Phase).
(1) Operational Concept. How will participating DLEAs and supporting activities accompl ish
the objectives of this phase. Include operational objectives, and detailed scheme of opera tion
(actions) for the phase. Indicate lead and supporting DLEAs required to do the job. Conside r
any roles of supporting Department of Defense forces.
(2) Tasks of DLEAs and other units participating in this phase of the campaign. (List each or ganization separately and assign it a job for this phase).
(3) Forces Held in Reserve. Location and composition. Explain “be prepared” missions.
(4) Deception and Protection. Consider a concept for deception and for protecting your
units/personnel from criminal counteractions. Describe your concept. Who do you wish to
trick; what behavior do you want him to effect; what do you wish to protect; what (friendly
force) will do the deception effort; what extra resources will be needed? [Use an annex for d etails if necessary.]
(5) Psychological. Describe any psychological operations that might support your strate gic objectives.
c. Phases II–Through Subsequent Phases. Cite information as stated in subparagraph 3.b.
above for each subsequent phase. Provide a separate phase for each step in the campaign at
the end of which a major reorganization of forces may be required and/or another significa nt
action initiated.
d. Coordinating Instructions. General instructions applicable to two or more phases or multi ple elements of the organization may be placed here.
4. Logistics. Brief, broad paragraph describing how you will provide supply, services, and
other administrative support over the course of the campaign. Provide overall goals and pri orities for sustaining your organization throughout the operation.
a. Phase I (Timing–same as in Paragraph 3). Consider providing the following information as
it applies to your plan.
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(1) Assumptions.
(2) Logistics goals and priorities for this phase of the campaign.
(3) Supply aspects (include role of each DLEA in providing supplies; consider any partici pating foreign DLEAs).
(4) Base development (develop a base from which you will provide supply and services if re quired).
(5) Transportation.
(6) Maintenance of equipment.
(7) Medical services.
(8) Personnel (common procedure for replacements, manning, etc).
(9) Administration (describe any administrative management procedures which impact on
the counterdrug campaign).
b. Phases II through Subsequent Phases. Cite information stated in subparagraph 4.a. above
for each subsequent phase.
5. Command and Communications.
a. Command Relationships. If using lead agency concept, state lead agency by phase. State
generally the command/coordination relationships for the entire campaign or phases ther eof.
Indicate any shifts of command or lead contemplated during the campaign, indicating time of
the expected shift. These changes should be consistent with the operational phasing in para graph 3. Give location of Special Agent-in-Charge or other official in charge and command
posts. If the SAC or lead agency official is out of action, state who is the deputy or the next in
charge.
b. Communications. Plans of communications. [May be contained in an annex.] Include time
zone to be used; rendezvous, recognition, and identification instructions, and plans for using
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radio, telephone, and computer networks. Consider encryption and special needs for rural
and city environments.
(Signed)_________________________

(SAC, or other Official-in-Charge)

ANNEXES: As required
DISTRIBUTION:
(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)
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CHAPTER 7
PLANNING AND THE INTERAGENCY ARENA:
THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE
Earlier chapters described the problems caused by drug trafficking, listed the key
organizations involved, and set forth strategy and planning principles that could be followed
in guiding most any group. Unfortunately, real world situations seldom permit the
formulation of an ideal plan, or the optimum use of all assets, even when unity of authority is
present and all subordinates try to be cooperative. Theory often falls victim to reality,
impelling compromise–or outright changes to our ways of thinking.
It is reasonable to expect that any counterdrug campaign involving different DLEAs, and
supporting military units operating in areas of overlapping jurisdictions, will involve some
honest disagreements. But this does not alter the fact that adhering to the basic tenets of
strategic and operational planning will enhance the effectiveness of tactical actions directed
towards a defined objective. This is true whether the organization is a business, a military
command, or a group of DLEAs responsible for areas along the U.S. border.
The challenge is to determine how strategic and operational planning techniques can be
made useful to DLEAs and the military units that support them. What organizational
structure is possible that can use this kind of planning for integrating multiple agencies in
large counterdrug initiatives? This chapter addresses that question.

THE SEARCH FOR EFFECTIVE COUNTERDRUG ORGANIZATION
The quest for an organizational structure that can efficiently and effectively meet the
challenge of drug trafficking is not new. There have been numerous attempts to reorganize
Federal drug control programs. Theoretically, what is needed is a single organization,
properly manned and funded, that operates under one leader who has directive authority to
control all counterdrug programming, planning, and tactical efforts, both domestically and
overseas. That will not happen.
The need for a single agency was recognized by the Nixon administration, and attempts in
that direction were made during the 1973 Executive Branch reorganizations. The effort failed
for bureaucratic and political reasons, but the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was
formed and made lead agency for investigating violations of federal narcotics and dangerous
drug law. However, other federal agencies, such as the U.S. Customs Service and the U.S.
Coast Guard, retained primary law enforcement roles in preventing the entry of illicit drugs
into the United States.
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Today some 50 federal agencies (to include such seemingly unrelated agencies as the
Bureau of Land Management; the Internal Revenue Service; Bureau of Indian Affairs; and
the Federal Aviation Administration have responsibilities as national drug control program
agencies in combating the flow of drugs. Then, too, the states and most large cities have their
own counterdrug bureaus and teams.
No one person or agency (excluding, perhaps, the President) coordinates or integrates the
operational planning or tactical actions of the many agencies. The ONDCP is not given this
authority, nor is it structured accordingly. The ONDCP is a policy developing organization,
concerned with national drug strategy, and serves as a coordinating mechanism at the
national level for implementing Presidential policy. In interagency operations at the
operational (campaign) planning level and at the tactical level, no one agency is “in total
command” nor in our system is it likely that any one agency ever will. This does not mean that
efficient operational and tactical activities cannot be accomplished. It means only that they
must be done through efforts in a multiagency coalition. The “headquarters” or designated
leading agency must be supported by diverse groups with common interests, much in the way
our nation has used alliances or coalitions in international initiatives–particularly when
facing grave threats to our interests.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE COUNTERDRUG EFFORT
Many common considerations exist between the planning efforts for a military operation
and interagency efforts in an international and domestic war on drugs. Defining the strategic
objectives, understanding enemy (drug trafficker) intentions and capabilities, specifying
areas of operations, setting priorities of effort, establishing organizations with workable
command and control structures, sequencing operations, following span of control principles,
and making sound resource allocation should be similar in either military or drug law
enforcement strategic and operational planning.
As an example, when fighting a war that is spread over vast areas, the strategist
determines what functional and geographic subdivisions should be made in order to organize
and effectively combat the enemy. He considers all the factors mentioned above plus timedistance factors, international law, sovereignty issues, the interests and objectives of his
allies, domestic political considerations, and budget constraints. In large conflicts, geographic
subdivisions are often called theaters of war (strategic level) and theaters of operation
(operational level). A theater commander is appointed who devises a theater strategy which
complements national military strategy and, within his resource allocation, he begins
formulating operational-level campaign plan(s) to attain the strategic objectives. His plans
consider not only the organizations and assets under his control but also those friendly forces
that may become available.
In coalition efforts, the leader also becomes a diplomat in order to achieve harmony and
unity of effort among the allies involved. He must consider the agendas and objectives of all
forces under his authority if he is to be successful in obtaining maximum effort against the
enemy. Compromise is both necessary and productive in coalition warfare.
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Many of these principles also apply to drug war planning where multiagency coalitions
must be formed to integrate activities. The drug threat is immense by any measure. Coherent
long-term planning within a unified framework is needed for successful multiagency efforts
on a scale adequate to counter the threat.

A UNIFIED ACTION PLAN FOR SUPPLY REDUCTION
OPERATIONS
A look at the strategic environment from a geographic and functional perspective might
lead to greater efficiency in countering the drug problem. Although the authors do not pretend
an optimum solution, the organizational concept described in the next several paragraphs
provide an example of what could be a sound organizational structure to facilitate unified
actions and one that may be politically feasible.

Multiagency Actions within the United States.
The continental United States can be viewed as a National Interagency Area (NIA) that
encompasses functional and regional counterdrug activities. The Director, ONDCP, could
serve as NIA Director, or he could nominate a Chief of the NIA to the President for approval.
In any event, the Chief of the NIA would provide strategic guidelines for subordinate areas in
order to achieve a unity of effort. The term interagency operating area (IOA) may be a good
descriptor of these subordinate areas since interagency DLEA effort is required. See Figure
26.
Within the continental United States, certain operating areas lend themselves to
geographic breakout for supply reduction operations. The Southwest Border area; the
Central region; the Southeastern region; and the U.S.-Canada border states are appropriate
IOAs that merit an operational level headquarters for counterdrug planning.
Some IOAs can be functional, rather that geographic. These “areas” might include the
function of detection and monitoring or the function of financial crimes enforcement. The U.S.
Interdiction Coordinator (USIC) (discussed in previous chapters) is one prototype example of
this approach to strategic direction. In this case, the USIC sets the goals and provides
strategic direction for the functional area of international interdiction, in the host countries
and in the transit zone. Although he does not exercise directive authority over U.S. drug
agencies in a specific area of the world, the USIC has “oversight coordination” authority over
U.S. agencies supporting the interdiction function.
We suggest that a lead agency be designated for each IOA within the United States. That
agency would designate an IOA Chief who has the authority and responsibility for preparing
regional strategies and campaign plans for multiagency counterdrug operations when they
are needed. This would involve the cooperative participation of appropriate federal agencies
(plus state and local agencies). Federal DLEAs playing a major counterdrug role might be
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Figure 26. Interagency Operating Areas.
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designated a lead agency for an IOA related to its primary function. It would designate a
senior executive to serve as IOA Director. In those IOAs where it is not the lead agency, the
DLEA would serve in a supporting role.
The suggested organizational concept plays to the strength of each group by selecting as
lead agency that agency best suited for the IOA environment. Such an arrangement also gives
each major DLEA a special domain in which to excel. Cooperative efforts are enhanced in that
each agency needs help from the others in order to succeed within its IOA. Agency heads will
encourage the cooperation of their subordinate officers assigned to IOAs where they are not
the leading agency.
The description of the IOAs shown in the Figure 26 is offered for illustration only.
Recommending geographical boundaries, functional areas, and lead agency designations is
more appropriately the role of ONDCP in responding to legislative requirements and
Executive guidance, and with consultation with the departments and agencies involved. But
the point to be made is that wherever multiagency operations are appropriate, they should be
guided by coherent strategies and plans, and implemented under authoritative direction.

Regional Operations Overseas.
In overseas operations, the designation of a leading agency is more complicated.
International law, treaty agreements, U.S. foreign policy objectives, security considerations,
military-to-military relationships, the role of an American Ambassador and his country team,
and the internal social and political environment of the foreign nation concerned are all piled
upon and intertwined with drug war problems. Over 50 U.S. Government agencies are
involved in activities outside the United States, particularly Agriculture, Commerce,
Defense, and Justice. Many of these agencies have important contributions to make in the
overseas counterdrug effort. But our foreign policy-strategy apparatus, unchanged since the
end of World War II, is challenged by the need to integrate U.S. overseas activities for
coherent and efficient actions. 1 For the national drug control strategy, it is especially difficult
to specify one lead agency or theater headquarters to provide leadership and planning.
One solution is that the responsibility for developing and implementing drug strategy in
an overseas region should reside with a senior executive, serving under the Director, ONDCP.
He would carry the authority of the Executive Office of the President to implement drug policy
and build effective counterdrug coalitions overseas. Because of the myriad of complex issues
that pertain to every region of the world, several regional coordinators might be needed: for
example, Western Hemisphere, Asia, and Middle East.
A regional coordinator would work closely with the Assistant Secretary of State for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement and the Director of Political-Military Affairs,
in consultation with other national leaders such as the Attorney General, Secretary of the
Treasury, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the regional military Commander-inChief. In this way the coordinator would be in good position to lead the regional strategy
formulation process. The regional coordinator would interact with this leadership group by
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way of his chairmanship of a regional interagency working group for international
counterdrug activities. He would take charge of U.S. drug policy and strategy in a region, and
ensure that law enforcement, the military, and other elements were effectively integrating
their skills and resources toward a common goal.
When it comes to operational planning, however, the American Ambassador and his
country team are the only persons in place with the knowledge, access, and opportunity to
develop plans for an in-country combined counterdrug campaign. The geographic U.S.
military CINC (example, CINC, U.S. Southern Command) can provide both strategic and
operational planning support as requested by the regional coordinator in charge or the
American Ambassador concerned. To under-use the talents and assets of the regional
military headquarters would be a mistake. (The regional military headquarters can provide
considerable intelligence data to the several lead DLEAs in the United States regarding the
flow of narcotics from overseas theaters to the United States.)

The Layer Cake Effect.
Most any proposal for improving interagency coordination and the integration of multiple
agencies in a common endeavor could be vulnerable to adding another layer of
bureaucracy–perhaps impeding the good intentions originally conceived. This notional
proposal would make use of existing organizations, and bring to these organizations leaders
with the authority and budget to implement strategic concepts.
Some staffs and Coordination centers are already in place to assist the IOA directors
perform their duties: in the Northern Tier, Project North Star can provide the basis for a
headquarters; in the Southwest Border IOA, Operation Alliance could take on this additional
requirement. Each of the IOAs would be supported by JTF-6 for military assistance to drug
law enforcement, as well as the Adjutants General of states within the IOA. These military
headquarters can assist in operational planning and in providing federal assets for mission
accomplishment.
In the main, new staffs need not be created to support this Unified Action Plan concept.
What are required for interagency cooperation and integration are leaders with the authority
to coordinate coherent strategies and plans.

PLANNING AND THE INTERAGENCY ARENA–CAN IT WORK?
There is the compelling need for a solution to the drug problem, and no single approach
will suffice. While demand reduction programs proceed apace, supply reduction efforts must
become more effective–and efficient.
The authors are convinced that the supply reduction effort can benefit from initiatives
that stress interagency cooperation and mid and long-range planning. Strategic and
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operational (campaign) planning are integral to joint, combined, and interagency operations.
They are adaptable to drug law enforcement operations, too. An organization responsible for
coordinating coalition efforts within a geographic area can use business and military
planning techniques to great advantage. The same principles apply to U.S. elements
operating in an overseas environment. Necessity stimulates innovation, and both a strategic
plan and campaign planning are within the art of the possible.
History teaches us that coalitions of different forces working toward a common goal have
been successful–particularly when the threat is beyond the capability of any one coalition
member to defeat. The drug threat is of that magnitude. A coalition of various drug law
enforcement entities, supported by the U.S. military and other agencies of the government, is
feasible, desirable, and necessary if the United States is to continue its progress in defeating
the drug trafficker.

Planning in the Separate Drug Law Enforcement Agencies.
The strategy and campaign planning processes can also be helpful within the separate
DLEAs to coordinate their tactical actions. From the administrator level to the agent in
charge of a field division, these planning methods can be important for keeping concepts for
operations in line with available resources. Other opportunities for applying planning
methods might be found at regional, area or sector offices.
The planning techniques discussed here have been implemented by various DLEAs. The
DEA strategic planning system has been previously cited as an administration leadership
and planning tool. Operation Alliance has had considerable experience in developing a
strategy process although implementation has proven difficult. Project North Star’s “Polaris”
strategy has been put to good use in recent years. The HIDTA program is based on a strategic
approach: threat assessment; strategic planning to address the threat; initiatives and
budgets to impliement the strategy; and annual reports as to progress made in countering the
threat. In the past, however, some of these strategies often have been unable to realize their
full potential because the allocated resources (budget) were insufficient to place strategic
concepts into play, or the leaders responsible were not empowered to direct planning and
operations. Nevertheless, the strategies have been useful to coordinate counterdrug activities
and maintain focus on the organization’s goals.
Through strategic and operational planning, senior and mid-level leadership within the
chains of command of our DLEAs have a means to synchronize their activities in phased
operations to achieve their objectives. Whether it is a part of strategic level endeavors as
posited in this chapter, or at the action level of a regional law enforcement bureau, strategic
planning and campaign planning can be critical for long-range success. In the following
chapter, the authors offer some concluding thoughts about the national drug problem and the
role of strategic planning in the counterdrug effort.
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ENDNOTE - CHAPTER 7
1. Roger Sperry, Director Management Studies, National Academy of Public
Administration, “Diplomatic Disorder,” Government Executive, July 1996, pp. 17-18. The
article describes the State Department preference for “high policy” (diplomacy and reporting)
and its avoidance of “low policy” such as managing the implementation of high policy–making
things happen. Sperry suggests that the consolidation of functions and agencies operating
overseas “will happen as a matter of time.”
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Research for this publication included numerous interviews with officials at national,
state, and local levels concerned with drug supply reduction, as well as field visits involving
direct observation of law enforcement and military personnel engaged in tactical operations.
The authors also did extensive reading on the drug trafficking problem. These experiences led
to the following conclusions regarding the drug war and how it should be waged.

• The problems created by drug abuse and drug trafficking are enormous. American

social structures and moral standards are being degraded, and the economic drain is
staggering. The $150 billion yearly drain on the U.S. economy from drug trafficking and
abuse is intolerable and unacceptable. Drug-related problems have impaired our
relationships with foreign governments, and our national security programs have been
jeopardized. In the long run, America’s counterdrug campaign is more critical for U.S.
national interests than terrorism or regional conflicts in places like Southwest Asia,
Africa, or even the Persian Gulf.

• After over two decades of fighting the drug problem, we may see the gains made in

reducing the numbers of drug users vanish as the traffickers concentrate on targeting
our youth. Regardless of their individual situations or their rationale for dealing in
illegal drugs, drug traffickers are the enemies of American society. They, in effect, are
waging an undeclared war against the institutions of the United States. They must be
vigorously pursued and punished to the limit of the law. To do this successfully, a
concerted national effort is required to mobilize the resources and will of the public.

• The American people continue to demand a solution to the drug dilemma. As evidenced

by legislation enacted and by continued concern of several congressional committees,
the Congress appears quite sensitive to these demands. In 1996 the Executive Branch
revitalized its counterdrug program and provided a much needed push to the national
counterdrug effort. However, unless the effort is sustained, Congress is likely to
mandate additional measures.

• The drug war is winnable, but the United States is not yet winning. We define winning

the war as reducing the amount of drug abuse and drug traffic to a level which is
acceptable to U.S. society and which does not seriously degrade our national security,
our economic well-being, and our social order.

• In our system, no one but the President can really be in overall control of the drug war at

the national level. Only he can be the “Drug Czar,” for only someone above the Cabinet
level has sufficient authority to control the departments and agencies which are
responsible for the various counterdrug forces. This does not preclude strong influence
by subordinates in policy development, strategy formulation, and operational guidance.
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It simply ensures centralized authority. Nor does it interfere with the execution of policy
by DLEAs in the several interagency operating areas. Rather it ensures uniformity of
guidance.

• By ensuring that the Director of ONDCP enjoys Cabinet-level status and remains a

member of the NSC, and by participating in the Presidentially-chaired Drug Policy
Council, the credibility of ONDCP can be maintained. This will enhance cooperation
among the several departments and agencies. While ONDCP can develop and
administer strategy and policy guidance for the President, through his Cabinet level
board, he must play an active, continuous role in directing the interagency counterdrug
effort. Only by his direct participation can we hope to pull together and fully integrate
our counterdrug efforts in the United States with those overseas.

• While some improvement has been made in past years, the 50-some federal agencies

involved in drug law enforcement actions and the myriad of state and local law
enforcement entities are not yet working effectively together in a synchronized or
coherent manner nationwide. Operation Alliance, Project North Star, and JTF-6 are
examples of large scale, sustained interagency cooperation–but there is much room for
improvement.

• The campaign planning process can serve the drug law enforcement community as a

planning technique to synchronize interagency operations in the war on drugs. The
stakes in this war are high. Thousands of dedicated people work long hours, often in
dangerous situations, attempting to stem the flow of drugs. They deserve more and
better support than they now receive, particularly in terms of personnel resourcing,
current technology, and interagency coordination. When fighting a foe that is cunning,
ruthless, and well-financed, to win we need a force of sufficient size that is better trained
and at least equally well-equipped. That force should use the best methods known to
plan and control the battles. Until demand reduction programs are successful, we must
continue the supply reduction struggle.

• Strategy and campaign plans shape our tactical actions, but strategy and plans can only

work if there is an agreed theory or doctrine available to provide principles and rules to
guide our actions. Drug law enforcement employees, U.S. military personnel, and the
Washington bureaucracy (to include the Congress) all speak different professional
languages. Ways must be found to improve communications. ONDCP should promote an
interagency effort to publish a doctrinal concept for drug interdiction activities to
include a dictionary of common terms. The nation would greatly benefit from the
establishing of a Law enforcement interagency senior level college for promising midlevel DLEA officers–in the same form now enjoyed by the military services. We must
train together in order to operate together.

• At the tactical level, interagency cooperation and joint operations have proven quite
feasible. Such operations flourish when an atmosphere of understanding and trust is
established. This has often been accomplished by continuous liaison, frequent planning
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conferences, and working together in joint operations. The challenge is to achieve
similar harmony at the operational and strategic levels.

• Designating a lead agency to coordinate and control all joint (interagency) planning and

tactical operations within a geographical area (an IOA) is a feasible way to reap the
benefits of strategic and operational (campaign) planning.

• The U.S. military is making a substantial contribution to the drug war. It must continue

to actively seek its proper supporting role and act in a positive but noncompetitive
manner. Temptation to go beyond a support role when providing needed help for DLEAs,
American embassy country teams, and friendly foreign governments should continue to
be avoided. The military should continue to be proactive within the rules of engagement.

• The military should offer greater participation in the area of predictive intelligence

production and fusion (to include systems architecture, collection methods, analysis,
dissemination, and retrievability) and in strategic and operational level planning at
various DLEA and interagency headquarters and offices. The excellent intelligence
analysis methodology practiced at JTF-6 provides current intelligence to military units
supporting the DLEAs.

• Though not endorsed by many, some well-meaning individuals have called for
legalization and the controlled sale of drugs to raise funds for education, medical, and
rehabilitation efforts to reduce demand. These critics of current policy argue that
present counterdrug efforts have failed, and that monies now going to drug dealers could
be channeled into demand reduction programs. Presidents of both political parties, and
other national leaders, feel this argument is ill-conceived and would do much more harm
than good. We agree with them. The “War on Drugs” can be won, legalization is morally
repugnant, and the problems caused by any legalization could be more severe than those
now at hand.

• The authors recognize that the terms “Drug War” and “War on Drugs” may be imperfect

metaphors for the complex social and legal situations involved in reducing drug abuse
and bringing drug law offenders to justice. However, they are useful and perhaps
descriptive in referring to what may be the level of effort necessary to stop the illegal
trafficking of drugs which is so damaging to our society. While compassion, medical
treatment, and rehabilitation assistance is called for in helping the user and addict,
there is little room for sympathy when dealing with those who traffic in human misery
for personal gain. While education, example, and patience are vital in deterring our
youth from falling prey to the drug dealer, no tolerance should be given the drug cartel,
the international smuggler, or those distributors and pushers who feed such poisons to
our children. They must be held responsible for their actions.

The principal point the authors wish to convey is that there is a better way to plan for
sustained counterdrug efforts. If joint efforts can be coordinated under lead agency
supervision, and the method for planning a campaign and marshaling assets needed is used,
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then greater success in our counterdrug effort can be realized. Ultimately we will win the
nation’s war on drugs.
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I. INTRODUCTION.
A. This document represents the Olympia HIDTA strategy for the 5-year period beginning in
FY 2001. By HIDTA Committee policy, this strategy will be reviewed, and evaluated annu ally, during the third quarter of the Fiscal Year (FY).
B. The Olympia HIDTA was established in 1997 by the Director, ONDCP after consultation
with the U.S. Attorney General, heads of National Drug Control Program Agencies, and the
governor of Washington. The Olympia HIDTA consists of the seven Washington counties of
Thurston, Pierce and Yakima in the south; King and Snohomish in the center; and Skagit and
Whatcom (on the border) in the north. They extend eastward from the eastern side of Puget
Sound running 125 miles northward from Tacoma through Seattle to Blain on the border with
Canada. It includes the Yakima River valley which extends to the southeast from the
Tacoma-Seattle area.
C. The HIDTA is operated under the aegis of the HIDTA Executive Committee. It has a collo cated staff which includes an administrative headquarters group, a Communications and
Support Center, and an Intelligence Group. Four Task Forces are located in Seattle, Tacoma ,
Yakima, and Blaine. The Olympia Executive Committee meets quarterly and on call. The cur rent chairman is Sheriff Jane Summers and the HIDTA director is William Dickerson, DEA.
D. The range of HIDTA task force activities in the past year has included drug interdiction,
drug trafficking and financial crime investigations, support for prosecutions, and drug abuse
prevention initiatives.
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II. THE OLYMPIA STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT. (See Annex A,
HIDTA Threat Assessment.) [omitted]
A. The citizens of the OLYMPIA HIDTA have an interest in:
1. Healthy children, free of the burden of substance abuse.
2. Safe streets, free of violent crime and gang activity.
3. A Northwest region resistant to illicit drug importation and throughput.
4. An educated adult citizenry—resistant to illicit drug abuse.
5. An effective drug treatment program within the HIDTA region.
B. Significant General Factors Affecting HIDTA Interests:
1. The Olympia HIDTA area represents a major gateway for drugs to enter the United
States from Canada, Latin America, and Asia. It is also a hub for distribution of illicit dru gs
throughout the United States. The HIDTA has a large, drug-dependent population.
2. The Seattle-Tacoma area is the most important economic and cultural hub in the
Northwest region of the United States. The SeaTac International Airport is a major trans shipment point for U.S. international trade with the countries of the Pacific rim. After Los Angeles, the area is the second largest commercial container shipping area in the United State s.
The Ports of Seattle and Tacoma process annually nearly 3 million containers, and this
through-put is continuing to grow annually. About 5,000 of the 7,000 commercial vessels ar riving annually in the Pacific Northwest pass through ports in source countries in Asia. The
high density of international trade has made the region vulnerable to illicit drug traffic king,
and drug traffickers have taken advantage of this factor.
3. The HIDTA region is a significant marine smuggling target for vessels coming from
the Far East, Southern California, and Latin America. Smuggling organizations operate fro m
Canada and the Pacific Northwest. The Puget Sound region has hundreds of marinas and iso lated coves, and about 170 remote islands in Northwestern Washington. These islands are lo cated in San Juan County and have been traditional points for smuggling operations. There
are no specific lines of operation or choke points to facilitate concentrating law enforce ment
assets; the border with Canada is open and without barriers to impede traffic. Water obst acles are used to advantage by smugglers who use small and large water craft for illicit drug
trade. Local roads facilitate smuggling operations.
4. Over 3 million people live in the Olympia HIDTA area. In the past 4 years the region
has experienced a growing epidemic of drug-related crime and drug abuse. Emergency room
visits related to drug abuse have increased by 25 percent over the last 3 years, and drugrelated admissions are 50 percent higher than the national average (1999 figures). Area de mand for opium products has held steady in the past 4 years, sparking local opium production
(indoors). Methadone treatment programs have not had any significant impact on the de mand for heroin-opium products. The Washington Division of Alcohol and Substance Abuse
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advises that 14 percent of the state population has a chemical dependency. Drug-related
deaths are higher in the HIDTA area than the national rate and hospital overdose admissions
are 75 percent higher than the rest of the nation.
C. Law Enforcement and Crime Factors Affecting HIDTA Interests:
1. External Factors.
a. Drugs. Illicit drugs entering the HIDTA region are predominantly heroin (from
Latin America and Far East), marijuana (from Northern California, Canada, and Mexico), co caine (via Latin America), hashish (Southwest Asia), and methamphetamine (from Mexico
and California). Foreign-based drug traffickers are using the Blaine border crossing on the
border with Canada, and the Yakima Valley agricultural region as the principal points of infiltration and transhipment. Illegal aliens coming north from Mexico bring Mexican black tar
and brown powder heroin and cocaine into Yakima Valley for storage and transhipment to
other regions of the United States. Asian gangs have been active importing heroin via Blaine
for sales in Tacoma-Seattle and transport to the south and east. Cocaine and Latin Americanproduced heroin are mostly routed from Andean countries, usually via Mexico, to California,
and then to Yakima Valley for distribution by Mexican drug criminals and local gangs.
b. Crime.
(1) The Mexicans. The predominant foreign drug trafficking organization in the
HIDTA region is the Northern branch of the Pena-Martinez organization. The patron, Oscar
Pena-Martinez is based in the town of Uruapan, state of Michoacan, Mexico, located about
180 miles west of Mexico City. All of the Mexican heroin is processed in Mexico, then shipped
to market. The Pena-Martinez gang has a well-established forward-based organization oper ating at two identified locations in Seattle. Through his control of migrants in the Yaki ma
Valley, and a loose alliance with Seattle gangs, Pena-Martinez has become an efficient im porter of Mexican heroin, methamphetamine and Colombian cocaine and heroin. It appears
that most illicit drugs are smuggled in cars and trucks on a continuing basis throughout the
year. Pena-Martinez appears to have ceded marijuana trafficking to U.S. criminal groups. In
attempting to attack the problem at its source over the past 5 years, cooperative initiati ves
with Mexican Federal and state law enforcement officials have consistently failed.
(2) The Asians. Asian gangs in Korea and Hawaii have been active in smuggling
crystal (ice) methamphetamine and heroin into the HIDTA region. Such drugs have been in tercepted on vessels and in the mail system. A recent take-down of ice traffickers from Haw aii
found that they were shipping one hundred kilo quantities of ice via containerized cargo int o
Tacoma-Seattle for nation-wide distribution. Thai marijuana and hashish smuggling organi zations off-load mother ships in the Puget Sound region to make use of marinas and isolated
coves, and islands. Also, immediately prior to China’s acquisition of Hong Kong, numerou s
Hong Kong-based criminals immigrated to British Colombia. These criminals have been ac tively importing SEA heroin for sales in Canada and the United States. Little is yet known
about these gangs, and Canadian officials have been unable to significantly curtail these o perations.
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2. Internal Factors.
a. Criminals. Locally-based criminals have been active in the past 2 years growing
marijuana and opium poppies indoors throughout the 7-county region. Prosecutions for her oin trafficking have increased nearly 200 percent over the past 4 years. Violent crime is part of
the turf wars among drug dealers and the large drug trafficking organizations. AfroAmerican Crips and Blood gang members have been operating in the Seattle-Tacoma area for
over 10 years. Violence in the form of street killings has directly resulted from turf wars ove r
crack cocaine and methamphetamine markets. Violent crime is also routine with users who
must support drug habits with rip-off money. Though the youth population has decreased by 5
percent, violent crime by youths has doubled over the past 10 years. About 100 youth gangs
have been identified in the HIDTA region (but only ten of these are responsible for half of t he
killings). A recent survey indicated that 25 percent of HIDTA teenagers carried a gun to
school within the past year.
b. Heroin. There has been approximately a 50 percent increase in availability of
back tar heroin as observed by police in Tacoma; Seattle police have made similar reports. The
seven seizures of back tar heroin in the HIDTA region (1999), for a total of nearly 470 pounds,
indicates that the area is a likely transhipment region as well as a lucrative market. The purity of heroin in the HIDTA region has increased significantly over the past 9 years. In 1990,
the purity of heroin imports averaged between 60 and 80 percent. Today in the HIDTA area,
the average is about 90 percent, leading to expected criminal and health outcomes. Inhospital admissions for heroin overdose have increased by 45 percent over last year, and the
region now suffers 7 heroin deaths per 100 thousand people each year. In 1998, the seven
county area suffered 195 heroin overdose deaths; preliminary figures for the first half of 19 99
appear that these annual figures will be surpassed.
c. Cocaine. Cocaine continues as a popular illicit drug. There has been a 40 percent
increase in cocaine overdose deaths from 1997 to the end of 1998. To June 30, 45 cocaine
deaths have been reported by local hospitals, indicating a potential annual figure for 1 999
that may approach 100 deaths. The HIDTA area is a major storage and transhipment area for
cocaine going to Canada and the Midwestern United States. Canadian marijuana is often ex changed for cocaine, and then peddled in Canadian markets.
d. Methamphetamine. DEA estimates that 75 percent of the meth entering the
HIDTA region is the result of Mexican and California-based (motorcycle gang) smuggling op erations. But, there has been an increase in discovering local production labs: 1998, 4 lab s;
1999 through second quarter, 9 labs. Hydriodic acid and other essential chemicals are in creasingly being interdicted at the Canadian border. Precursor chemicals penetration vi a the
Canadian border are becoming a serious threat to the HIDTA region. The port of entry at
Blaine, Washington has reported a ten-fold increase in the confiscation of precursor and essential chemicals over the past 2 years. With increasing threats from both Mexican traffick ing organizations and local labs, it is anticipated that there will be a greater danger to t he
population from methamphetamine in the next few years.
e. Marijuana. Marijuana is increasingly being grown indoors in Canada, then
smuggled into the United States in direct competition with California, Oregon and Washing A-4

ton growers. Last year, the DEA Domestic Cannabis Eradication Program supported a major
counter-marijuana program in the HIDTA. About 31,000 plants were eradicated in some 345
indoor nursery operations. Local growing is so successful that Washington state now expo rts
Marijuana to Hawaii and elsewhere in the United States.

III. NATIONAL POLICY AND STRATEGIC GUIDANCE.
A. Vision, Intent, Missions. The President has said that our common purpose is to reduce ille gal drug use and its consequences in America. His long-range vision for this effort is the ef fective prevention of illicit drug use by Americans; quality and readily available drug treatm ent;
dedicated and energetic citizens working to counter drug abuse and drug crime; and effectiv e
and cooperative law enforcement and defense agencies effective against drug trafficking and
drug crime.
B. Policy Guidance, Goals and Objectives. The National Drug Control Strategy identifies five
goals. Because of the strategic environment of the Pacific Northwest, all five of these goa ls apply to the Olympia HIDTA.
1. Motivate youth to reject illegal drugs and substance abuse.
2. Increase the safety of America’s citizens by substantially reducing drug-related
crime and violence.
3. Reduce health, welfare, and crime costs resulting from illegal drug use.
4. Shield America’s air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.
5. Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.
C. Primary HIDTA Objective. The primary objective of the HIDTA program falls under Goal 2:
Improve the ability of the HIDTA to counter drug trafficking.

IV. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
A. Vision Statement. The HIDTA Executive Committee foresees a Northwest Region effective
in its resistance to drug trafficking, drug distribution, and drug abuse, and a region of c itizens
that enjoy a safe and healthful community environment, free of the scourge of illicit drugs .
B. Intent. The HIDTA Executive Committee intends to put drug criminals in jail and shut
down major drug operations with coordinated, multiagency task force intelligence, inves tigations, prosecutions, and other initiatives; the HIDTA intends to develop and sustain effec tive
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anti-drug education programs for children and adults; and it intends to achieve effective d rug
rehabilitation programs via regional government and private groups.
C. Mission Statement. The Olympia HIDTA coordinates and provides funding support to the
HIDTA multiagency task forces to dismantle or severely disrupt major regional and local tr affickers of illicit drugs; facilitates the flow of intelligence information among member agencies;
assists regional public and private health agencies to reduce the demand for illicit drugs and
improve rehabilitation programs.
D. Strategic Objectives.
1. Dismantle illicit drug trafficking and distribution organizations so that the PenaMartinez organization is disestablished by the end of FY 2002, and no other large organiza tion has replaced it through the end of the strategy planning period (30 September 2005).
2. Promote an effective anti-drug education program for children and adults of the re gion so that the percent of children using drugs is reduced from 12 percent to 10 percent by 30
September 2002; reduced incrementally to 1 percent by 2005. Adult usage rates should dem onstrate an annual, incremental reduction from the current 17 percent to 5 percent by 2005 .
3. Increase the effectiveness of drug rehabilitation programs with priority to the crimi nal justice system programs to reduce the recidivism rate from 85 percent to under 50 perc ent
by 2005. Mid-point goal for 30 September 1993 is 65 percent.
4. Increase the effectiveness of drug interdiction in the HIDTA region as measured by a
15 percent increase of the street prices of drugs and a 40 percent drop in drug-related hospi tal
admissions in the Seattle-Tacoma area through 2005.

V. CONCEPTS for OPERATIONS and/or PROGRAMS.
A. Intelligence Group. To dismantle illicit drug trafficking and distribution organizations and
increase the effectiveness of drug interdiction efforts, intelligence sharing among Fed eral,
state and local agencies will be improved. The Intelligence Group will be strengthened with
six additional analysts (two from the National Guard) to provide increased case support and
analytical services for investigations, and to provide information about large drug traf ficking
organizations in the region. The Intelligence Group will complete the process of consoli dating
intelligence within the Intelligence Group data base by the end of FY 2001. The Greater
Olympia HIDTA-wide Strategic Information Network (GOHSIN) will be completed by the
end of FY 2002, with terminals supporting local police departments lacking intelligence units
and task force participation.
B. Campaign Chill Blaine. Counter-smuggling Campaign “Chill-Blaine” will be conducted for
the 3-year period FY 2001 through 2003 to decrease the incidence of drug-related violent
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crime, drug smuggling and drug trafficking. The campaign will be in three phases. Phase I,
Operation “Black Diamond,” 1 October 2000 through 30 June 2001, will take drug crime off
the streets of metropolitan Seattle and Tacoma and place emphasis on citizen and local po lice
neighborhood cooperation and education programs. Phase II, “ Operation White Swan,” 1 May
2001 through 1 March 2002, will focus on investigations of countering drug criminals in the
Yakima Valley region and interdiction efforts along the Interstate 90 corridor. Phase III, “Operation Nighthawk,” 1 May 2002 through 30 August 2003, will focus on the northern border
with Canada from Blaine westward to Nighthawk; during Nighthawk operations along the
border to reduce smuggling and incidents of port running, interdiction operations will c ontinue along Interstate Highways 90 and 5. Campaign Chill Blaine success will be measured
by a 15 percent reduction in the incidents of violent crime in metropolitan Seattle and Tacoma, a 15 percent increase in the street prices of drugs, and by a 40 percent reduction in th e
number of drug-related emergency room admissions throughout the HIDTA by 1 October
2003.
C. Task Force Support. Law enforcement-unique equipment, to include an electronic wire in tercept facility, will be made available with priority to all HIDTA task forces. Task forces
within the HIDTA will be reinforced with additional intelligence support, HIDTA funding,
military operational and non-operational support.
D. Demand Reduction. A comprehensive, HIDTA-wide demand reduction program will be de veloped, integrating the resources and skills of local government and private organizat ions,
mutually supported by local, state and HIDTA funding. Washington Army National Guard
will be the coordinator for support activities for this program.
E. Criminal Justice System. Drug courts and related treatment programs will be extended to
include all eligible defendants using multiagency planning and programming to support a n
long-range program for the region.
F. Asset Forfeiture. A comprehensive asset forfeiture program will be continued that targets
major area drug organizations with the purpose of damaging their financial capabilities .
X. (Additional Concepts as required.)

VI. RESOURCES.
A. Director’s Resource and Budgeting Guidance. HIDTA resource requirements are projected
for the next Fiscal Year, and the following four years thereafter, to give a picture of the e xpected long-range costs of the HIDTA programs. Programs will be reviewed annually to deter mine their effectiveness in meeting HIDTA objectives; the objectives and concepts of
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programs that demonstrate an inability to meet objectives will be reviewed for necessary
changes or elimination from HIDTA funding.
B. Asset Forfeiture Funds. The 5-year average annual input of forfeiture assets made avail able to the HIDTA has been $870K. For planning the support of this strategy, the HIDTA will
assume receiving $850K in assets forfeiture resources during FY 2001, and the four years fo llowing. Failure to receive this amount will require adjustment to the strategy budget.
C. Strategy Resource Requirements, FY 2001 through 2005:
1. Intelligence Group Operations and Enhancements $815K for FY 2001. For the peri od FY 2001 through 2005, $325K in salaries for FY2001, increasing to $350K by FY 2005, plus
$85K additional will be required each year to support temporary hire of two additional ana lysts for the Intelligence Group; data base consolidation process will require $110K durin g FY
2001, and $3K maintenance costs for each of FY 2002 through 2005. The GOHSIN network re quires an annual contract fee of $200K for FY 2001-3, and $85K for FY 2004 and 2005. Opera tions and Maintenance requires $70K each year through FY 2002, increasing to $85K
through FY 2005. A contingency fund for TDY and conferences and the Intelligence Group Di rector’s discretionary account is $25K for FY 2001-02, increasing to $35K by FY 2005. Tota l
cost over the 5-year planning period for Intelligence Group is $3532K. See budget display
(Figure 27).
2. Law Enforcement New Equipment . . .
3. Task Force Enhancements . . .
4. Overtime requirement for major investigations . . .
5. Training funds . . .
6. Maintenance of equipment . . .
7. Education and Rehabilitation programs . . .
8. Asset forfeiture use . . .
9. Administrative/infrastructure support . . .
X. (Additional requirements as identified.)
D. Resource Requirements by major program: (See Figure 27, Intelligence Group.)
E. Olympia HIDTA Strategy Recapitulation: (See Figure 26, Olympia HIDTA Five Year Pro jection.)
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Figure 27. Intelligence Group.

VI. STRATEGY REVIEW.
A. The HIDTA Director will conduct a staff review of Olympia 2005 in August 2001 to estab lish the effectiveness of the objectives and concepts of the strategy, and to assess avail able resources to support the strategy as currently structured. Based on this assessment, the
strategy will be revised and disseminated to all HIDTA activities not later than 15 Septemb er
2005.
B. Programs and operations that prove unable to meet the measurable objectives of the strat egy will be deleted from the strategy, or modified to meet HIDTA expectations of effective ness, timeliness, and economy.
C. The Strategy Review will serve as the basis for budget requests for the following fiscal year.
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Figure 28. Olympia HIDTA Five Year Projection.
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APPENDIX B
EXAMPLE OF A MULTIAGENCY CAMPAIGN PLAN
The following example of a multiagency campaign plan assumes that a coordinating head quarters (West Star) is established to facilitate broad based counternarcotics operation s on
federal land in the Western United States. It further assumes that the participating agenci es
under West Star provided representatives to a planning conference to develop this plan. T he
campaign plan provides information about the situation, describes the mission (strategic objective), identifies a lead agency for each phase of the campaign, and assigns tasks to other
participating agencies. It identifies required resources and gives priorities for their u se. This
type of plan also can be helpful to the supervisory chain of a single agency in the conduct o f extensive operations involving numerous groups.
Copy No________
Headquarters, Operation
West Star
Sacramento, California
1 August 1997
Drug Interdiction Campaign Plan: Paul Bunyon I
References: (Note: Here would be listed appropriate maps, or any special directives from
higher echelon offices pertaining to this operation)
1. SITUATION. Marijuana consumption in the United States has declined only slightly in
the past 5 years while U.S. production now exceeds 40 percent of the demand. Projections in dicate this will become over 50 percent by 2001, given that the current consumption rate re mains constant. With new plant materials being cultivated in the Western United States, a
high concentration of THC (about 7 percent) has made the U.S. product popular with drug us ers at home and abroad. The governments of Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, and Barbados have re ported substantial sales of high potency U.S. marijuana in their countries and have requested
action be taken to curtail U.S. exports. The President has directed increased efforts be pla ced
on marijuana eradication and on the apprehension and conviction of U.S. marijuana produc ers and traffickers. The Congress has been consulted and supports the effort. However no ad ditional funds are expected this fiscal year to finance the campaign.
Much of the high potency U.S. marijuana is grown in the Operation WEST STAR area of re sponsibility (AOR). Intelligence reports indicate that U.S. National Parks and other fed eral
and state-owned lands now under lease for future timber harvesting are principal growing a reas for marijuana cultivation. The Northwest Border Committee will be augmented with rep resentatives from the Interior Department, the U.S. Forest Service, the U.S. National Par k
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Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. This committee
will furnish guidance and technical assistance for Paul Bunyon I and assist in coordina tion
necessary between Operation WEST STAR and their respective field offices. The U.S. Attor ney General has made Paul Bunyon I a priority effort and has requested the Administrator,
DEA and the Director, FBI to support this campaign to the maximum extent possible. State
Attorneys General in the West Star AOR have been informed and all promised their coopera tion. Likewise, appropriate state police officials, federal and state military leaders, a nd
county sheriffs have been alerted that countermarijuana efforts will be intensified.
a. Strategic Guidance. The National Drug Control Strategy calls for stepped-up efforts
against domestic marijuana cultivation and places success or failure in this program as an indicator of national antidrug resolve. The strategic objective is a 10 percent decrease i n domestic production between 1996 and 1998 and a 50 percent reduction by the year 2001. Both the
U.S. Attorney General and the Administrator, DEA have directed that antimarijuana effor ts
be sustained and not be neglected in favor of anticocaine/heroin programs.
(1) Current strategy and Presidential direction dictate that enhanced efforts be taken
to eliminate marijuana production that now exists within the West Star AOR. Action must be gin as soon as feasible. Priority of effort should be at least equal to that being devoted t o other
illicit narcotics.
(2) ONDCP, Office of Supply Reduction policy letter of February 2, 1996 provides these
policy aims:
(a) To end marijuana production on federal lands, first priority to the Western Region.
(b) To destroy the infrastructure now controlling marijuana trafficking within the
United States.
(3) Normal rules of engagement apply. No operations on land affected by treaty with
American Indians will be conducted without prior approval by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
Care will be taken to minimize danger of forest fires. Supporting military units will be em ployed in accordance with current DOD policy and serve under Title 10 USC or Title 32 USC
as appropriate.
b. Criminal Forces.
(1 ) A majority of the marijuana production and distribution in the Pacific Northwest is
controlled by the Carlos Pena-Martinez family. Their operations are based along the coastal
regions running north of Fresno, CA, to the Canadian border and inland throughout the for ested areas of California, Oregon, and Washington. Marijuana cultivation occurs mainly o n
federally-owned lands but also has been found on state-owned lands and private property.
The Pena-Martinez organization is subdivided into several distinct groups, each with diffe rent functional responsibilities. The groups may also be subdivided on a regional basis to reduce command and control problems. The exact size of the Pena-Martinez family is unknown
but is believed to exceed 200 persons.
(2) Functional subdivisions include (a) cultivation and harvest operations; (b) trans portation, packaging, and warehousing; (c) market and distribution; (d) finance and acc ountB-2

ing; and (e) security. Each subdivision is headed either by a relative of Carlos Pena-Mart inez
or a trusted friend. (See Annex A, Intelligence.)
(3) Geographic subdivision of cultivation operations is based on both political bounda ries and terrain features. In general, the overall operation is separated by states into Cal ifornia, Oregon, and Washington. State operations are further subdivided as required by terra in
features. Other components of the organization operate across the boundaries set for the c ultivation and harvesting division. (See Annex A, Intelligence).
(4) Pena-Martinez intends to maintain operations on National and State Parks land in definitely. He pays nothing for the land, avoids populated areas, enjoys excellent growing conditions, and, to date, has not experienced significant loss to law enforcement actions. He is
likely to expand his operation as the market permits.
(5) The family intends to expand their control over marijuana production and distribu tion throughout the Western United States. Pena-Martinez will avoid dealing in other narcot ics but will attempt to establish connections with foreign dealers for exporting his highe r
grade marijuana.
(6) Pena-Martinez seldom visits his field operations, spending most of his efforts on
marketing, distribution, and financial planning. His son-in-law, Eduardo Montez, acts a s an
“executive vicePresident” in managing routine affairs. Both Pena-Martinez and Montez are
residents of Walnut Grove, California. Another son-in-law, Charles E. Kelly, is in charge o f
transportation and warehousing. Kelly lives in Portland, Oregon. These three individuals
make the major decisions concerning operations. In charge of security is Alan Lynn, a bach elor and a loner who reports only to Carlos Pena-Martinez. Lynn resides in Oakland, CA, but
constantly circulates throughout the Pacific Northwest.
(7) The operation is so large that elimination of a few fields will not substantially de grade its position. However loss of the crops and fields covered in extensive eradication o perations will hurt him if the denial can be sustained. The family could suspend operations for o ne
growing season and still be a viable organization.
(8) Vulnerabilities.
(a) The decisionmaking apparatus of the family is small. Apprehension and conviction
of Pena-Martinez, Montez, Kelly, or Lynn would drastically weaken the family.
(b) Harvest season, when most members of the field divisions will be on-site, offers the
best time to damage the lower levels of the organization.
(9) Center of Gravity. The main source of enemy power is the efficient and disciplined
senior leadership group of the Pena-Martinez organization. There are several decisive fac tors
contributing to the success of the organization:
(a) Their ability to control large sections of land and use it for marijuana cultivation.
(b) Substantial financial reserves which permit sustained operations and expansion
even during period of decreased production.
(c) Efficient managerial expertise at the higher levels.
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(d) Loyalty to Pena-Martinez and cohesion of upper echelon leadership.
c. Friendly Forces.
(1) ONDCP will assist in coordination with Washington, D.C.-based officials as re quested. Deputy Administrator for Operations, DEA, will monitor and assist as required. A ssistant Regional Commissioners, Enforcement, and U.S. Customs Service will provide
support as necessary to augment Customs officials participating directly in Paul Bunyon I.
U.S. Border Patrol will continue normal operations. U.S. Attorneys and State Attorneys Ge neral concerned will assist in warrant and/or wiretap assistance and advise on jurisdictio nal issues. Bureau of Indian Affairs Liaison will advise on any actions concerning Indian Treat y
rights. State Police and Highway patrol support will be coordinated through appropriate l iaison officers. Federal military support will be coordinated through Commander, JTF-8 and
state military support will be requested through The Adjutant General of the state concerned .
(2) The Royal Canadian Mounted Police will furnish a Liaison Officer to Headquarters
West Star during Phases I and 11 of the campaign. Canadian Authority will support the op eration as deemed feasible.
d. Assumptions.
(1) Permission to operate on federal and state-owned lands will be forthcoming
throughout the duration of the campaign.
(2) State and local political support will continue throughout the campaign.
(3) Title 10 (Active and Reserve) and Title 32 (National Guard) military support will be
available, especially for air transportation.
2. MISSION. West Star coordinates phased Drug Law Enforcement Agency operations to
eliminate marijuana production and distribution from federal and state-owned lands within
Washington, Oregon, and California (north of Fresno) and to destroy the Pena-Martinez
marijuana trafficking organization.
3. EXECUTION.
a. Concept. The participating agencies of West Star intend to conduct phased opera tions over a two-and-one-half year period to stop marijuana cultivation and trafficking from
federal and state-owned lands in the West Star area of operation; success in this campaign
will be marked by the destruction of the Carlos Pena-Martinez organization and the incar ceration of its key leaders. Participating DLEA will achieve the above objectives by a coor dinated two-and-one-half year effort which will include these actions:
(1) Eliminating secure areas for cultivator of marijuana; destroying marijuana crops
wherever located.
(2) Seizing drug related assets of the Pena-Martinez organization.
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(3) Disrupting the Pena-Martinez transportation network by seizing or destroying
transloading sites, warehousing, packaging equipment, air and ground fleet.
(4) Seizing capital (currency and other instruments) to obstruct the financing of the or ganization.
(5) To accomplish the above actions, a campaign in three phases is envisioned:
Phase I, Preparation (March 1 - August 1, 1998).
Phase II, Eradication, Investigations, Apprehension (August 2 - October 30, 1998).
Phase III, Exploitation (November 1, 1998 -October 1, 2000).
b. Phase I. Preparation. (March 1, 1998 - August 1, 1998). During Phase I, intelligence
about the Pena-Martinez organization will continue to be gathered with emphasis on plots
under cultivation and locations of facilities and personnel. A tactical planning work shop will
be held under the aegis of DEA to prepare plans for the Phase II operation, and to effect de tailed coordination among DLEA for that operation. Rehearsals will be conducted, especia lly
with supporting military units to ensure mutual understanding of standing procedures. La te
in Phase I, participating DLEA and supporting military units will deploy to forward opera ting areas and establish logistics/supporting bases. The time for transition to Phase II wi ll be
when the lead DLEA (DEA) establishes a forward command post and confirms that support ing agencies are ready. HQ West Star will retain the lead for overall support coordination for
this campaign.
(1) Lead Agency. DEA is lead agency for operational planning and rehearsals in this
phase; provides a special agent in charge who will coordinate DEA support from Seattle and
San Francisco Field Offices. DEA takes the lead in preparing a plan for the operation in Phas e
Il; conducts preliminary investigations and assimilates intelligence information as available;
identifies support or logistics shortfalls to West Star for resolution; develops rules of engagement, guidance for legal procedures, search and seizure, arrest; establishes operational command post for Phase Il; directs rehearsals as required; assures coordination with HQ West
Star, within DEA supervisory chain of command, and with other law enforcement agencies.
(2) Supporting Agencies.
(a) State Police (Washington, Oregon, California). Provides intelligence and recon naissance information; assists in identifying friendly facilities such as assembly poin ts, command posts and logistics bases. Provides liaison personnel to DEA command post and
provides liaison to military units as required. Provides planner to attend plan developm ent
conference.
(b) Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Forest Service, National Park Service, State
Forest/Park Services. Provide operational and technical support. Advise during operatio ns
via liaison officers.
(c) Bureau of Indian Affairs. Provides technical advice via liaison officer. Supports
planning phase by providing liaison officer to plan conference.
(d) NDIC/EPIC. Provides intelligence support to planning process.
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(e) National Guard (Washington, Oregon, California). State Adjutants General will
provide liaison personnel for planning and to support establishing command post and log istics facilities.
(f) 6th Army. Provides liaison officer to planning conference; coordinates for Federal
and Reserve troop unit support.
(g) CDSO-El Segundo, CA. Assists in planning; coordinates for federal loan and
grants of DOD property in support of this plan.
(h) JTF-5. Assists West Star to coordinate Title 10 military support. Provides liai son for planning conference; provides liaison to DEA operational command post.
(i) FBI. Sacramento Field Office will provide liaison to DEA during planning and is
prepared to supplement DEA investigative effort.
(j) USMS. Provides liaison support for operational planning conference.
c. Phase II. Eradication, Investigation, Apprehension. (August 2 - October 30, 1998).
During this phase, DLEAs will isolate and destroy marijuana crops growing on federal and
state-owned lands; related assets will be seized and criminals apprehended; case work in
preparation for trial will continue; public relations efforts will be conducted by West St ar to
encourage support for countermarijuana operations. The destruction of identified growi ng
plots and arrest of persons involved will signal the end of Phase II.
(1) Lead Agency. DEA is lead agency for this phase; provides Special Agent in
Charge to direct operations and coordinate with DEA Field Offices. DEA will coordinate th e
crop eradication operation and provide guidance for arrests, seizure of property, and prep aration of evidence.
(2) Supporting Agencies.
(a) State Police (Washington, Oregon, California). Provides support for eradica tion operations to include security for seized assets, highway control/access, special we apons
and tactics reaction teams and intelligence support. Provides liaison officer to comma nd post.
(b) Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Forest Service, National Park Service,
State Forest Park Services. Continue with technical advise and liaison to command post. Pr ovide facilities for DLEA operations in forest and park areas.
(c) Bureau of Indian Affairs. Continues liaison to Command Post and provides
Marijuana Eradication Reconnaissance Team.
(d) NDIC/EPIC. Provides, within capabilities, intelligence concerning this cam paign phase.
(e) National Guard (Washington, Oregon, California). Provides administrative,
planning, intelligence and communications personnel to supplement DEA command post.
Provides troop units for reconnaissance and to support crop eradication on federal and stat eowned lands as directed by DEA.
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(f) 6th Army. Provides troop support (one helicopter composite company) under
the tactical control of JTF-5 to support Phase II. Provides communications equipment on l oan
basis with operators to support lead agency command post and West Star Headquarters. Pro vides ground sensor equipment and personnel to support lead agency.
(g) CDSO-Segundo, California. Provides coordination for grants and loans of
DOD equipment and training in support of this phase.
(h) JTF-5. Conducts coordination with military services to assure DOD support;
serves as single point of contact for Title 10 support for this phase.
(i) FBI. Sacramento Field Office will provide supplemental investigative support
as requested by DEA. Investigative resources will focus on Pena-Martinez linkage to Mexic an
Drug Trafficking Organization as well as its support infrastructure to include money laun derers, transporters and distributors.
(j) USMS. Supports lead agency with seizure of property related to drug traffick ing, executing court orders and arrests, witness security, and apprehending fugitives.
(k) OCDETF. By approval of the Associate Attorney General and the Executive
Office for U.S. Attorneys, the Office for U.S. Attorney, Northern California District (Sa n
Francisco) will be prepared to provide OCDETF Program support as needed. If the campaign
develops a case of sufficient scope (interstate) with national implications, then OCDETF will
be tasked to bring the case to court.
(I) ONDCP. Facilitates coordination and liaison for campaign with ONDCP
and other Federal agencies.
d. Phase III, Exploitation. (November 1, 1998 - October 1, 2000). During the Ex ploitation Phase, investigations will be expanded based on information developed in Pha se II.
The DEA forward command post will be disestablished as needed. Reconnaissance will be
conducted to identify new marijuana growing plots and surveillance will be maintained over
areas previously subject to eradication. DEA, supported by State and local police, will ma intain a rapid reaction capability to destroy new-found growing areas and apprehend perso ns
involved. The ultimate destruction of the Pena-Martinez organization and incarceration of its
leadership will mark success for this phase.
(1) Lead Agency. DEA continues as lead agency for coordinating reconnaissance,
surveillance, and rapid reaction operations for further eradication, arrests, and seizur e of
property. Continue case work leading to prosecution.
(2) Supporting Agencies.
(a) State Police (Washington, Oregon, California). Continues Phase II support on
as-needed basis to prevent resurgence of marijuana growing and trafficking.
(b) Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Forest Service, National Park Service,
State Park and Forest Services. Continue support and liaison as in Phase II.
(c) Bureau of Indian Affairs. Continues support as in previous phases.
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(d) NDIC/EPIC. Continues to provide information concerning marijuana traffick ing.
(e) National Guard (Washington, Oregon, California). Continues to provide liai son to DEA; as forward command post is disestablished, support personnel will be released to
home units. Provides troop units as in Phase II on an as-needed basis to support rapid reac tion requirements.
(f) 6th Army. As in Phase II, except helicopter company availability limited to 48
hours’ notice for support of reaction force.
(g) CDSO-El Segundo, California. Same as Phase II.
(h) JTF-5. Same as Phase II.
(i) FBI. Same as Phase II.
(j) USMS. Same as Phase II.
(k) OCDETF-Office of U.S. Attorneys, Northern California District. Same as
Phase II.
(l) ONDCP. Same as Phase II.
e. Coordinating Instructions.
(1 ) West Star retains lead for overall coordination support throughout this cam paign. DLEAs should submit requests for support to HQ, West Star.
(2) HQ West Star will maintain intelligence fusion cell throughout campaign to
support lead agency.
(3) Phase I planning conference for lead agency operations will be held March 29,
1997 at the Command Conference Center, Presidio of San Francisco; coordinating point of
contact is West Star Senior Coordinator. Request participating agencies provide planne r to
conference.
(4) Code name for this campaign is Paul Bunyon I.
(5) HQ West Star will provide overall Public Affairs support. The lead agency will
prepare and execute specific Public Affairs announcements concerning arrests, investi gations and drug seizures conducted.
4. LOGISTICS. Throughout the campaign, supplies and services (to include maintenance)
will be the responsibility of the separate DLEAs and military units except as specifically addressed in this plan or by bilateral agreements between agencies.
a. Phase I. Preparation (March 1, 1998 -August 1, 1998). The goal in this phase is to es tablish supply and service procedures and to preposition required supplies to be ready to support operations in Phase II. Priority for supply and services will be to the lead agency and its
efforts to establish a forward command post for the campaign. Procedures for interagency
transfer of funds will be established by participating DLEAs and military units. Require B-8

ments for support will be identified by the lead agency so that supporting agencies can
plan for providing support.
(1 ) Base Development. California National Guard will provide the Gordon Dilmore
Armory in Sacramento to all participating agencies for assemblying vehicles, equipment and
supplies as required. National Park Service will provide forward Command Post facilities a t
Lassen Volcanic National Park. Additional facilities will be available at Crater Lake Nat ional
Park in Oregon.
(2) Transportation. Transportation will be provided by commercial contract or
within the means of participating agencies.
(3) Medical Services. Medical services will be provided on a local procurement basis
in accordance with the standing procedures of the DLEAs.
b. Phase II. Eradication. Investigations. Apprehension (August 2 - October 30, 1998).
Principal logistics goal in this phase is to assure Lead Agency of sufficient transportat ion (especially airlift) and communications facilities to efficiently conduct eradication op erations.
Priority for all logistics efforts will be to support DEA then state and local agencies.
(1) Assumptions. Army helicopter support (one assault helicopter company of no
less than 10 UH60 type aircraft) will be available to support the campaign in this phase. JTF5 will coordinate for command and intelligence communication equipment with military p ersonnel to enable 24-hour operation of forward command post.
(2) Transportation. DLEAs will use organic and commercially contracted transpor tation means as funded by each agency. JTF-5 will coordinate through Forces Command to
provide one Army assault helicopter company in support of the lead agency throughout Phase
II. In addition, TAGs of California and Oregon have agreed to provide truck transportation
throughout Phase II in support of eradication efforts. Requests for additional transporta tion
support will be forwarded to HQ West Star for action. Lead DLEA will establish priorities fo r
transportation.
(3) Maintenance. DLEAs will be responsible for maintenance of their organic equip ment. Active and Reserve component forces established in forward operating bases can pro vide maintenance assistance to DLEA equipment within capabilities on an interagency
reimbursable basis. Maintenance for all military supporting equipment (to include C31) w ill
be provided by sending Active/RC units.
(4) Medical. DLEAs will be responsible for routine medical support for their person nel within agency guidelines. Army helicopters will provide medical evacuation to local hos pitals on emergency basis. Active and Reserve Component personnel will be evacuated through
military medical channels except when sent to local hospitals for life-threatening emergen cies.
(5) Personnel. DLEAs and supporting military units will be responsible to insure
prompt replacements for sick or injured personnel. Temporary transfer of personnel or tea ms
from one agency to the tactical control of another DLEA will be authorized by the sending
DLEA.
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(6) Administration. Procedures for loan of equipment and interagency transfer of
funds will be established in bilateral agreements among DLEA.
c. Phase III. Exploitation (November 1. 1992 - October 1. 1994). Procedures and ar rangements established to support Phase II will also apply during the Exploitation phase. It
is not envisioned that a forward command post or support bases will be needed; however,
DLEA and military supporting units must be prepared to provide resources as needed to sup port short notice response operations.
5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS.
a. Command Relationships. HQ West Star will retain overall support coordination
authority throughout this campaign to provide a single point of contact for Federal, State a nd
local DLEA requests for assistance (transportation, equipment, personnel). West Star will retain intelligence fusion responsibility during the campaign.
(1) Phase I. DEA is lead agency. It directs operational planning, rehearsals, and es tablishment of tactical command posts as needed. Other DLEAs and military organizations
provide direct support in accordance with the objectives and priorities of the lead agency .
(2) Phase II. DEA is lead agency. It provides direction for conduct of investigations,
eradication operations and guidance concerning arrest and evidence. Other DLEAs support.
West Star continues support coordination function.
(3) Phase III. Initially DEA continues as lead agency, other DLEAs provide opera tional support. West Star continues as coordinating headquarters. On a contingency basi s,
OCDETF (USAO, Northern California District) is prepared to serve as lead agency if scope of
case(s) developed by this campaign is sufficient to justify transfer to the OCDETF Program.
(4) Command Post Locations.
(a) HQ West Star. Dilmore Reserve Armory, 133 West North Street, Sacramento,
CA 94300; Telephone: 91 6-XXX-XXXX; Fax 91 6-XXX-XXXX.
(b) DEA Task Force. Phases I and III 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Franscisco, CA
94102; Telephone: 415-XXX-XXXX; Fax 415-XXX- XXXX. Phase Il: Honeymoon Lodge,
Larsen Volcanic National Park, CA 951 13; Telephone: 91 6-XXX-XXXX; Fax 91 6-XXXXXXX.
(c). OCDETF Program. Office of U.S. Attorney, N. California District, 45 Pillory
Place, San Francisco, CA 94102; Telephone: 41 5-XXX-XXXX; Fax 41 5-XXX-XXXX.
b. Communications. In addition to routine and organic communications provided by
DLEAs, West Star will coordinate through JTF-5 to assure military communications support
throughout Phase II and on-call as needed in Phase III. See Annex K, Communications In structions.
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William Walker
Senior Tactical Coordinator
West Star
ANNEXES (Omitted):
A - Participating agencies
B - Intelligence assessment
K - Communications instructions
DISTRIBUTION: A
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APPENDIX C
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE
SUPPORTING THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY
The letters included in this appendix will be useful to law enforcement officials and mili tary
officers working together in the counterdrug effort. The letters describe the strategic intent of
the Secretary of Defense in providing DoD support to the DLEAs and to other aspects of the
national drug control strategy.
Two letters by former Secretary Dick Cheney are important for their guidance: that the mili tary Department will support the drug war because drugs “. . . pose a direct threat to the sov ereignty and security of the country.” The letter to the Combatant Commanders (the CINCs)
made it clear that the DoD counterdrug support effort “. . . is a high priority national se curity
mission of the Department of Defense.”
The more recent letters by Secretary William J. Perry express his “support for an aggressi ve
and results-oriented DoD counterdrug program.” His letter of 27 October 1993 outlines spe cific initiatives that DoD will pursue. The 15 April 1995 letter identifies DoD’s “five coun terdrug strategic elements” for supporting the drug strategy.
In spite of significant DoD budget and force structure draw-downs in the 1990s, the Depart ment has been successful in providing assistance to the DLEAs. The program for providing
275 personnel from the Military Departments has been effected. The DoD is providing about
88 personnel to the DLEAs in the Detailee Program. While the Regional Logistical Support
Offices mentioned by Secretary Perry have been eliminated and replaced with a Counterdrug
Support Office under Defense Logistics Agency, DoD has been able to administer the Sectio n
1208 Excess Property Program to great effect: about $1 billion in excess property has been
transferred to the DLEAs in FY 96.
These guidance letters are supplemented by numerous subordinate directives and regula tions that the practitioner will want to keep on hand. The letters included here establish t he
framework for DoD counterdrug cooperation and support.
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
September 18, 1989
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE
FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
PRESIDENT’S NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY
On September 5, 1989, the President issued the National Drug Control Strategy pursuant to
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. The President’s strategy provides for an integrated program
of counternarcotics actions designed to move the country substantially closer to the goal of a
drug-free America. This guidance is designed to assist in the swift and effective implemen tation of the President’s strategy within the Department of Defense.
The supply of illicit drugs to the United States from abroad, the associated violence and in ternational instability, and the use of illegal drugs within the country pose a direct threat to the
sovereignty and security of the country. The threat of illicit drugs strikes at the heart of the
Nation’s values. It inflicts increased crime and violence on our society and attacks the we llbeing and productivity of our citizenry. One of the principal foreign policy objectives of this
Administration is to reduce, and if possible to eliminate, the flow of illegal narcotic s ubstances
to the United States. Also, the Congress has by statute assigned to the Department the duty
to serve as the single lead agency of the Federal Government for the detection and monitori ng
of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs to the United States. For these reasons, the detection and countering of the production, trafficking and use of illegal drugs is a high p riority
national security mission of the Department of Defense.
The Nation ultimately will be rid of the scourge of illegal drugs only through the sustained application of the energy, courage and determination of the American people. As the Presid ent’s
Strategy reflects, the Nation must seek to eliminate both the demand and the supply for ille gal drugs, for the Nation will conquer neither if the other is left unchecked.
The Department of Defense, with the Department of State and U.S. Law enforcement agen cies, will help lead the attack on the supply of illegal drugs from abroad under the Presiden t’s
Strategy. The efforts of the Department of Defense will complement those of other U.S. agen cies and cooperating foreign countries. The Department of Defense will work to advance su bstantially the national objective of reducing the flow of illegal drugs into the United Sta tes
through the effective application of available resources consistent with our national val ues
and legal framework.
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An effective attack on the flow of illegal drugs depends upon action at every phase of the f low:
(1) in the countries that are the sources of the drugs, (2) in transit from the source countries to
the United States, and (3) in distribution in the United States. The United States Armed
Forces can assist in the attack on the supply of drugs in each of these phases.
I. THE ATTACK ON DRUGS AT THE SOURCE
The Department of Defense will assist in the attack on production of illegal drugs at the
source. The production of illegal drugs is a complex criminal enterprise. The criminal en terprise requires illicit labor, capital, entrepreneurship and a substantial infrastructu re to grow
the plants that are the raw materials for illegal drugs and to refine and manufacture the i llegal drugs. Reducing the availability of these elements of illegal drug production in the c ountries from which illegal drugs originate would reduce the flow of illegal drugs to the United
States.
The Department of Defense can assist in the three elements of an effective attack on the su pply of drugs in source countries: (1) assistance for nation-building, (2) operational suppor t to
host-country forces, and (3) cooperation with host-country forces to prevent drug exports.
Pursuant to the National Drug Control Strategy, near-term efforts will focus on the Andean
nations from which most cocaine entering the United States originates. A key requirement for
the success of U.S. efforts directed at the supply of illegal drugs, and in particular U.S. counternarcotics operations, will be the cooperation of the foreign countries involved.
As the National Drug Control Strategy indicates with respect to the Andean countries, a sus tained, multi-year effort to provide economic, security, and law enforcement assistance i s an
essential element for a successful fight against illegal drugs abroad. Drug-producing crimi nal
organizations control what amounts to private armies that challenge the law enforcement
and military forces of their countries. Often such organizations are intertwined with insu rgent forces that challenge directly the governments of their countries. The National Drug
Control Strategy calls for the United States to reinforce the abilities of the governments o f the
countries cooperating in the fight against illegal drugs to combat drug producing organi zations. Security assistance will help enable such a government to protect itself from crimi nal
drug enterprises and drug-related insurgencies, and to enforce its laws against drug produc ers and traffickers. Future economic assistance will help to strengthen the national econom y
and keep the labor, capital and entrepreneurship available in the country channeled towar d
useful production and away from drug production. Success in other efforts to attack the sup ply of illegal drugs depends in the long-run upon the establishment of healthy economies in
drug-producing countries and the restoration of governmental authority in those countries .
To assist in the implementation of this element of the National Drug Control Strategy, the
Department of Defense will execute security assistance programs in accordance with Presi dential instructions and applicable law, and in coordination with the Department of Sta te.
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Effective implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy requires that the Depart ment of Defense be prepared to provide counternarcotics operational support to the forces of
cooperating countries. The U.S. Armed forces can provide foreign forces substantial assis tance in training, reconnaissance, command and control, planning, logistics, medical sup port
and civic action in connection with foreign forces’ operations against the infrastructure of
drug-producing criminal enterprises. Such U.S. military support would be designed to in crease the effectiveness of foreign forces’ efforts to destroy drug processing laborator ies, disrupt drug-producing enterprises, and control the land, river, and air routes by which the
enterprises exfiltrate illegal drugs from the country.
In addition to assistance for nation-building and support for foreign forces’ strikes on dru gproducing enterprises, the U.S. can assist law enforcement agencies of cooperating fore ign
countries in combating the export of drugs from those countries. The Department of Defense
can assist with an improved intelligence collection effort, which will be essential not o nly to
assist the governments of the source countries, but also for U.S. actions in the second line of
defense—the attack on drugs in transit to the United States.
II. THE ATTACK ON DRUGS IN TRANSIT
The substantially increased effort to attack drugs at their source in the drug-producing coun tries as a first line of defense should help reduce over time the export of illegal drugs to t he
U.S. Nevertheless, drug-producing criminal enterprises in those countries currently are so
vast in scope that, even if U.S. efforts to attack drugs at the source are highly successful, t he
flow of drugs by sea, air, and land will continue. As the second line of defense against the flo w
of illegal drugs, the U.S. armed forces will implement the National Drug Control Strategy
through substantial efforts to counter the flow of illegal drugs in transit to the United St ates,
both outside the United States and at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry. The Depart ment’s service pursuant to statutory direction as the single lead agency of the Federal Gov ernment for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs to the
United States will prove particularly important to the success of this effort.
Deployment of appropriate elements of the U.S. armed forces with the primary mission to in terdict and deter the flow of drugs should over time help reduce the flow of illegal drugs int o
the U.S. At a minimum, deploying the armed forces with this mission should have the imme diate effect of substantially complicating the logistical difficulties of criminal dr ug traffickers
and increasing the costs and risks of their drug smuggling activities.
As a high priority, United States military counternarcotics deployments will emphasize c ombating the flow of drugs across the Caribbean Sea and across the southern border of the
United States. The Department of Defense will proceed with planning to deploy a substantial
Caribbean Counternarcotics Task Force, with appropriate air and maritime drug interdic tion
assets and aerial and maritime detection and monitoring assets, to combat the flow of ill egal
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drugs from Latin America through the Caribbean Sea. The Department also will proceed with
planning for other deployments of U.S. forces to complement the counternarcotics actions of
U.S. Law enforcement agencies and cooperating foreign governments.
Success of the attack on drugs in transit will require sustained deployment of appropriat ely
trained and equipped members of the U.S. armed forces and substantially improved coopera tion between the armed forces and U.S. Law enforcement agencies. The substantial increase
in military participation in the attack on drugs in transit is intended to be in addition to,
rather than in place of, Federal law enforcement agencies’ efforts.
The success of interdiction and deterrence efforts will depend greatly upon the ability of the
Department of Defense and law enforcement agencies to marshal effectively the myriad com mand, control, communications and intelligence resources they possess into an integrate d
counternarcotics network. The Department of Defense will serve as the single lead Federal
agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs an d
will be prepared, with the cooperation of U.S. Law enforcement agencies, to integrate exp editiously into an effective network the Federal command, control, communications, and tech nical intelligence assets that are dedicated to the mission of interdicting illegal drugs from
abroad. The Department of Defense will seek to develop and employ when appropriate the ca pability to exercise tactical control of Federal detection and monitoring assets acti vely dedicated to counternarcotics operations outside the United States and in border areas.
To ensure that action to implement the President’s National Drug Control Strategy begins
immediately, the Commanders-in-Chief of all unified and specified combatant commands wil l
be directed to elevate substantially the mission priority within their commands of actions to
fight illegal drugs.
III. THE ATTACK ON DRUGS IN THE UNITED STATES
After the first and second lines of defense — actions directed at illegal drugs in source co untries and in transit — the third line of defense against drugs will be in the United States itse lf.
The role of the armed forces in the third line of defense includes both actions to reduce the s upply of illegal drugs and actions to reduce the demand for those drugs.
Within the United States, to assist in reducing the supply of illegal drugs, the counternar cotics actions of the Department of Defense will emphasize support to Federal, State and loca l
law enforcement agencies, and the National Guard in State status. The Department of De fense will assist requesting law enforcement agencies and the National Guard with training,
reconnaissance, command and control, planning, and logistics for counternarcotics oper ations. In appropriate cases, armed forces personnel and equipment will be detailed directly to
law enforcement agencies to assist in the fight. The Department of Defense will ensure that
its administrative and command structures permit rapid and effective response to approp riC-5

ate requests for counternarcotics assistance from law enforcement agencies and the Natio nal
Guard. The Department will continue to assist the Governors of the several States in employ ing the National Guard in the fight against illegal drugs.
With respect to reduction of demand for drugs within the United States, the Department of
Defense bears an important responsibility to reduce the use of illegal drugs within the a rmed
forces and among its civilian personnel. The Department of Defense has met with substantia l
success in its demand reduction efforts with armed forces personnel through aggressive dru g
abuse education and drug-testing programs — an 82% reduction in drug abuse since 1980.
The Department will step up its efforts to combat illegal drug use by departmental person nel
and will make available to other large organizations its experience in reducing the deman d
for illegal drugs. The Department also will emphasize drug abuse awareness and prevention
programs in the Department’s school system, which educates over 190,000 of America’s chil dren.
The Department of Defense will be prepared to assist the Department of Justice with its re sponsibilities for incarceration and rehabilitation of drug criminals, through means suc h as
training Federal, State and local personnel in the conduct of rehabilitation-oriented train ing
camps for first-offense drug abusers and providing overflow facilities for incarceration of
those convicted of drug crimes.
The President’s National Drug Control Strategy emphasizes a multi-national and multiagency approach to reduction of the drug supply. The Department of Defense has a crucial
role in defending the United States from the scourge of illegal drugs. The Department will em ploy the resources at its command to accomplish that mission effectively. Should it prove ne cessary in implementing the President’s Strategy effectively, any needed additional statu tory
authority will be sought. The men and women of America’s armed forces will fight the produc tion, trafficking and use of illegal drugs, as an important part of the national effort to secure
for all Americans a drug-free America.
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
September 18, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDERS OF THE
UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMBATANT COMMANDS
SUBJECT: Elevation of the Mission Priority of Counternarcotics Operations
One of the principal foreign policy objectives of this Administration is to reduce, and i f possible to eliminate, the flow of illegal narcotic substances to the United States. The detectio n and
countering of the production, trafficking and use of illegal drugs is a high priority na tional security mission of the Department of Defense.
I direct you to elevate the priority of the counternarcotics mission within your command. Keep
me informed through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the progress of your com mand in carrying out this mission within your area of responsibility.

/s/ Dick Cheney
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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
27 Oct 1993
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY
DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION
DOD COORDINATOR FOR DRUG ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND SUPPORT
COMMANDERS OF THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR OF PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
COMPTROLLER, DOD
GENERAL COUNSEL, DOD
INSPECTOR GENERAL, DOD
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
SUBJECT: Department of Defense Guidance for Implementation of National Drug Control
Policy
The flow of cocaine and other illegal drugs into the U.S. continues to constitute a critica l national security threat. The violence accompanying the distribution and sale of these ill egal
drugs, and the societal toll that drug use imposes on our citizens, are national problems tha t
affect every American. Moreover, the endemic violence and corruption that the cocaine car tels bring are significant threats to the democracies of South America.
New National-level policy has keen promulgated to respond to this threat. The Interim Na tional Drug Control Strategy recently released by the Director of the Office of National Dr ug
Control Policy emphasizes the need for an integrated National drug control program, inclu ding both demand and supply reduction activities, while underscoring the crucial value of demand reduction efforts. The Interim Strategy presents an integrated anti-drug Internati onal
Leadership program that supports dismantling cartels, assisting key Source and Transit na tions, and the interdiction of the transport of drugs. The interdiction efforts are redir ected
from the Transit zone to the cocaine Source nations.
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In direct support cf these policy initiatives, the Department of Defense will continue to aggressively execute a comprehensive counterdrug program. The program will be refocused in
order to support the new National direction outlined above, and will be shaped by the findin gs
of the recently concluded internal Comprehensive Review of DoD counterdrug programs. The
new DoD counterdrug policy will enhance programs that support cocaine Source nation ac tivities, dismantling cartels, and demand reduction, and will address at a lesser priorit y the
heroin threat. Consistent with applicable laws, authorities, and regulations, DoD will als o
continue to support Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in their efforts to disrupt the transport of illegal drugs into the U.S., emphasizing critical border locations. As in
the past, DoD will not actively participate in the arrest of traffickers or the seizure of d rugs,
and DoD personnel will not accompany Host Nation forces on field operations.
The Department of Defense will, through the Office of the DoD Coordinator for Drug Enforce ment Policy and Support, in concert with the National Policy, implement the following coun terdrug program guidance:
1) Source Nation Support. The new National Strategy calls for increased support to
those nations that demonstrate the political will to combat narcotrafficking. Specifica lly, DoD
will focus its supporting efforts in Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia. Support will be aimed at
strengthening the democratic institutions in these nations, encouraging national resolv e and
regional cooperation, and further developing air sovereignty and “endgame” (effective arrest
and prosecution) capabilities. DoD will achieve these objectives by providing, to the ext ent
feasible and effective, training and operational support to Source nation police and mili tary
through deployments funded by security assistance or counterdrug funding—primarily by in creasing the utilization of authority under Section 1004 of the FY 1991 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) as amended and Sections 517 and 506(2)(A) of the Foreign Assis tance Act of 1961 as amended.
2) Dismantling the Cartels. DoD will enhance its support of the Drug Enforcement Ad ministration’s (DEA’s) Kingpin strategy and the Counterdrug Community’s Linear strategy
which are specifically designed to dismantle the cocaine cartels and the cocaine “business .”
DoD will enhance support to drug law enforcement agencies (DLEAs) through the use of Sec tion 1004 authority to provide linguist and intelligence analyst-support, and by expanding intelligence gathering and sharing programs.
3) Detection and Monitoring (D&M) of the Transport of Illegal Drugs. DoD will support
domestic law enforcement and host nation detection and monitoring efforts by: (a) empha sizing activities in the cocaine Source countries of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru; (b) streamli ning
activities in the Transit zone (the region between the Source countries and the U.S. border region)—Transit zone D&M efforts will be focused toward intelligence-cued operations that di rectly support the Linear strategy and Source country and Arrival zone operations; and (c)
refocusing activities in the U.S. to emphasize the cocaine threat at critical border loc ations.
4) Direct Support to DLEAs Domestically —Emphasizing the Southwest Border and
other High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas. DoD currently directly supports the DLEAs
through: (a) a Detailee program that provides intelligence analysts, linguists, and suppor t
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personnel; (b) a program implementing Section 1004 that provides transportation, mainte nance, equipment upgrade, etc.; (c) a program implementing Section 1208 of NDAA FY 1990
and 1991 as amended that provides excess DoD equipment to Federal, State and local
DLEAS; and (d) the Governors’ Plans for using the National Guard for counterdrug support to
Federal, State, and local DLEAs. DoD will develop comprehensive prioritization plans for requirements submitted under these programs, emphasizing the importance of efforts at the
Southwest Border and other High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas. Funding support for the
Section 1004 program will be increased, and DoD will continue to execute the Detailee and
Section 1208 programs at their basic FY 1993 funding and resource levels. In addition, DoD
will continue to support Federal counterdrug law enforcement agencies in addressing and
solving multi-agency counterdrug command, control, communications, and technical intel ligence problems.
5) Demand Reduction. All Military Department and Defense Agency drug testing pro grams will be continued, with an emphasis placed on cost effective, automated and consoli dated testing. Furthermore, the Military Departments and the National Guard will
implement expanded counterdrug community outreach programs that target at-risk youth.
Building on the current demand reduction outreach pilot programs, Active and Reserve
CONUS units will develop new programs that use military personnel as role models. Addi tionally, the DoD Coordinator will study the feasibility of increasing support, under S ection
1208, to institutional drug treatment programs at State and local levels.
Other Issues:
In order to enhance counterdrug operational response, the Chairman, Joint Staff will
review the current CD operational structure, evaluating the current designation of five supported counterdrug CINCs.
Additionally, CINCUSACOM and USCINCPAC will review counterdrug intelligence
centers and functions under their command in order to determine economies or consolida tions which will enhance counterdrug mission accomplishment.
The Military Departments will, under a 275 billet ceiling, plan to continue outyear bil let/personnel support for the counterdrug Detailee program that supports the DLEAS, and
for the Regional Logistical Support Offices that are key to the very effective Section 120 8 program.
/s/ William J. Perry
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000
17 APR 1995
MEMORANDUM TO SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
COMMANDERS OF THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS
SUBJECT: Counterdrug Operations and Programs
On October 27, 1993, I issued policy guidance for implementation of the President’s In terim National Drug Control Strategy. I stated that the flow of cocaine and other illegal dru gs
into the United States constitutes a critical national security threat, and that the Depart ment
would continue to execute a comprehensive counterdrug program. I want to reiterate this policy in support of the President’s 1995 National Drug Control Strategy, and clearly state my
support for an aggressive and results-oriented DoD counterdrug program.
The use of illegal drugs in the United States remains at crisis proportions, and the ris ing costs of associated violence, incarcerations, and care for drug users are causing per vasive
damage to our society. Alarmingly, the use of illegal drugs by young people in our nation i s on
the rise. We must continue to make a strong contribution to the President’s National program
if we are to succeed in mitigating this serious threat to our nation.
The President has released the 1995 National Drug Control Strategy. My implement ing guidance to the Department is clear. The Department of Defense will fully support the
President’ s Strategy through focused efforts which further enhance our five counterdrug
strategic elements; (l) source nation support, (2) dismantling the cartels, (3) detection and
monitoring, (4) support to domestic drug law enforcement agencies, and (5) demand reduc tion. The Department will make every effort to ensure that sufficient forces are allocated to
the counterdrug mission to make our support to domestic and foreign law enforcement agen cies more effective and productive.
The DoD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, with oversight from
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, is the single focal point for DoD’s counterdrug efforts and will ensure that the Department develops and implements a strong counterdrug
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program with direction, priorities, and measured results. To ensure that the Department i s
implementing a cohesive counterdrug program, the DoD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement
Policy and Support will chair quarterly meetings with counterdrug principal decision mak ers
from the Joint Staff, Services, Comptroller and General Counsel. While resolving issues is important, I want this group to also focus on developing and implementing new initiatives t hat
will ensure the success of the Department’s program. The DoD Drug Coordinator will forwar d
the results of these quarterly meetings to the Deputy Secretary, whom I have asked to give
special attention to the Department’s counterdrug program.
The Director, National Drug Control Policy has asked to review all drug-related pro posed legislation and testimony, regulations, press statements, and speeches before they a re
released. and to be informed of major changes to DoD’s implementation of the National Strat egy before they are implemented. I ask that you satisfy the Director’s request, but that all information provided to or contact with the Director, National Drug Control Policy be first
coordinated with the DoD Drug Coordinator.
To be successful, the nation must work together. For our part, the Department makes
an important and valuable contribution with the unique skills of its personnel, and the gre at
capability of its military systems and intelligence assets. Please tell your personnel t hat the
fight against illegal drug use continues to be a high priority mission of the Department o f Defense. Likewise, I ask that you ensure they are recognized for their important contributio ns.
/s/ William J. Perry
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APPENDIX D
DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
MILITARY ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ADNET - Anti-Drug Network
AG - Adjutant General (also TAG, The Adjutant General)
AID - Agency for International Development
ANG - Air National Guard
AOR - Area of Responsibility
ARNG - Army National Guard
ARSTAF - Headquarters, Department of the Army Staff
ATF - Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (also BATF)
AUSA - Assistant U.S. Attorney
AWACS - E3C Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System
BATF - Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
BAY WATCH - Intelligence supported operations to counter movement of illicit drugs
through Central America and Mexico to the U.S.
BIA - Bureau of Indian Affairs
BIC - Border Interdiction Committee
BLM - Bureau of Land Management
BLM - Bureau of Land Management
BOP - Bureau of Prisons
C3I - Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence
CARIB NET - Intelligence supported operations to counter movement of illicit drugs through
the Caribbean
CDSO - Counterdrug Support Office (of the Defense Logistics Agency)
CHARLIE T - Intelligence collection focused on drug traffic through the Pacific by air and sea
CIA - Central Intelligence Agency
CINC - Command-in-Chief (of a U.S. Unified or Specified Command)
CINCLANTFLT DETSO - Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet Detachment South
CINCUSACOM - Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command
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CINCUSSOUTHCOM - Commander-in-Chief U.S. Southern Command
CMC - Customs Management Center
CMIR - Currency Monetary Instrument Report (a U.S. Treasury Form 4790 by which cash en tering the U.S. is declared to Customs)
CN - Counternarcotics
CNA - Coordinator for Narcotics Affairs (usually the Deputy Chief of Mission)
CNAC - Customs National Aviation Center
CND - Joint Staff Counternarcotics Division
CNOD - Counternarcotics Operation Division, J3, The Joint Staff
CONUS - Continental United States
CONVOY - Intelligence supported operations to counter movement of illicit drugs and cur rency on the U.S. interstate highway system
CSGN - Coordinating Subgroup Narcotics of the NSC
CT- Counterterrorism
CTR - Currency Transaction Report (a U.S. Treasury Form 4789 by which U.S. banks report
deposits over $10,000)
D&M - Detection and Monitoring
DAICC-Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center (U.S. Customs)
DAWN - Drug Abuse Warning Network
DEA - Drug Enforcement Administration
DEP&S - Office of DoD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support
DIA - Defense Intelligence Agency
DLA - Defense Logistics Agency
DLEA - Drug Law Enforcement Agency
DoD - Department of Defense
DOI - Department of Interior
DOJ - Department of Justice
DOS - Department of State
DROP-IN - Intelligence and operations directed against general aviation aircraft at remo te
locations within the U.S. and parts of the Caribbean
EDIC - Embassy Drug Intelligence Center at U.S. Embassy Bolivia
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EPIC - El Paso Intelligence Center
FAA - Federal Aviation Administration
FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDIN - Federal Drug Identification Number
FinCEN - Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
GOLDEN CARRIER - Intelligence supported operations to counter movement of illicit drugs
from Asian source countries to the U.S.
GPRA - Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
GPS - Global Positioning System
GSR - Ground Surveillance Radar
HIDTA - High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
IAC - Information Analysis Center in U.S. Embassy, Mexico City
INL - Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of the Under Secre tary for Global Affairs, U.S. State Department
INM - International Narcotics Matters
INS - Immigration and Naturalization Service
INSINC - INS Integrated Network Communications System
INTERPOL - International Organization of Police Forces
IOA - Interagency Operating Area
IPB - Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
IRS - Internal Revenue Service
IWG - Interagency Working Group
JCG - Joint Command Group
JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff
JETWAY - Intelligence supported operations to counter movement of illicit drugs via com mercial aircraft within the U.S.
JIATF- Joint Interagency Task Force
JICC - Joint Information Coordination Center
JOA - Joint Operations Area
JSCP - Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JTF - Joint Task Force
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JUST - Justice Department Telecommunications System
Laser Strike - U.S. Southern Command supported, U.S. and host nation interagency interdic tion effort to counter drug trafficking in Andean Ridge countries
LECC - Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee
LEDET - Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment
LEIS II - Coast Guard Law Enforcement Information System
LNO - Liaison Officer
MAAG - Military Assistance and Advisory Group
MARFORLANT LN ELM - Marine Forces Atlantic Liaison Element
MEDEVAC - Medical Evacuation
MET - DEA Mobile Enforcement Team
MILGROUP - Military Group
MTT - Mobile Training Team
NADDIS - DEA Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information System
NAS - Narcotics Affairs Section of the Country Team
NCIC - National Criminal Information Center
NDIC - National Drug Intelligence Center
NG - National Guard
NGB - National Guard Bureau
NICC - National Intelligence Consumers Committee
NICI - National Interagency Counterdrug Institute
NIIS - INS Non-immigrant Information System
NISU - INS Nationality Identification Search Unit
NLETS - National Law Enforcement Teletype System
NNBIS - National Narcotics Border Interdiction System
NNICC - National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee
NORAD - North American Aerospace Defense Command
NPS - National Park Service
NSC - National Security Council
NSDD - National Security Decision Directive (of the President of the U.S.)
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NVG - Night Vision Goggles
OAJCG - Operation Alliance Joint Command Group
OASIS - Operation Activities Special Information System (Immigration and Naturaliza tion
Service’s file on aliens, drug smugglers and fraudulent documents)
OCDETF - Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force
OCONUS - Outside the Continental United States (overseas)
OMB - Office of Management and Budget
ONDCP - Office of National Drug Control Policy
OPALL - Operation Alliance
OPBAT - Operation Bahamas, Caicos, and Turks Islands
OPCON - Operational Control
OPORD - Operation Order
PAT - U.S. Southern Command Planning Assistance Team
PCC - Policy Coordinating Committee of the NSC
PDD - Presidential Decision Directive
PIPELINE - Intelligence supported operations to counter movement of illicit drugs via the
U.S. highways by private auto
PNS - Project North Star
POI - Program of Instruction
POM - Program Objective Memorandum
RDD - Required Delivery date
RECON - Reconnaissance
RLSO - Regional Logistics Support Office
RMIN - Rockey Mountain Information Network
ROE - Rules of Engagement
RSU - Rapid Support Unit
SAC - Special Agent-in-Charge
SAO - Security Assistance Office
SEALS - Sea Air Land Navy Special Operations (Team)
SENTRY - Federal Bureau of Prisons Database
SFOD-A - Special Forces Operational Detachment, Alpha
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SKYWEB - DEA and Colombian National Police operation to interdict drug aircraft
SMURF - To make a number of deposits under $10,000 into a bank to avoid CTR require ments of Department of Treasury
SOCOM - Special Operations Command
SOCSOUTH - Special Operations Command South (a Subordinate Unified Command of US SOUTHCOM)
SWB - Southwest Border
TACON - Tactical Control
TACSAT - Tactical Satellite
TAG - The Adjutant General
TAT - U.S. Southern Command Tactical Analysis Team
TECS II - Treasury Enforcement Communications System Data Base
TIC - The Interdiction Committee of ONDCP
Title 10 Forces - Forces Under Federal Control
Title 32 Forces - Forces Under National Guard (State) Control
TRADOC - U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
TRANSCOM - U.S. Transportation Command
USACOM - U.S. Atlantic Command
USAID - U.S. Agency for International Development
USAO - U.S. Attorney’s Office
USARPAC- U.S. Army, Pacific
USARSO - U.S. Army, South
USBP - U.S. Border Patrol
USCG - U.S. Coast Guard
USCS - U.S. Customs Service
USDA - U.S. Department of Agriculture
USFORSCOM - U.S. Forces Command
USG - U.S. Government
USIC - U.S. Interdiction Coordinator
USIS - U.S. Information Service
USMS - U.S. Marshals Service
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USPACOM - U.S. Pacific Command
USSOUTHAF FWD - U.S. Air Force South, Forward
USSOUTHCOM - U.S. Southern Command
USSS - U.S. Secret Service
WINTERNIGHT - Intelligence supported operations to counter the smuggling of narcotics
into the U.S. via commercial air, maritime and overland cargo
WSIN - Western States Information Network (state and local DLEA network for criminal
case information)
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